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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the media coverage of anthropogenic climate change in
the Russian Federation. It achieves this aim by testing Edward S. Herman and
Noam Chomsky's Propaganda Model (1988) which argues that media coverage
predominately stays within the boundaries defmed by the 'elite's' interests.
Through media analysis as well as elite interviews, this project has found that
in the Russian case, regardless of the newspapers' ownership structure or
dependence on advertising, there is little difference in quantity and quality of
overall coverage on climate change. Most newspapers rely on Russian officials
as information sources, almost none criticize or question Russian climate
change policy and Russia's contribution to global levels of greenhouse gas
emissions. This subordinate media policy is not the result of any purposeful
and overt state censorship or management of media activity on the issue of
climate change, but the product of the media's 'genuine' interest in the state
elites as the 'main newsmakers' on the problem and a 'genuine' public lack of
interest in climate change as an issue. Furthermore, the study concludes that in
the Russian case the omission of climate change issues from media discussions
is a greater problem than biased coverage as it prevents the issue from entering
public debates. However, considering media interest in the state and the recent
change in state climate policy (by becoming more tolerant towards climate
change mitigation measures) it is argued that coverage of climate change in
Russia will steadily increase and in this case, media 'consent' with the elites'
interests will eventually benefit the development of public and official
discourse on the problem.
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NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION
In this thesis, I use a Library of Congress transliteration system for the Russian
language. Well-known names appear in their most common jransliterated form
(for example, Bedritsky instead of Bedritskiy).
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INTRODUCTION
'Change will come about only if people understand the scientific realities
of why we need to fight climate change. If you don't get that message clearly,
then obviously you are not going to see any changes whatsoever' - P. K.
Pachauri, Chairman, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
(UNESCO 2009).
'An increase of two or three degrees wouldn't be so bad for a northern
country like Russia. We could spend less onfur coats, and the grain harvest
would go up' - v.V.Putin, International Conference on Climate Change,
Moscow, 2003 (Pearce 2003)
More than 20 years ago two prominent scholars, Edward Herman and Noam
Chomsky (1994 [1988]), made a 'splash' among the academic community
when they claimed that American mass media do not act as a 'watchdog' for
the liberal ideas which the United States is supposed to be based on. Instead
they claimed that mass media was just a 'tool' in the hands of economic and
political elites. Whilst in its communist adversaries (such as the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) or the People's Republic of China (PRC»
mass media were straightforwardly governed by the leading party through
officially accepted censorship and institutionalised control, in the liberal
democracy of the United States, as Chomsky (l989b: 19) said, 'more subtle'
means were required to control and influence mass media. It is not very easy to
find a Western journalist who would admit that he/she has experienced open
censorship by the ruling elites or that words are put into his/her mouth. Indeed
this is not what Herman and Chomsky stated in their work. On the contrary,
they argued that the political economy of mass media is such that it becomes
quite natural for the reporters to cover a news story in one way or another.
Herman and Chomsky explained their vision of how mass media operates by
introducing ·the Propaganda Model (PrM) which suggests that before
information reaches the pages of newspapers or is broadcast on the Television
it goes through five filters, or barriers, (ownership structure, advertising,
information sources, flak and anti-communist ideology), each of which
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modifies the media message which eventually takes its final form in agreement
with the elites' interests.
By questioning the whole system of media production, Herman and
Chomsky's model was brought into question and criticized by various scholars.
One of the most frequent criticisms concerns the PrM's applicability. Herman
and Chomsky successfully applied their model in 1988 to American media
coverage of predominately foreign news, and very specific foreign news such
as elections in El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua, the Indochina wars
(Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia) and the murders of religious victims in Poland
and Latin America. But will the model work just as well in 201Os?Will it work
outside of the United States? Will it help us to understand the peculiarities of
media coverage of different kinds of news?
In this research I apply the PrM to the modem mass media coverage of
climate change in Russia. Overall, the application of the PrM to the Russian
case shows the high level of influence that the Russian state and some
corporate entities (that are closely linked to the state) have in each 'filter'
suggested by the model. The state and state-related industries are significantly
present in the ownership structures of the main media organs, they dominate
the advertising market, and produce 'flak' or actually censor the media in one
way or another. Furthermore, being an 'illiberal democracy' the dominant
ideology of Russia also restricts media activity.
Indeed, in the case of media coverage of climate change issues in Russia,
media policy is determined by the state's climate policy, or using the PrM's
terms, the 'manufactured consent' in the Russian mass media on the issue of
climate change is a result of media adjustment to the state elites' intere~ts.
However, the study also shows the limitations of the model and the relative
insignificance of certain filters in this particular case of climate coverage. For
instance, the media coverage does not drastically change between media outlets
depending on their ownership structures or advertising policies. Journalists do
not face censorship or 'orders' from the top on how to write and/or how not to
write about the climate, whilst Russia's political regime can be described as a
'democracy' with a free market economy. At the same time, analysis of the
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PrM filter 'sources of information' demonstrates that with most newspapers
relying for information on Russian officials, almost none criticize or question
Russian climate policy and its contribution to the world's level of greenhouse
gas (GHG) emissions. We can witness how the coverage on climate change
'naturally' follows the position of the 'main newsmakers' in the country. This
observation of the state's influence over media attention towards the climate
change issue also helps us to understand the relative omission of the topic from
Russian public discourse which correlates with the low priority of the climate
change issues on the state policy agenda.
Originality
This research project is unique in its revision and use of a theoretical approach
of the PrM and its practical implementation. By applying the PrM filters to the
case study of the media coverage of climate change in Russia, it provides
testimony for the applicability of the PrM in post-Communist space. It also
examines the ways in which the most dangerous and ambiguous environmental
risk of our time (climate change) is communicated in one of the world's
leading polluters (Russia).
Russia provides an interesting example for testing the PrM's applicability.
The Russian mass media system went through 70 years of state control and
some argue that this Soviet legacy can still be observed (Oates 2007). Then
after the collapse of the Soviet Union mass media gained significant freedom
and power that to some extent they influenced the political events of the
turbulent post-perestroika years (Zassoursky 2(04). Eventually, with the
introduction of new political and economic regimes, Russian mass media had
to adjust to the realities of the free market economy which their Western
colleagues had been dealing with for many decades. The introduction of the
free market was not the last modification Russian mass media have had to deal
with. When Vladimir Putin came to power in 2000 and started to implement his
policy of strengthening and centralising state power, media once again had to
adjust accordingly. As a result the Russian mass media system became a
unique hybrid of the 'fourth estate' (the fourth branch of power next to the
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judiciary, the executive and the legislature) 1 which tries to manage its way
through the free market economy; and at the same time has to cope with the
restraints imposed by the state. It can be argued that unlike the original
research on the American mass media conducted by Herman and Chomsky, in
Russia, 'elites' (whose interests influence the media) are defined predominately
in political terms (whilst Herman and Chomsky suggested that powerful elites
could be represented by business groups as well as the state), which suggests
state supremacy in the Russian mass media production process.
Another valuable contribution of this research comes from the
significance of Russia in the world's climate change policy. Russia is one of
the world's largest producers of GHG (Doyle 2009), mainly from extracting
and burning fossil fuels. 'Russia holds the world's largest natural gas reserves,
the second largest coal reserves, and the ninth largest crude oil reserves' (EIA
2012) which playa key role in the state's economy. For example, oil and gas
exports together are responsible for around 15 percent of overall Russian GDP
(Tekin and Williams 2009: 340). Furthermore, due to the vast territory, severe
weather conditions and carbon intensive nature of the economy, Russia heavily
relies on fossil fuels for domestic consumption (Perelet et al. 2007). The
priority of economic development in Russia for the decades moved
environmental issues to the background of political discourse and made it very
unlikely that Russia will purposefully commit to a reduction of its economic
carbon dependency in order to 'save the world' from climate change (which is
still relevant). On the other hand, after the split of the USSR, Russia
experienced an involuntary drop in GHG emissions. So in comparison to the
late 1980s when Soviet industrial production was high, in the early 1990s due
to economic collapse Russia's GHG emissions were cut tremendously.
Eventually this fact gave Russia significant bargaining power during the major
international negotiations on climate change which, arguably, Russia has used
1 According to Louw (2010: 31) 'the notion of the Fourth Estate media'
originates in Locken's 'free-flow of information principle' (which he discussed
in Second Treatise of Government (1966». From this point of view, media
become an essential element of liberal democracy which allows the public to
control the other branches of power and expose them if they deviate from the
principles of the democratic state.
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and abused to the extent that it was even accused of 'environmental blackmail'
(Henry and Douhovnikoff 2008: 451).
Recently, the situation has started to change and climate change is more
often perceived as a policy of 'opportunities' rather than a policy of 'costs'.
The evolution of the perception of climate change risks can be seen through the
words of the country's leaders in different decades, from Putin' s famous
remark about less money spent on fur coats (Muenchmeyer 2(08) to
Medvedev's recognition of climate change's anthropogenic character and its
threat to Russia's security (President of Russia website 201Oc). More often
experts and state leaders started to talk about Russia's vulnerability to climate
change consequences rather than its questionable benefits, by bringing
attention to the fact that climate change is happening faster in Russia (Charap
2010) and provoked weather abnormality that causes severe economic losses.
Furthermore, former President Medvedev's statement at the Copenhagen
Conference in December 2009, accepting the .Climate Doctrine, the
appointment of a President's advisor on climate change, as well as the
realisation of Russia's great potential for the de-carbonisation of its economy
through the development and implementation of steps for energy efficiency
(which becomes profitable for the country) - arguably all can serve as evidence
of alterations in the state's rhetoric on climate change and policy re-orientation
towards 'climate pragmatism'.
If the assumption that the PrM is applicable to the Russian case and if the
assumption that the Russian state dominates media coverage of climate change
are correct then this change in state climate policy will be mirrored in media
coverage.
Overall, this study investigates a number of equally important issues:
• Firstly, it contributes to the existing theoretical studies of the political
economy of mass media by deepening the understanding and applicability of
the PrM and testing why theoretical approaches which consider other factors of
media production (such as journalist professional norms, the characteristics of
the described events or the interests of the audience) are less relevant.
14
• Secondly, it looks closely at the Russian media system and how the
years of regime change have influenced it and how it has adapted to the free
market economy.
• Thirdly, this project explores how climate change is communicated in
Russia and what factors or actors are involved in this process. It should be
noted that this study contributes to a rapidly growing body of literature on
media communication of environmental risks by adding an analysis of a state
which to date has mostly been overlooked. Apart from a limited number of
studies (Tynkkynen 2010, Wilson Rowe 2009, Yagodin 2010), Russia is rarely
mentioned in this regard.
• Fourthly, in order to test the assumption of the influence of state policy,
. this project explores Russia's state policy on climate change (which can be
seen as extremely questionable and ambiguous, but also vital to the world's
climate change mitigation strategy).
• Finally, getting all of these jigsaw pieces together, this research project
answers the following questions: if state policy is indeed an independent
variable in the media coverage of climate change in Russia, then what can we
expect from Russia in terms of communicating one of the most important
environmental issues - climate change. Carvalho (2008: 164) claims that
'understanding the evolution of matters such as war, terrorism or climate
change, and the ways they are interdependent in relation to the media, is one of
the most important contributions to be made by social researchers' . I argue that
in the Russian case it is so important because media coverage does not only
demonstrate what the audience learns about climate change but also how the
state approaches the problem. As Russia plays a great role in the climate
change mitigation process, and due to its natural resources, has a large capacity
to influence climate change in one way or another, to study the media discourse
on climate change in Russia is in itself a great step in the development of this
area of study.
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Methods
The methods used in this research project for data collection and analysis can
be broadly divided into two categories: media analysis and elite interviews.
Media analysis
A detailed explanation of the media analysis methods are presented in chapter
five, however, some key points are outlined here. Corresponding to Herman
and Chomsky's original study, this project uses both qualitative and
quantitative methods of media text analysis. Herman and Chomsky originally
looked at coverage of their case studies by what they call 'elite media organs'
such as the New York Times or Time. The time frame for their analysis varied
from two months to a year and a half depending on the case study, as well as
the selection of media organs. Concluding from the way Herman and Chomsky
presented and explained their results, it is suggested here that the use of content
and discourse analysis will allow us to follow the PrM's methodological logic.
For example, the quantification of the data by the means of content analysis
recreates a table close to the one used by Herman and Chomsky, whilst
discourse analysis allows us to look at media information within the historical,
political or economic contexts and critically assess the factors (or 'filters')
influencing the coverage. The 'elitism' of the chosen media outlets was defined
through the following categories: territory covered (the whole country rather
than one region); circulation; popularity amongst readers (based on opinion
polls data); political orientation and their influence on and representation of the
opinion makers.
An important aspect of this research is that the 'green' media were
purposely excluded from the investigation. Neither during the media analysis
nor during the fieldwork were media specialising solely in environmental
issues approached. The rationale behind this decision comes not from
undermining the role and values of these types of media, but from the
understanding that they by definition dedicate their time and efforts to raising
awareness about problems such as climate change, hence, their coverage will
not be altered as much by state policy or any other external factors. At the same
time, the 'green' media have quite specialised (often narrow) target audiences-
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people who are already concerned with environmental problems and the future
of our planet. Whilst in the non-specialised popular media, the climate change
topic has to compete with many others starting with economic news and ending
with celebrity gossip, so the way journalists and editors prioritise the news and
how they approach the problem provides rich material for analysis.
Elite interviews
The elite interviews became a substantial part of this research project. Overall,
30 interviews with journalists working in different types of media organs
(newspapers, TV, radio and news agency) we conducted, including:
representatives of environmental NGOs (Russian headquarters of the major
international environmental groups Greenpeace, WWF, Oxfam as well as
NGOs working closely with government such as the 'Centre for Environmental
Policy and Justice); with policy makers involved in environmental control and
climatologists who contribute to the development of Russian science on the
subject matter, but also provide consulting service to state officials. Half of the
interviews were conducted in Moscow due to the significant political and
economic influence of the Russian capital. However, considering Russia's vast
geography and the substantial differences between the European part of the
country and its more remote provincial regions, in addition to Moscow and St.
Petersburg, interviews were also conducted with experts based in Barnaul,
Novosibirsk, Krasnoyarsk, Petrozavodsk, and Kemerovo. The interviews were
carried out in person during fieldwork trips to Russia in July-August 2011, as
well as by telephone, Skype, and emails throughout 2011-2012. The average
length of the interviews was one hour (for a more detailed reflection on the
purpose of the interviews and challenges encountered during the process see
chapter three).
Additionally, official documents, such as Russian federal and regional
laws, presidential decrees, the state's doctrines, reports prepared by various
state agencies and so on, became important sources of data for this research.
Furthermore, chapters four and six rely on the content analysis of official
presidential speeches made publicly available on the Russian President's
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website (the data collection and analysis processes are also explained in the
respective chapters).
Research focus and terminology
Conducting research on any dimension of climate change issues tends to
suggest a clear understanding of the problem itself. Being a social scientist
rather than a natural scientist implies that the researcher has to accept the
science of the problem for granted and rely on secondary data provided by the
international community of climatologists. A brief overview of how this
scientific problem is understood in this research project is presented below.
The Earth's climate is regulated through a balance of energy received
from the Sun and energy emitted back to space. Atmospheric gases and clouds
are responsible for trapping the energy which is reflected of the Earth's surface,
leading to the 'greenhouse effect' (The Royal Society 2010). The research
shows that the largest contributors to the 'greenhouse effect' are water vapour
and carbon dioxide (C02)' Climate change, provoked by the modifications in
this balance, is the manifestation of the planetary system trying to 'adjust' and
regulate the Earth's temperature. According to a Royal Society report (ibid),
changes in climate are evident throughout Earth's history due to various natural
phenomena. The impact of human activity on these changes is, however, quite
a recent cause of climate change that has upset the Earth's ability to naturally
regulate the climate system.
This research project is concerned with the media coverage of
anthropogenic climate change. The international scientific community has
reached a consensus that anthropogenic emissions of GHGs from burning of
fossil fuels, deforestation, and industrial and agricultural activities, are largely
responsible for the increase in the average temperature of the Earth by 0.6°C
over the past century. Unlike natural phenomena such as volcanic eruptions or
sustained variations in the energy emitted by the Sun (the Royal Society 2010),
anthropogenic climate change can be mitigated by people through the cuts in
GHG emissions. Considering the world's dependence on fossil fuel energy and
the global nature of climate change consequences this process involves a clash
18
of interests where states are supposed to become the main actors or negotiators
in the climate change mitigation process.
Another clarification which needs to be addressed with regards to the
case study of this research is the confusion between the terms 'climate change'
and 'global warming'. Most of the time in mass media these terms are used
interchangeably as synonyms. Strictly speaking 'global warming' refers to the
overall trend of rising temperatures, whilst 'climate change' is a more general
term that includes an increased frequency of extremely cold or hot seasons,
increases or decreases in the amounts of precipitation, increases in anomalous
weather events (hurricanes, droughts, snow storms and so on). Even though
these climatic changes still happen within the context of the overall rise in
temperature, in terms of media coverage, the use of this term signals certain
trends in understanding the problem. Carvalho (2006 see in Good 2(08) states
that until the end of the 1980s the term 'greenhouse effect' prevailed in the
public discourse, but by the early 1990s it was replaced by 'global warming',
Good (2008) points out that now the dominance of the term 'climate change'
can be seen even through the name of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) rather than the Intergovernmental Panel on Global Warming
(see more on this issue in Linder 2006, Schuldt et al. 2011, Whitmarsh 2009).
Russian climatologist Nataliya Kharlamova (presentation, Chemal,2 13 August
2011), pointed out that just five to seven years ago people were talking about
'global warming', however, when Russia recently experienced severely cold
winters, the term 'global warming' was ridiculed and the temporary drop in
temperature was used as evidence of its falsehood. Then, according to
Kharlamova (ibid), for scientists it was a reason to start promoting the term
'climate change' which would cover a broader range of natural abnormalities.
In this research project, during the data collection process both terms were used
(climate change and global warming (,izmenenie klimata', 'global'noe
poteplenie') due to the scarcity of information on the topic, this approach
aimed to broaden the results of the scientific inquiry.
2Referencing of personal communication includes geographical location of
where the communication took place rather than where the interviewees are
based.
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Chapter plan
The outlined problems addressed by the research are depicted in the following
chapters:
1. Mass media and climate change: its role, challenges and
trends - this chapter reviews existing studies on media and climate change. It
considers the major agreements and disagreements within the research
community, looks at the popular approaches to the subject and the main
challenges faced. The chapter also explores the dilemma of the studies of
media reporting on climate change which from one side involves complex
scientific communication, from another side, considering the impact and
complexity of climate change, involves analysis of various factors influencing
this coverage. Even though the literature review demonstrates that the
considerations of micro-processes (for example, widely discussed journalistic
norms and practices) was studied in greater detail, recently, scholars more
often tum their attention to the macro-factors influencing media coverage of
climate change (such as politics and economy). Furthermore, several
researchers refer to the studies of the political economy of mass media and in
some cases even specifically to the approach suggested by Herman and
Chomsky.
2. Manufacturing the Propaganda Model: theoretical
implications and critique - this chapter defines the main theoretical approach
to the research project - the PrM created by Herman and Chomsky in 1988 and
explores why for many years its assumptions about political and economic
elites' domination over the US media coverage was criticised and marginalised
amongst social scientists. This chapter questions the geographical applicability
of the PrM and whether after 20 years it remains relevant in the Post Cold War
world order as well as in the world of 'new' media. It also looks specifically at
each of the PrM filters: the media ownership structure, advertising, information
sources, flak and anti-communist ideology, and examines how, over the years,
each of them was contested or updated by a number of scholars who have tried
to utilise the PrM in their research. More importantly, the chapter demonstrates
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how the model contributes to existing studies of media and climate change and
why this approach might be useful in the Russian context
3. The political economy of Russian mass media: state and
market - this chapter presents an analysis of media in Russia and explores the
major modifications they went through during the years of Yeltsin, Putin and
Medvedev, but also it has some reference to the Soviet media system and its
legacy. Importantly, the chapter looks at the Russian media system through the
perspective of the PrM. It analyses how each filter of the PrM applies in the
Russian context. The analysis conducted shows that it can be argued that
overall the PrM is applicable to the Russian case with some slight
modifications and with the consideration that some filters in the Russian case
are more, or less, influential than they were in the US case. On the other hand,
it is not entirely clear how this works for climate change coverage, and to what
degree the factors neglected by the PrM play a role in the media reporting of
environmental issues.
4. Russian climate change policy: towards 'climate
pragmatism' - this chapter offers a study of Russia's climate change policy.
Through detailed analysis of various actors and factors involved in policy
making, it analyses why, with regards to climate change, Russia can be
considered both a 'de-environmentalist' and an 'environmental leader' . Further
on the chapter looks at the development of Russian climate policy (towards
becoming more concerned with the problem) which coincided with
Medvedev's presidency. Content analysis 'of his official speeches shows that
Russia's leaders now see it as being in the best interest of the state and leading
economic actors to pursue more climate-oriented policies. Indeed, we can
already observe this move toward the policy of 'climate pragmatism', where
carbon emissions are cut through the modernisation of the economy and
improvement in energy efficiency.
5. . Russian Newspapers and Climate Change - this chapter
offers an analysis of Russian press coverage of climate change. The data are
collected from five national newspapers: Izvestiya (right-wing newspaper),
Kommersant (liberal), Rossiyskaya gazeta (state-owned), Komsomol'skaya
pravda (tabloid) and Sovetskaya Rossiya (communist). The aim of this chapter
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is to study the dynamics of media coverage by looking at how the amount and
the character of climate change news has changed over time depending on
certain conditions (modifications in state policy, global conferences on climate
change, acceptance of international documents and so on). Coverage in the
newspapers mentioned above will be studied by focusing on three events: the
Kyoto Conference, the Copenhagen Conference (plus acceptance of the
Climate Doctrine) and the heat-wave of 20lO in Russia. Since state policy was
significantly modified between the Kyoto and Copenhagen Conferences, the
analysis in this chapter enables us to see a correlation between this change and
media policy, whilst the heat-wave shows that other factors, such as natural
disasters, have less influence over coverage than does state policy.
6. Mediating climate change in Russia: passing through the
barriers - this chapter draws together the theoretical framework of this
research project and the empirical findings of the study. It explores the key role
of the state and economic elites in determining climate change coverage in
Russia, and discusses the lesser, but still important, role of micro-factors (such
as the specifications of the topic, the influence of journalistic professional
norms, and the role of experts). Furthermore, this chapter highlights the fact
that the research findings show not only a biased media policy towards the
problem, but also (at times) the omission of the issue from the media discourse.
This has been demonstrated through a comparison of the number of articles
devoted to climate change in various countries and Russia as well as through
the statements of the people interviewed for this research project. This finding
has led to the discussion of Lukes' 'third dimension of power' which in
agreement with the logic of the PrM states that the elites' power is also
demonstrated through the involuntary withdrawal of issues from public debate.
The chapter finishes with a discussion of how media coverage of climate
change in Russia can be improved.
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CHAFfER 1'- MASS MEDIAAND CLIMATE CHANGE: ITS ROLE,
CHALLENGES AND TREND
A recent rapid increase in studies of media coverage of climate change can be
observed throughout the world. While ten years ago there was a limited
number of research projects conducted in Europe and the USA (e.g., Dirikx
and Gelders 2009; Gavin 2009a;.Hulme 2009; Lockwood 2009), now studies
are carried out allover' the world, including in the largest economies and
polluters such as China and India (Shanahan 2009; Wu 2009; Xu 2010) as well
as in the most vulnerable countries already facing the consequences of the
changing climate such as Bangladesh or Pakistan (Ali 2010; Rhaman 2010;
Shanahan 2009). Moreover, scholars have moved forward and proposed
conducting comparative studies within the same country (Liu et aL 2008).
The importance of the media in communicating environmental risks has
been stressed by Ulrich Beck (1994: 23) in his influential monograph on risk
society in which he states: '[risks'] can be changed, magnified, dramatized or
minimized within knowledge, and to that extent they are particularly open to
social definition and construction. Hence the mass media and the scientific and
legal professions in charge of defining risks become key social and political
positions.' Beck (1994: 197) stresses that 'expensive and extensive scientific
investigations are often not really noticed in the agency that ordered them until
television or a mass-circulation newspaper reports about them.' The high level
of interest in the topic of media coverage of climate change can be explained
by the crucial role the media play in translating the abstract threats of climate
change reported by science into the language of the general public (Antilla
2005; Boykoff and Boykoff 2007; Carvalho 2007; Carvalho and Burgess 2005),
in forming people's opinions (Lewis and Boyce 2009), in shaping perceptions
and reactions to the danger posed by climate change (Boykoff 2012; Lockwood
2009); in serving as middlemen between the people, science, business and
policy makers (Butler and Pidgeon 2009) and in prescribing responsibility for
3By 'risks' Beck (1994: 22) understands 'all radioactivity, which completely
evades human perceptive abilities, but also toxins and pollutants in the air, the
water and foodstuffs, together with the accompanying short- and long-term
effects on plants, animals and people.'
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the 'creation and resolution of problems' (Olausson 2009). The analysis of
media coverage of the 'risks' associated with climate change helps us to
understand why some narratives become salient and some remain so (Boykoff
2008a) and what factors or actors shape the created discourse.
In some regimes the media have the potential to bring about change in
how the governments and populations perceive and deal with climate change
mitigation and adaptation policies (Boykoff 2008a). However, as has been
demonstrated (Antilla 2005; Boykoff and Boykoff 2004; Carvalho 2(07) quite
often mass media do not fulfil these beneficial functions but on the contrary
create barriers or obstacles by distorting the information or approaching the
topic from a questionable angle or by simply ignoring or undermining
discussion of the climate change problem. This chapter critically assesses
existing studies on media coverage of climate change, and is divided into three
sections: first, the spec~fication of the climate change topic; second, how
journalists' professional values shape coverage; and finally, the role played by
politics in climate change coverage.
Climate change as a topic
Climate change is indeed one of the biggest challenges of our time and the
media are capable of playing a crucial role in popularising the danger of
climate change among the wider public. Before we embark on analysis of how
the.media deal with this task and what social, economic or political barriers
they encounter, it is crucial to realise that climate change is an unusual topic
and on its own it has the potential to become a barrier for the journalists. As
with other environmental topics, climate change is an 'unobtrusive issue' (the
term introduced by Atwater et al. 1985 cited in Shanahan and Good 2(00).
Whilst 'obtrusive issues' such as economic recessions are clearly evident for
people and directly affect their lives, climate change is not that apparent and
straightforward and demands that journalists do 'an extremely difficult job'
connecting 'global warming, weather extremes, flooding and human activity'
(Gavin et al. 2011: 433). In this regard, it is useful to refer to Schumpeter's
(1943) discussion of the 'classical doctrine of democracy', in which he reaches
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the conclusion about foreign news: 'these things seem so far off; they are not at
all like a business proposition; dangers may not materialize at all and if they
should they may not prove so very serious, one feels oneself to be moving in a
fictitious world' (Schumpeter 1943: 261). Further on he continues:
The reduced sense of responsibility and the absence of effective
volition in tum explain the ordinary citizen's ignorance and lack of
judgement in matters of domestic and foreign policy which are if
anything more shocking in the case of educated people and of
people who are successfully active in non-political walks of life
than it is with uneducated people in humble situations. Information
is plentiful and readily available. But this does not seem to make
any difference (Schumpeter 1943: 261).
Here if 'foreign news' is replaced by 'climate change', then
Schumpeter's arguments will remain relevant without any modifications. For
an ordinary person, climate change is an abstract idea and even though it could
be stated that there is a very limited number of people who are unaware of
climate change or global warming, the rudimentary understanding of the
problem prevails as well as the detached perception of its effects.
It often gets forgotten that it is due to the collaborative work of scientists
around the world that climate change was discovered. As Dorothy Nelkin
(1995: 2) states 'for most people, the reality of science is what they read in the
press'. Climate change like any other scientific topic represents 'an encoded
form of knowledge that requires translation in order to be understood' (Ungard
2000: 308 cited in Boykoff and Boykoff 2004: 126; also see in Dirikx and
Gelders 2009) which involves joint work between scientists and journalists.
For journalists to be able to provide proper coverage of the topic, they need to
have at least some understanding of the problem, otherwise 'public confusion
is exacerbated by reporters who misunderstand the basic scientific principles of
climate change' (Wilson 2000a cited in Antilla 2005: 350). Ideally, journalists
who specialize in climate change need to have some training or initial
background knowledge which will allow them to have a grasp on the
development of the science of climate change as well as its politics (Shanahan
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2007).4 Scientists are also responsible for communicating their findings in an
adequate way by adding 'authority and legitimacy to environmental reporting'
(Taylor and Nathan 2002: 330). Carvalho (2007: 228) argues that in the 1980s
'scientists were the uncontested central actors and exclusive definers of climate
change' (she refers to original studies conducted by Boykoff and Boykoff 2004;
McComas and Shanahan 1999; and Trumbo 1996). As will be discussed below,
this situation changed quite quickly in the early 1990s when scientists became
more reticent in their communication with journalists and due to the growing
complexity of the problem, scientists were replaced by politicians or
economists (as information sources).
As Smith (2005) confirms through his research, journalists have often
directed accusations at scientists who do not completely fulfil their duty of
assisting in communicating climate change threats, which makes Smith (ibid:
1481) conclude that 'specialists need to be more available and more assertive
in relation to what may come to be seen as the century's biggest story.' For
instance, one of the common misunderstandings between scientists and
journalists is the probability of climate change happening (Keeling 2009).
Journalists need a clear answer to whether climate change is happening or not
and what the human impact on it is. However, in scientific discourse universal
agreement is practically impossible, and that is why statements in IPCC reports
that argue anthropogenic climate change is happening tend to suggest that it is
very likely (say, a more than 90 percent chance). This is quite understandable
for scientists, but needs 'translation' for journalists. Another very common
problem is that often journalists and the broader public do not differentiate
between 'climate' and 'weather'. As Bostrom and Lashof (2007) argue this
mistaken substitution of the concepts leads to different behavioural and policy
outcomes. 'Weather' is seen by people as a natural phenomenon which cannot
be influenced upon and which is taken for granted, hence, there is no
4 Shanahan (2009) states that in non-industrialised countries the problem of the
lack of special training on how to write about climate change is also worsened
by the journalists' inability to find local experts on the topic who will
communicate their findings and to persuade editors about the climate change
importance and also by lack of resources in order to travel to the places for
collecting information or attending the conferences.
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responsibility for humans. Furthermore, when people see climate change as a
change in weather then after one cold month or a 'normal' season in terms of
temperature, claims such as 'global warming is not happening any more' or
'climate is stabilised' can be seen in the press.
Writing about climate change journalists have to deal with a strong (or
one could rather say 'loud') lobby of climate sceptics (see: Gavin and Marshall
2011b). Arguably because the topic is so controversial the media become even
more important in the way climate change is presented and transmitted to the
audience (Carvalho 2(07). As will be discussed below in length, journalists
often struggle to identify how fair the sceptics' attacks are and the strength of
the disagreement inside the scientific community about the anthropogenic
climate change. Arguably it happens again due to the lack of adequate
qualifications or training, and also due to the nature and routine of journalists'
work (Stocking and Holstein 2009). When journalists are not able on a daily
basis to conduct in-depth investigative analysis on who is right or wrong and
which science is funded by whom, eventually, journalists themselves become
suspicious of climate change science or twist the topic in a way that fits their
interests.
A related problem which also shapes journalists' coverage of the highly
scientific topic of climate change, is that journalists tend to employ 'heuristics'
that are different to those employed by scientists. As Kahneman et al. (1982)
explain 'thinking about risks, people rely on certain heuristics, or rules of
thumb, which serve to simplify their inquiry' (cited in Sunstein 2006: 198).
Dunwoody and Griffm (2002) state that it is to a large extent due to this hectic
journalistic work routine (where they cannot afford to spend too much time on
one issue) that journalists are fast to use 'judgemental shortcuts' in the process
of making up their mind on complex problems:
In a world of rapidly recurring deadlines, journalists cannot afford
to engage in systematic information processing. Instead, the
occupation rewards those who can make quick decisions about
'what's news' and decide rapidly how to cobble together a story.
Extremely fast decisions are, perforce, heuristic ones. Thus,
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journalism is unapologetically a world of heuristic decision making
(ibid: 180).
For instance, Dunwoody and Griffin (2002) provide several examples of
journalists' heuristic in defining 'news value'. Firstly, they state that for
journalists 'size matters' meaning that the larger the impact of the event the
more likely it will become of interest to journalists. Secondly, 'the closer, the
better': if something will happen in direct proximity to journalists' audience it
will be prioritised over events taking place across the globe. Lastly, once
something becomes news, it is very likely that it will remain news for some
time. Other examples of journalists' heuristics involve the prioritisation of
events over the process, negative information over positive information or
'preference for the vivid anecdotal account'. In the case of climate change, the
last point would mean that journalists prefer to build their news story around an
interview with a person who witnessed the polar bear dying or noticed how
energy bills drastically decreased/increased rather than 'utilising systematic or
consensus data' (ibid: 187) provided by a group of climatologists. The authors
also argue that these heuristics are not unique to journalists, but 'used by most
individuals to negotiate daily life [... ] journalists' practice reinforces reporters
and editors for using heuristics that are integral to problem solving for all of us'
(ibid: 178). The specifications of journalists' professional habits or norms will
be discussed further on with regards to climate change reporting.
Journalists are not alone in their desire to use scientific knowledge in a
way that is convenient for them, as Carvalho and Burgess (2005) argue,
politicians also look for ready answers from scientists with further
interpretation of the scientific knowledge in order to fit within their political
agenda. For example, former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher used
the scientific uncertainty on the subject as a justification for the government's
inaction on the climate change matter and appealed to wait in order to not make
a mistake (Carvalho 2(05). Hansson (2004: 357) characterises this decision
making pattern as 'the delay fallacy' - 'if we wait we will know more about X:
no decision about X should be made now'. However, in the case of public
decision making on risks (such as climate change) this reaction leads to an
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obvious problem - while waiting, the risk gets worse. Hansson himself refers
to this type of fallacy as 'one of the most dangerous fallacies of risk' (ibid),
since resolving the scientific uncertainty on the issues would imply reaching
the ultimate position of possessing all the knowledge on the subject which
becomes near to an impossible situation (as was noted beforehand scientific
certainty is extremely difficult to achieve), then the 'delay fallacy' argument
'can almost always be used to prevent risk-reduction actions' (Hansson 2004:
357).
Scientific knowledge is also questioned by businesses and activists
involved in the climate change regulation processes and as a consequence
'science has become more exposed to criticism, contestation and
deconstruction' (Carvalho 2007: 224). All of these cases of the
misinterpretation, twisting or scrutiny of scientific information leads to the
problem of scientists becoming more and more aware of their vulnerability
(Keeling 2009) and being cautious in what they say and how they say it.5
It is now apparent that climate change is not only a scientific or even
environmental topic, but instead the public comprehends it as 'packaged within
more hybrid arrangements that construct scientific and socio-political or m,?ral
ordering' (Zehr 2009: 83). For instance, as Zehr states the 'US public doesn't
understand climate change solely as a scientific issue' (ibid), but it looks at it
as a part of a bigger picture - how would it influence the economy or what is
the role of the state in mitigating the problem and so on. Nielsen and
Kjaergaard (2011: 26) share similar ideas and state that 'climate change [is]
making the transition from a scientific hypothesis to an established fact in
public debates, the issue became political, financial, and ethical as much as
scientific' and journalists' roles in interpretation or the framing of these issues
becomes to some extent an economic or political tool. Further on the
journalists' professional norms will be discussed with regards to the way they
shape media coverage of climate change.
5 As an example, Boykoff (2011) points to the situation after the 'Climategate'
scandal, when scientists did their best to avoid any form of communication
with journalists. For more on issues of mistrust between journalists and
scientists see Nelkin (1995).
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Journalists' views of climate change
Regardless of the specification of climate change as a topic (whether it is a
scientific, political or an economic issue), some argue that in order for
journalists to start writing about climate news they need to see 'news value' in
it or as Carvalho (2007: 224) argues 'novelty, controversy, geographic
proximity and relevance for the reader, for example, are important
determinants in the selection of science news'. Maxwell Boykoff and Jules
Boykoff have also made a significant contribution to the development of the
study of media coverage of climate change. One of their most widely held
arguments revolves around the idea that media coverage of climate change is
determined by the journalists' professional habits or norms (for example, see
Boykoff and Boykoff 2004; Boykoff and Boykoff 2007; Boykoff 2007;
Boykoff 2008b) which become a natural barrier in the way of transforming
scientific description of the process in its professional manner with an
unavoidable amount of uncertainty into comprehensible information for the
mass public.
The idea of 'journalists' norms' is borrowed from the media scientist W.
Lance Bennett, who argues that political news is influenced by political,
economic and journalistic norms. Political norms unfold the idea that the media
should provide the broader population with information pertaining to political
issues, therefore reinforcing political accountability. Economic norms force
mass media to act according to the demands of the capitalist society.
Journalists' norms specify the constraints or rules that journalists impose on
themselves due to the specification of their profession (Boykoff and Boykoff
2004). Even though these three categories of norms are closely interconnected,
Boykoff and Boykoff particularly concentrated on the importance of the last
group: journalistic norms, which include first order norms - personalisation,
dramatisation and novelty; and second order norms - authority, order and
balance. The first order norms are superior in the sense that if the conditions
are met (the news is dramatic and novel) they are the most likely to be
published and then the second order norms would in their turn influence the
way the articles were published and on the contrary 'if the first-order
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journalistic norms of dramatisation, personalisation and novelty are not met,
the chances for extensive, in-depth coverage of this environmental problem are
diminished' (Boykoff and Boykoff 2007: 12(0). These norms not only serve as
the barriers in the way of climate information getting on the pages of
newspapers, but also allow journalists to twist information or create
'informational bias', which in tum might give the policy makers the
opportunity to postpone their reaction to the problem. These norms will be
briefly discussed below.
The norm of 'personalization' characterises the journalists' skills to
portray abstract global political or economic processes through stories about
particular individuals (Boykoff and Boykoff 2(07). This is extremely relevant
to the coverage of climate change, which, as was discussed before, is too
abstract for people to understand because of the unseen threats it poses and the
absence of immediate and obvious connections between the causes and
consequences. Another interpretation of this norm can be seen in the work of
Shanahan (2007: 2) who suggests that people will be more interested in the
climate change topic if it is 'framed to suit diverse audiences'. Animal
welfarists might be touched by disturbing images of a drowning or starving
polar bear, while other people might be interested in the national security or
economic sides of the problem. On the other hand, if people see climate change
as something distant from their everyday life, they are less likely to react to it
(Lowe 2006 cited in Howard-Williams 2009).
A similar concept of how journalists convey abstract information on
climate change is presented by Hoijer (2010) who suggests that journalists use
the communicative mechanism of 'anchoring and objectifying' in their
coverage of climate change. Through anchoring journalists bring unknown
concepts into the known context, for instance, a comparison of climate change
to mad cow disease. Objectification is extremely similar to personalisation but
it does not only make an abstract concept more concrete through relating it to
individuals, but also animals (once again, polar bears) and even the observable
process of the melting Arctic ice, basically, anything which makes the problem
more visual. Perhaps this norm could be considered as a positive strategy used
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by the journalists, by allowing them to make it more relatable to the audience
and help to avoid the problem of 'distanciation', defmed by McManus (2000)
as the situation when the climate change related issues and events that are
described by the media do not make any links to the everyday life of the public.
From another side, the danger of over-relying on the 'personalisation' norm is
that the topic is very likely to disappear from the public arena when, let's say,
Obama, Cameron or Brittney Spears have nothing to say about it or the
judgement of the problem becomes identical with the people's perception of
the public figure.
The norm of 'dramatization' allows journalists to bring a remarkable
brightness to their work and catch the attention of their audience. Arguably
climate change is already an extremely dramatic event with severe (mostly
unavoidable) consequences for the whole world, however, the natural
prolonged drama of climate change is often not enough for journalists and they
tend to exaggerate the reality and focus on the sensationalist nature of the
problem" and publish articles under such titles as , 'Global warming will bring
Black Plague back to Europe' or 'Humanity will not survive 21st century'
(Karavaev 2(05) which openly claim that at this point there is nothing people
can do, the end of the world is coming and we cannot even postpone it. Partly,
the problem comes again from journalists neglecting the uncertainty of
scientists' prognoses. It is possible in some scenarios that climate change could
kill every human on Earth. But this modality of 'possibility' rather than
certainty does not make a catchy headline. This kind of coverage causes a
number of problems, such as the audience might remain with two possible
options - we should not do anything because it will not change anything or we
should not do anything because it is too absurd to be true. As Boykoff (2008a:
562) states 'fear-inducing and catastrophic tones in climate change stories can
inspire feelings of paralysis through powerlessness and disbelief rather than
motivation and engagement'. In both cases, the coverage does not provoke any
6 Interestingly, James Painter (2007) compared the TV coverage of IPCC
reports in China, Brazil, Russia, Mexico and South Africa and concluded that
the more negative first IPCC reports on the consequences of climate change got
much greater coverage than the second report on the mitigation of climate
change impact (see in Shanahan 2007).
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constructive behaviour from its readers. From another side, it makes the
climate change topic more vulnerable to the sceptics' attacks.
There is another way for journalists to talk about climate change in an
evidently dramatic, sensational way without distortion or misrepresentation of
climate change - to connect the coverage with natural disaster events which
sometimes directly or indirectly relate to climate change and which make it
extremely visible and relevant to the media audience. However, this approach
triggers more problems rather than solutions, since from the scientific point of
view the correlation is quite questionable. For example, weather abnormalities
per se do not prove the existence of climate change, at the same time the
progression of climate change involves the possibility of an increased
frequency of extreme weather events (see more in Devine 2012).The research
conducted by Shanahan and Good (2000) on the connection between the
amount of media coverage of climate change and variations in temperature has
demonstrated that there are some relationships between these two variables, but
they conclude that temperature is a much weaker factor than the science or
politics surrounding climate change issues. Of course one might argue that
temperature variation is not as definite as natural disasters.
The last first-order norm, 'novelty', asks journalists to always report
brand new information, whereas the continuing problem of climate change
might stop being newsworthy. Anthony Downs (1972: 38) argues that since it
is difficult to keep the public's attention drawn to one problem for a long
period of time, information tends to go through an 'issue-attention cycle'.
According to this theory, developing a story on the news does not reflect real
developments, but the development of people's attention to the story. The cycle
contains five stages. The first one is the 'pre-problem stage': only small groups
of people are aware such as experts or involved groups. The second stage is
'alarmed', when the public suddenly gets a chance to learn about the problem
and is quite hopeful about solving it without major losses. During the third
stage people start to see the problem in a realistic way and realize that a
solution might demand great efforts and resources. When more and more
people start to understand the actual sacrifices and work that they need to do in
33
order to overcome the problem, the 'issue-attention cycle' reaches the fourth
stage. At this point the public gets scared. unmotivated and simply bored. The
fmal stage is when the problem is no longer a centre for attention, but at the
same time it does not disappear from people's lives. Periodically it attracts
attention again, mostly because during this stage of the biggest attention some
organisations are created or documents are signed to solve the problem and the
activity of organisations or conditions of agreements periodically create a base
for news.
In the case of media coverage of climate change in order for the topic to
achieve the second stage of the 'issue-attention cycle', something extraordinary
has to happen in front of the public's eyes: a natural disaster or similar event
like flooding or forest fires. However, the nature of the problem of climate
change is such that it happens constantly and often does not reveal itself
through weather extremes but rather through gradual changes such as
temperature increases. Boykoff and Boykoff (2007) argue that their content
analysis does not prove the adequacy of Downs' model for climate change
issues. The model does not take into consideration the role of the mass media,
as well as other factors which influence the coverage of climate change such as
political and economic processes, and even, as Zehr (2009: 81) argues 'the
controversy and uncertainty that was constructed around it.' Downs suggests
that consideration should only be given to the characteristics of the
environmental topic itself, which will naturally go through this 'issue-attention
cycle', whilst Boykoff and Boykoff (2007: 1195) state that climate change over
time becomes a more and more serious problem, hence they conclude that: 'the
persistence of environmental problems on the social docket is affected more by
the way these problems are constructed in the news media than by a natural
history framework.'
The second-order journalistic norm of 'authority-order' describes the
journalists' desire to refer to the powerful players as sources of trustful
information - 'authority figures - government officials, business leaders, and
others - who reassure the public that order, safety>and security will soon be
restored> (Bennett 2002 cited in Boykoff and Boykoff 2007: 1193). Howard-
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Williams (2009) points out that for such abstract and complicated issues the
choice of sources plays a particularly important role. This norm creates a
problem when the sources of information for the scientific problems of climate
change become not climatologists themselves but policy makers, state leaders
and heads of major energy corporations7 suggesting that the more powerful
source is the better positioned to offer explanations of climate issues, which in
many cases is not true. The problem of politicisation of the climate change
topic will be discussed further on in this chapter.
The journalistic norm of balance deserves a separate discussion, since
arguably after the climate change topic reaches the newspapers' pages the
balance becomes one of the most 'damaging' journalistic norms with regards to
the media coverage of climate change.
Balancing climate
One of the most basic professional principles that journalists around the world
follow in their everyday practice is the principle of objectivity and a balance of
facts, which is presented in their works by different and sometimes
contradictory news sources. Firstly, a professional reporter needs to detach
himself from the problem (Ward 2(08), so his personal feelings and ideas do
not interfere. Secondly, journalists are expected to 'present the views of
legitimate spokespersons of the conflicting sides in any significant dispute, and
provide both sides with roughly equal attention' (Entman 1989: 30, cited in
Boykoff and Boykoff 2007: 1193). Indeed, from professional articles or news
stories we would like to see the information from the different sides in order to
make up our own opinions.
In the case of scientific topics, such as climate change, it is much more
complicated: 'simply to balance sides gives readers little guidance about the
7 Nissani (1999) says that what readers get is an enormous amount of
politicians' or businessmen's' presentations, reports from international and
national meetings and negotiations, scientists' opinions. The information
coming from these sources presupposes that people already have knowledge
about the topic and can put it into context without external help, but according
to Nissani, most of the people do not have the necessary background and
information in newspapers can be useful only for environmental specialists.
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scientific significance of different views' (Nelkin 1995: 88). Should the
problem be presented equally from the point of view of the scientists
confuming the anthropogenic character of climate change and so called climate
sceptics that either reject the whole idea of climate change or the human impact
on it? As Carvalho (2007: 223) points out 'media depiction of the issues often
suggest that the scientific community is divided in the middle' and as a result
'coverage of anthropogenic climate change perpetrates an informational bias
by significantly diverging from the consensus view in climate science that
human activities contribute to climate change' (Boykoff 2008b: 3). This
problem partly concerns the understanding of what 'balance' means. Is it
according equal weight to two unequal sides, or is it according proportionate
weight to each side? For instance, Anderegg et al (2010: 1) state that '97-98
percent of the climate researchers most actively publishing in the field support
tenets of anthropogenic climate change', so if journalists quote an equal
number of scientists from both sides of the debate and prescribe equal weight
to their arguments, does it represent balanced reporting of the problem? On the
contrary this journalistic quest for 'objectivity' leads to a 'distortion of the
news' (Antilla 2005: 339) and consequently to public belief in the greater
divide between scientists (Freudenburg and Muselli 2010).
The damaging character of 'balanced' media coverage of climate change
might lead to climate change scepticism amongst the public (Liu et al. 2(08)
and more importantly might negatively affect national (or even international)
policy on climate change by giving policy makers a justification not to act. For
example, as Fletcher (2009) states, the controversy created around climate
change diverted attention from the Bush administration climate change policy.
Antilla (2005) supports the argument established by Zehr and Gelbspan, where
they explain how journalists' professional standards such as objectivity makes
them present the opinions of 'industry-supported science'' to balance their
coverage (Durfee and Corbett 2005: 88).
8 One of the examples: 'a coalition headed by the American Petroleum Institute
invested $600,000 in 1998 in a campaign aiming to increase the volume of US
news coverage questioning the prevailing climate science' (Cushman 1998
cited in Doulton and Brown 2007: 2).
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Lately at least in the United States and Europe the situation is changing
and even Boykoff (2007: 470) started to question whether the norm of balance
in climate change media coverage still creates problems or is it a 'dead norm'.
His later comparative research of US and UK newspapers has demonstrated 'a
dramatic increase in the quantity of newspaper coverage of anthropogenic
climate change' (ibid: 475). Ward (2008) confmns that since 2006 in the USA
more and more coverage is devoted to the scientific consensus on climate
change, rather than its sceptics. Doulton and Brown (2007) have also
challenged Boykoff and Boykoff's (2004) original research by stating that their
media analysis of UK newspapers did not demonstrate a 'balanced' approach
to the coverage, but rather the predominant majority of articles were quite
alarming and urged an active climate change policy. Media analysis of
newspapers from New Zealand and Australia has also demonstrated that media
discourse has moved from questioning the science to finding a solution
(Howard-Williams 2009). This change towards 'unbalanced' reporting is a
positive move in the media coverage of climate change, as Ereaut and Segnit
(2006: 25) state 'treating climate change as beyond argument' is one of the
greatest steps on the way to popularising the climate change topic and
approaching pro-active mitigation policy.
In summary, one of the most popular approaches to the studies on media
coverage of climate change introduced by Boykoff and Boykoff argues that the
media failure to accurately popularise scientific fmdings in the field is not
accidental but rather is a result of systematic 'micro-processes' (Boykoff and
Boykoff2004: 134) stimulated by journalists' professional norms. Though later
researchers have shown that the journalistic norm of balance is losing its
relevance, overall, the influence of journalism's nature cannot be
underestimated. For the purpose of this research project 'micro-processes' or
'micro-factors' are understood as the variables which are specific to journalists'
reporting of climate change such as journalists' norms or the scientific
specifications of the topic, whilst 'macro-processes' or 'macro-factors' are seen
as the politico-economic and social context within which journalists have to
operate, such as the influence of capitalist ideology or state policy on climate
change (as discussed below).
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Does politics matter in covering climate change?
Arguably throughout the last two decades the science of climate change has
been replaced by the politics of climate change. The shift from scientific
sources of information to political ones started in the late 1980s and continues
today (Bell 1994; Wilkins 1993 cited in Kim 2011), and especially after a
scientific consensus (or close to it) was reached (mostly through the IPee
reports), public eyes turned to the politicians as they tried to negotiate on GHG
reduction commitments. The goal of trying to keep the temperature rise below
2°e is considered to have a political rather than a scientific base. Various
studies have demonstrated the nuances and complexity of the international
negotiations around climate change which detracts attention from the scientific
research on the subject matter (Doulton and Brown 2007) and that the
influence of politics 'complicates efforts to move ahead with any kind of
consensus or compromise on climate change despite the urgency of the issue'
(Kim 2011: 691). Even scientific uncertainty, as discussed above, becomes 'a
powerful political tool' (Boykoff and Boykoff 2007: 1193) where any
hesitation in scientific agreements is used in order to postpone or twist the
political decisions. The popularity of climate change as a news item has grown
proportionately to the influence of politics. Various researchers have
demonstrated that media coverage is particularly amplified during major
international events (Gavin and Marshal 2011b) which have 'significant
attention-grabbing power' (Liu et al. 2011: 415). In media discourse. the role
of the political actors overshadows the roles of any other actors, including
scientists, businesses or activists (Carvalho and Burgess 2005).
Carvalho and Burgess (2005: 1457) through empirical research of UK
broadsheet newspapers coverage of climate change argue that the discourse
created by the media around this topic is influenced by 'the agency of top
political figures and the dominant ideological standpoints in different
newspapers.' The media's stance on climate change certainty or the role of the
state in the climate change mitigation process depends on the newspapers'
political affiliation. For example, when the first IPCC report was announced in
1990: the conservative paper The Times published a series of articles seeking to
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discredit the scientific discoveries on climate change risks, whilst the more
liberal Guardian accentuated the 'danger' of climate change and used it as an
opportunity to criticise the government and its official position.
What is even more interesting, as Carvalho (2005: 21) argues in the case
of the UK quality press, is that despite the difference between the newspapers'
political orientation and its impact on climate change coverage, most of the
time they all 'remain within the broad ideological parameters of free-market
capitalism and neo-liberalism, avoiding a sustained critique of the possibility of
constant economic growth and increasing consumption, and of the profound
international injustices associated with the greenhouse effect'. Hence, the
media discourse around climate change is not only influenced by the political
affiliations of a single studied newspaper, but in general it is to some degree
unified by the existing overarching state ideology. This observation is
extremely important for the study of media coverage of climate change and for
the fate of climate change mitigation policy in general, since arguably climate
change is a product of 'a consumer society [... J and a "buy now, think later
logic''' (Lewis and Boyce 2009: 5; see also Trumbo and Shanahan 2000;
Wilkins 1993), and in order to be able to stop or slow down the tragic
consequences of climate change, the whole concept of economic growth and
consumerism has to be modified.
Another approach to the study of the inter-relations between media
coverage of climate change and state politics has been suggested by Neil Gavin
(2009a) who draws our attention to the argument that as much as politics
shapes the media, the media can motivate politicians on certain behaviour as
well. In other words, we can witness the process of the 'mediatisation' of
politics (a term Gavin (2009a) borrows from Meyer (2002». The idea of
'mediatisation of politics' refers to the media power over politicians' behaviour
through the 'third person effect' which states that even if a person was not
persuaded by the news, he/she might think that others will be. The same is
relevant for the politicians. For instance, even if they do not have evidence of
media influence over public opinion on the climate change topic, they might
think that this influence exists, which in tum makes them attentive to how mass
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media present such problems as climate change. Climate change mitigation
policy assumes 'unpopular political effects in many countries, with the need to
reduce power consumption, vehicle use and other "everyday luxuries" which
industrialized societies take for granted' (Bell 1994: 59). Therefore 'political
self-preservation' (Gavin 2009a: 168) makes politicians very cautious if
'intervention [into climate change policy]... involves direct or financially
burdensome initiatives, awkward and intrusive regulatory policies, or higher
taxation' (ibid: 768). Eventually, one of the conclusions Gavin (2009a: 771)
achieves in his research is that in the UK context even if they wanted to
politicians would not be able 'to push climate change further up the media
agenda', but rather they have to think about themselves and how to react to
certain media messages. Doulton and Brown (2007) also argue that if
government (in the UK) wants to take leadership in the international action on
climate change they need to be sure that their actions will be backed by public
support, and therefore it is important to understand what information on
climate change the public receives.
In conclusion, politicisation of the problem and bringing the national
agenda into media coverage of climate change might be considered a powerful
tool in attracting attention to climate change. In the case of Russia, as will be
seen throughout this study, we face a different set of problems, even though the
politicisation of climate change reporting is relevant for Russia. If we are
talking about the influence of the state on the media system on climate change
discourse, we should take into consideration that there is a different type of
regime, a different understanding of climate change problems and consequently
a different framing of the problem. The concluding part of this chapter will
discuss the existing studies on media coverage of climate change in Russia and
what theoretical approach is the most relevant for this study.
Concluding remarks: media, climate change, Propaganda Model and
Russia
Studies of the media and climate change in Russia were virtually non-existent
until a few years ago and still their number remains extremely limited. To date
only a few authors working on this topic can be identified. One of them,
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Dmitry Yagodin (2010), provides a brief analysis of the media coverage of the
Copenhagen Conference in 2009 in two newspapers - tabloid Moskovsky
Komsomolets and a quality paper Kommersant, Yagodin (2010) highlights how
newspapers mostly follow state official policies on climate change and the state
in tum backs up the interests of large industries. The research demonstrates the
rising popularity in the media of the idea that climate change negotiations can
have a 'beneficial character' (ibid: 288) for Russia's national interests.
Nina Tynkkynen (2010: 182), in a more extensive study of climate
change coverage by five Russian newspapers (of various types) draws a
connection between the Russian print media framing of climate change and the
concept of Russia as a 'Great Ecological Power'. She relates this idea with the
historical concept of Russia considering itself a 'Great Power' which she traces
back to the sixteenth century and connects it with the modem political situation,
such as a restoration of Russia's 'greatness' under the presidency of Putin.
Today this concept mostly relies on the country's vast amounts of natural
resources which make it one of the key countries in global environmental
policy.
Elana Wilson Rowe (2009) studies the coverage of climate change in the
state-owned newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta in order to analyse the political
discourse that has evolved around the problem of climate change and the
consequent role of experts in the framing of this issue. The author
acknowledges that it is quite difficult to assess how much the expert
community influences Russia's policy on climate change, however, Wilson
Rowe (2009: 607) concludes that 'their [experts'] presence appears to be
deemed necessary and appropriate' and scientists also see themselves 'as
having policy-related roles' (Ibid: 608). As probably could be expected the role
of scientists becomes more prominent when their position coincides with that
of the state. Wilson Rowe (2009) concludes that Russia will stay engaged with
the international negotiations on climate change as it does not really contradict
its political and economic agendas and, as Rowe's media analysis shows,
'Russia has succeeded in developing a "domesticated" version of international
discourse' (ibid: 612) on the climate change problem, meaning that Russia has
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started to see how the ideas existing within the international discourse can be
relevant at the domestic level and eventually as Rowe argues Russia's
approach to climate change gets closer to the European one.
Even this limited amount of information on the media coverage of
climate change in Russia demonstrates some degree of state influence and the
overall consent within media coverage. This project suggests that in order to
understand these connections and perhaps illuminate other actors involved in
the process, the media coverage of climate change in Russia should be studied
through the prism of the Propaganda Model (PrM) developed by Herman and
Chomsky in 1988. The model proposes that we look at how the media operate
through the perspective of the macro-factors which might influence their
production process. The model itself will be discussed in detail further on in
the dissertation. What follows is a discussion of some studies which directly or
indirectly refer to the postulates of the PrM in their analyses of media reporting
of climate change issues, hence they already prove the relevance and adequacy
of this theoretical approach for the topic under investigation here.
Carvalho's (2005) research has demonstrated how the UK broadsheet
newspapers differ in their ideological orientation, which made the author state
that 'factors like ownership and the wider political economy of the media can
provide significant contribution to understanding these differences, as well as
the press's relations with established interests and the social distribution of
power' (ibid: 21). As an example, Carvalho referred to Herman and Chomsky's
PrM, which relies on the idea that the media coverage is influenced by the
political and economic context. Olausson (2009) also refers to the studies
(including Herman and Chomsky's) on the media's conformist position to
official policy and confirms the relevance of the argument with regard to the
media coverage of climate change, not only on the national, but also
international scale of Europe. Eventually she concludes that 'the tight
relationship between the political elite and the media implies that the media do
not offer any alternative frames, in relation to those established in policy
discourse, for understanding global climate change' (ibid: 433).
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Holmes (2009: 99) does not directly refer to the PrM, however, he points
out 'the surrounding framework of institutional pressures from owners,
managers, and major sources of revenue; the capacity. of various sources to
mobilise 'flak'; and propaganda campaign, PR, and information management'
(ibid) which make a substantial contribution to the shaping of the journalistic
norms. Wu (2009: 165) also alludes indirectly to some postulates of the PrM by
stressing the importance of media institutions' social, economic, and political
affiliation' which form the way the media talk about global warming.
Good (2008) and Babe (2005) specifically apply the PrM to the analysis
of the coverage of climate change. Babe (2005) through an analysis of the
media coverage of global warming and the Kyoto Protocol in Canadian
newspapers concluded that the coverage is 'consistent with the PrM [... ]
[environmental] issues were never addressed in their full range and seriousness;
lip-service, we might speculate, served to divert attention from the overall
thrust of the reporting, which was one-sided and hardly environmental' (ibid:
219). Good (2008: 234) justifies her choice of research topic and the theoretical
approach, by saying of climate change that 'there is arguably no other issue
that is on the one hand so fundamentally challenging to the interests of the
global elite neo-liberal order, and yet has consequences that are so easily
framed, or ignored as something else'. Consequently, the author argued that
American media frame climate change issues in a way to correspond to the
elite's interests, for instance, 'to avoid critique of the world's largest, and most
profitable, industry: oil' (ibid: 235). Such a specific conclusion derives from
the analysis of the US role in the climate change policy and where its position
lies.
As the foregoing analysis has demonstrated, media reporting on climate
change is a complex process which involves consideration of macro-factors
(such as politics and economy) and micro-processes (for example, the widely
discussed journalistic norms and practices). It seems that the latter arguments
have been explored much more in the bulk of the literature, while few have
investigated whether these micro-processes could not be enough for
understanding why climate change in Russia is covered or not covered in a
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certain way. As Carvalho (2007: 225) states 'the role of ideology in media
representation of science is still blatantly under-researched', in the Russian
case the role of ideology and the state and the way it interacts with other actors
influencing media reporting of climate change is not researched at all. This
project will allow us to not only understand the way the media and the state
coordinate with each other in Russia, but also the political discourse that has
evolved around climate change issues and the role of other actors involved in
this process.
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CHAPTER 2· MANUFACTURING THE PROPAGANDA MODEL:
THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS AND CRITIQUE
In 1988, just three years before the Cold War officially ended and the Soviet
Union collapsed, Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky published their
provocative work: Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass
Media.9 In this book Chomsky and Herman argued that American mass media
are far from the idealistic picture imagined by the masses and no longer act as
the 'fourth estate' or the watchdog of the American political and social systems.
On the contrary they are subordinate to the existing political and economic
elites and their work is nothing more than a product of the elites' machinations
and can be explained through the theoretical approach of the PrM. Hence, the
US mass media did not look particularly different to the media of the United
States archenemy at the time - the USSR (Schlesinger 1992).
The idea provoked much negative reaction among the general public and
within academic circles. Herman and Chomsky's model was criticised for its
determinism and simplicity, often dismissed on the ground of its conspiratorial
nature and ignored in mainstream media studies in the United States (Mullen
2010, Robertson 2010, Jensen 2010). However, the authors kept arguing for the
adequacy and high value of their approach to understanding the media system
in general and of the PrM in particular, and continued to develop their ideas in
a number of other studies (for example, see Chomsky 1989a and 1989b;
Herman 1999 and 2000; Herman and Chomsky 2002; Herman and McChesney
1997). The PrM was also discussed by numerous dedicated researchers (Jensen
2010; Klaehn 2003a, 2005, 2009a and 2009b; McChesney 1998; Mullen 2008,
2010a and 201Ob; Mullen and Klaehn 2010; Pedro 2011a and 2011b) and
tested in a range of various themes and geographical contexts (Doherty 2005;
Gibbs 2003; Hackett 2006; Jackson and Stanfield 2004). Whilst Chomsky was
proclaimed by some scholars to be 'the leading intellectual figure in the battle
9 Both Herman and Chomsky started to write about the ideas which they later
articulated into the PrM several years before Manufacturing Consent was
published, for example, see 'Corporate control, corporate power' by Herman
(1981) or 'The political economy of human rights' by Chomsky and Herman
(1979). Schlesinger (1992) argues that Manufacturing Consent is a synthesis of
Herman and Chomsky's previous academic and political works.
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for democracy' , Manufacturing Consent has been called 'the starting point for
any serious inquiry into news media performance' (McChesney 2008: 287).
This chapter introduces the main postulates of Herman and Chomsky's
vision of the US mass media system and the elements of the PrM. Furthermore,
it will look at existing critiques of the PrM and will discuss the arguments
behind its marginalization in social science, as well as the reasons why after
more than 20 years since the PrM was first published, it is still relevant for
contemporary media systems in different geographical areas (and specifically
in this research case study - Russia). The chapter concludes with a discussion
of the future development of the PrM and the ways it will benefit the analysis
of media coverage of climate change in Russia.
The Propaganda Model's foundations
Herman and Chomsky's vision of the media system relies on three main
hypotheses, or, as the authors refer to them, 'first and second order
predictions.' 10 The first hypothesis, or first-order prediction, states that the
media will spread information in favour of the dominant economic, social, and
political groups and when they are united on important topics, consent I I among
media is more likely to happen. In other words: 'among other functions, the
media serve, and propagandize on behalf of the powerful societal interests that
control and fmance them' (Herman and Chomsky 2002: xi).
The second hypothesis (also belonging to the first-order predictions)
proposes that before reaching the audience media information goes through the
following filters: the media ownership structure (usually mass media sources
belong to a large corporation and have to support its interests), advertising (to
10 The first order predictions made by Herman and Chomsky are concerned
with the way media operate, whilst the second order prediction suggests the
way the PrM would be perceived by the academic community and general
rublic.
1 According' to the Oxford English Dictionary (2013) 'consent' means
'voluntary agreement to or acquiescence in what another proposes or desires'.
Throughout this dissertation 'consent' is understood in precisely this manner,
which correlates with the main idea of the PrM where the elite influence the
media in a way that they 'voluntarily agree' with the elites' vision of the events.
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cover the costs of production and make more profit, the media try to find a way
to match their content to advertisers' requirements), information sources
(journalists' dependence on newsmakers), flak (negative reaction to media
activity; it appears after media publish or broadcast information which is not in
favour of some individual, political or business groups) and anticommunist
ideology (after the Soviet Union split, it was replaced by other anti-ideologies,
such as anti-terrorism).
Finally, the third hypothesis, a second-order prediction, refers to the
reaction the PrM would encounter from the wider public and scientific
community. Chomsky (1989b) predicted that the PrM would be ignored by
mainstream media studies and as he.puts it himself: 'if [PrM is] invalid, it may
be dismissed; if valid it will be dismissed' (ibid: 11) and as Chomsky (1989a)
pessimistically confirms 'one way or another, you can be sure that this model
isn't going to be discussed' (ibid: 10, see also in Herman 2(00). This
pessimistic vision of their own model is explained by the fundamental ideas of
the PrM: 'because of the PrM's anti-elitist perspective, it proves unable to pass
through the very filters that it identifies' (Pedro 2011a: 1866).
Indeed, some social science researchers have been arguing for years
about the value of the PrM and its contribution to media studies, meanwhile,
the PrM has been marginalized and its developers seen as 'outsiders' of the
mainstream of social science (Mullen 20 lOb; see also in Mullen and Klaehn
2010) and their approach was not seen as a reliable way of studying media. In
order to test the hypothesis of the PrM' s marginalisation, Mullen (201Ob)
studied a sample of 3053 articles from ten journals of media and
communication studies and found that only 79 articles referred to the PrM to
some extent. Mullen (ibid) also looked through 48 media textbooks and found
that only in 11 of them mentioned the PrM (only four of them had a
comprehensive discussion of the subject). Arguably, this trend of the PrM's
marginalisation developed due to several reasons. On the one hand, the authors
of the model were perceived as controversial figures. For instance, Chomsky
has been labelled 'an apologist for totalitarian regimes and a self-hating Jew'
and his political work is still unpopular in some mainstream circles (Edgley
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2009). On the other hand, the PrM has internal features which have been
criticized (they will be introduced further on in the chapter). Firstly, the
hypotheses of elite and media consensus, and the PrM filters will be discussed
in greater detail.
The elites' consensus and media compliance
As mentioned above the foundation of the PrM rests on the idea of media
compliance with governmental and/or economic elites and downplays the
liberal-pluralist view of the function of the media which claims that 'the media
serve as a guardian of the public interest and as a watchdog on' the exercise of
power' (Mullen 201Ob: 674) or in the US case as 'an instrumental defence of
the first amendment' (Chomsky 1989a: 2).
The PrM's arguments on questioning the role of the media in the society
are arguably close to the ones proposed by the followers of the Marxist-radical
tradition (Mullen 201Ob; Mullen and Klaehn 2010), who see the media as a
tool in the hands of the dominating classes, used in order to achieve certain
political goals. In this case the goal is the 'continuation of the capitalist class
system' through news content (Pedro 2011a: 1866). From another point of
view, Herman and Chomsky's approach to understanding the media production
process belongs to the tradition of the political economy of communication
studies (Curran and Seaton 1991; Murdock and Golding 1977; Murdock 1982
in Mullen and Klaehn 2010) which looks at the .media in the wider politico-
societal context. The political economy of communication looks at the same
factors which the PrM suggests we analyse, such as ownership, the influence of
state policy and dependence on finance sources (McChesney 1998).
In the book 'Necessary illusions', Chomsky (1989b) develops the ideas
of the PrM and goes even further in comparing the US media system with the
one in the USSR. He states that in fact propaganda is. more effective in the
United States due to the false sense of freedom it creates'" - 'at home [the US],
12 Klaehn (2002) develops these ideas by stating that the consent of elite and its
consequence in media, are more effective in democratic societies, because the
elite has the opportunity to come to conclusions naturally in order to gain the
same interests (for example, profit), whereas in totalitarian societies some part
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more subtle means are required: the manufacture of consent, deceiving the
stupid masses with "necessary illusions", convert operations that the media and
Congress pretend not to see until it all becomes too obvious to be suppressed'
(ibid: 19). In its communist adversary (at the time when the book was
published) people had a much clearer understanding of how the media operated
and whose interests they advocated, whilst in the United States the interests of
'state and corporate power are closely interlinked, framing [media] reporting
and analysis in a manner supportive of established privileges and limiting
debate and discussion accordingly' (Chomsky 1989b: 10). By referring to the
work of Edward Bernays, Walter Lippmann and Harold Lasswell, Chomsky
(1989b) points out that in their vision of democracy the elite's 'supervision' or
'influence' over media messages can only benefit society. In particular
American journalist and intellectual Walter Lippmann (to whom Herman and
Chomsky owe the name of their book Manufacturing Consent13) in his work
Public Opinion (2007 [1922]) elaborates on how public opinion ought to be
managed by the more knowledgeable and authoritative 'specialized class',
rather than letting people whose understanding of the problem is often quite
limited to allow themselves to jump to conclusions.
Returning to the PrM's resemblance with the Marxian vision of the
media, Chomsky (1989a) himself stresses that 'the similarity between this [the
of the elite is always suppressed and forced to agree. He argues that 'because
'thought control' is virtually transparent in democratic societies, the
propaganda system is actually more effective and efficient than it is in
totalitarian states' (ibid: 164). This, at first glance seems an absurd idea, but it
has its logic. In a democratic society there is an ideology of free media, and
even debates which might happen in media only reinforce the main message by
showing that it was not only one option, but the best one out of many others.
13 Lippmann (2007 [1922]) mentions the term 'manufacture of consent' in the
context of the discussion on how 'established leaders' are capable of defining
what information the public should know, and in this sense he [the leader]
becomes a censor and a propagandist. Furthermore, Lippmann states: 'The
. creation of consent is not a new art. It is a very old one which was supposed to
die out with the appearance of democracy. But it has not died out. It has, in fact,
improved enormously in technique, because it is now based on analysis rather
than on rule of thumb. And so, as a result of psychological research, coupled
with the modem means of communication, the practice of democracy has
turned a comer. A revolution is taking place, infinitely more significant than
any shifting of economic power' (ibid: 81).
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ideas expressed by Lasswell and Lippmann] and Leninist ideology is very
striking. According to Leninist ideology, the cool observers, the radical
intelligentsia, will be the vanguard who will lead the stupid and ignorant
masses on to communist utopias, because they are too stupid to work it out by
themselves' (ibid: 6). Even though Herman and Chomsky do not directly
situate their work within the Marxist or Leninist traditions, neither do they use
any Marxist terminology, but considering the influence and references (even in
the title of their book) to the work of Lasswell and Lippmann, Herman and
Chomsky indirectly relate and compare their approach with the one developed
earlier by Marxists. It can be argued that the PrM does indeed resemble
Leninism, but not with its paternalism, rather with Lenin's scepticism about the
bourgeois press. Such as Lenin saw bourgeois press as a source of mass
deception which through its lies tried to slander the Bolsheviks, furthermore,
he argued that despite the possibility of the formal absence of censorship,
bourgeois freedom of press is a 'freedom of the rich, the bourgeoisie, to
deceive the oppressed and exploited masses' (Lenin 1917: 209 cited in Resis
1977: 282), whilst the genuine freedom of press suggests that the 'press must
be liberated from the power of money as well as from the power of the censor'
(Resis 1977: 282).
Hearns-Branaman (2009) also finds some similarities between the PrM's
ideas and the quasi-Marxist idea of the supreme role of the economy in the
news production process 'to such an extent that any activity by the journalists,
editors or other actors cannot compare with the influence of capital's
institutions' (ibid: 133). Hearns-Branaman (2009) also argues that Chomsky's
comparison between Lippmann's idea and Marxist-Leninist theories comes
from the mischaracterization of Walter Lippmann's work. Hearns-Branaman
(ibid) considers that Herman and Chomsky made a mistake b)' arguing that
Lippmann thought that only small groups within societies can understand what
is important for the rest of us and use this knowledge for control, instead he
says that anyone can manipulate society as long as he understands the
simplicity of the media system.
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Despite the apparent similarities between the PrM and the Marxist vision
of media - that the mass media follows the dominating economic class in the
society - Chomsky does not support the idea of historical materialism - one of.
the main arguments of the Marxist tradition. Edgley (2009) argues that this
disbelief in historical materialism is central to Chomsky's theoretical approach,
since he sees the states as 'consciously organised bodies of elites' (ibid: 28),
which implies that 'if individuals are in control (not some logic of capital. or a
socially determined group, or an historical dynamic) then these individuals
have choices' (ibid). Hence, it would be wrong to conclude that the PrM
completely equates the media systems in capitalist democratic countries such
as the United States and the communist states. Chomsky (1989a) claims that
despite all of his critique of the US society and its media system, he considers
the United States as one of the 'freest societies in the world' from the
comparative point of view'. To carry on with the comparison between the
United States and the USSR, in the latter the media straightforwardly mirrored
and supported the interests of the state and its leading party, whilst according to
the logic of the PrM, 'media will protect the interest of the powerful'
(Chomsky 1989b: 149),which might or might not to be represented by the state
leaders and managers. The authors of the model call this dominance ,over the
media 'elite advocacy' - 'elites believe that's the way it ought to be. the media
oughtto be' (Chomsky 1989a: 11).
Herman (1999) identifies three 'merits' of the PrM that make the model
different to other models that describe the propaganda of totalitarian regimes.
Firstly, the media system operates so 'naturally' that it does not require open
measures of censorship. Secondly, even though the PrM assumes that 'where
the elite are really concerned and unified, and/or where ordinary citizens are
not aware of their own stake in an issue or are immobilized by effective
propaganda, the media will serve elite interests uncompromisingly' (Herman
1996 in Mullen 2010: 675), but the authors of the model do suggest that there
is some flexibility which lets media represent different points of views'" (such
14 Freedman (2009) highlights that the PrM does not provide enough evidence
of how media would behave during conflicts among elite groups. So, through
his research of British media coverage of the Iraq war, Freedman suggests that
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as happened during the Vietnam war). Lastly. the media system governed by
the logic of the free market allows the existence of 'a dissident media' , though
it will not be able to reach a vast audience. Another 'merit' of the PrM which
Herman did not mention in this list, is that it does not only allow us to identify
in whose favour and why media content is shaped one way or another, but also
it allows us to see which content, and in whose favour, is omitted from media
coverage (see more in chapter six). As will be discussed further later in the
dissertation, this omission of the topic of climate change in Russia becomes a
much more important issue than any biased or contradictory coverage of it.
The Propaganda Model fdters
Herman and Chomsky (1994 [1988]) explain the dominance of the particular
elite groups over the media content through the mechanism of the PrM. They
state that the media message gets influenced by the elite already during the
media pre-production and production processes by going through the five
filters: ownership structure, advertising, sources, flak and dominant ideology.
Below, each filter will be discussed in more detail. It should be noted that a
more specialised analysis of the Russian media system from the perspective of
the PrM filters will follow in the next chapter of this thesis, however, some
limited references to the Russian media will be made during the current
discussion.
Ownership structure
during abnormal social situations the normal structure loses its stability and
becomes open to new media messages. The analysis demonstrated that 'social
crisis, when elites are divided amongst themselves and the public is willing to
challenge and mobilize against these elites, a space can open up in which
radical ideas start to circulate' (ibid: 66). As an example, Freedman (2009)
discusses the media policy of The Mirror. The newspaper during the time of
disagreements among international, state and business elites managed to spread
information about the illegitimate military actions of the US army in Iraq and
Britain's involvement in it. However, when it became apparent that investors,
shareholders and government became unsupportive of such a newspaper policy,
The Mirror lost its interest in the anti-war movement in order not to lose its
profit and investors' loyalty.
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Nine years after the publication of Manufacturing Consent, Herman together
with another media scholar, McChesney, in their manuscript devoted to the
global media (1997) state that the 'concentration of media power in
organisations dependent on advertiser support and responsible primarily to
shareholders is a clear and present danger to citizens' participation in public
affairs, understanding of public issues, and thus to the effective working of
democracy' (ibid: 1). Hence, it could be argued that the first two filters of the
PrM devoted to the problem of the corporate influence over the media
production process, overreliance on the advertising income and extreme
concentration of the media outlets in the 'hands' of a few major media
conglomerates are the cornerstones in the capitalist 'propaganda machine' .
Most media outlets cannot exist independently and they have to be part
of bigger conglomerates. First of all, there is the necessity for large investments
to found a new media outlet; secondly, media organs do not always become
profitable businesses, and in some cases are used not for their fmancial benefits
but as a tool to exercise power; The big corporations or governments acquire
their own media businesses in order to become a part of the creation of
information discourse and be able to dictate their policy. Herman and Chomsky
(1994 [1988]) discussing this filter put more emphasis on the business
dependence of mass media - 'many of the large media companies are fully
integrated into the market, and[... ] the pressures of stockholders, directors, and
bankers are powerful' (ibid: 5). In support of their argument Chomsky and
Herman state that all of these trends were already in place over a century ago
(in the United States at least) when the start-up cost of newspapers grew from
$69,000 in 1851 to $18 million by the 1920s. This condition of large
investment for the start of any media outlet has led to a situation where the
existing diversity (in the United States at the time of the writing of
Manufacturing Consent) of newspapers, radio and TV stations was in fact
illusionary and the ownership structure of these media outlets was limited.
Herman and Chomsky (ibid) produced a table with 24 companies which were
in control of the major media outlets in the United States in the late 1980s and
whose total revenue was counted in billions of US dollars. A decade later
McChesney (1998) developed the same ideas in his study of global
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communication by arguing that globalisation is one of the main trends of the
modem era, which has led to the domination of a 'few hundred of the largest
private corporations, which have increasingly integrated production and
marketing across national borders' (ibid: 1). This integration erases boundaries
between media and market, big media conglomerates start spreading their
interests on areas beside media production and vice versa, leading to businesses
far from journalism buying media outlets.
Another important element of this filter is the tight connections between
media owners and government (or government-related institutions). One of
their points of intersection is that government gives licenses for media activity
or allows access to satellites and other infrastructure. On the other hand, some
owners whose interests spread far beyond the media business also require
governmental support in areas of 'business taxes, interest rates, labour policies,
and enforcement and non-enforcement of the antitrust laws' (Herman and
Chomsky 1994 [1988]: 13), or more specifically assistance in their other areas
of business starting with nuclear power and fmishing with overseas trade.
Lastly, in some countries the government openly owns the media (or controls
some shares of it). As will be discussed in the next chapter, in the Russian
media system this situation is worse and the boundary between the market and
the state in the ownership filter is blurred to the extent that sometimes it is
impossible to say where market factors influence media coverage or if it is
utterly dominated by the state.
The problem of state influence over the ownership filter was also
developed by Doherty (2005) who utilised the PrM in order to support his
argument of the British Broadcasting Corporation's (BBC) bias towards the
pro-governmental line. He concluded that even though the 'ownership' filter
cannot be applied to the BBC in a straightforward way (since it is not owned
by a private company but financed through national TV license fees), however,
the system in which government ministers recommend who to appoint as the
board of governors is quite opaque and assumes tolerance towards powerful
interests in the BBC's reporting. Likewise, Hearns-Branaman (2009) (in his
studies of the Chinese media system) argues that the 'ownership' filter is very
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much connected with state control, which in capitalistic countries is less
noticeable and covered with market forces and in less democratic countries is
more visible and comes directly in the form of state power. In this sense once
again the PrM opposed the plural-liberal approach to the media system in
which the same factors (like private ownership and market influence) 'assure
diversity and the independence of the media, the PrM holds that these factors
lead the media to fully integrate into the structures and logic of power' (Pedro
2011a: 1875).
Similar to the arguments proposed by Doherty (2005) and Heams-
Branaman (2009), during the analysis of climate change coverage in Russia,
the ownership filter will be studied not only from the position of market
influence and how the media ownership is divided between several media
conglomerates, but also to what extent government and state officials control
ownership of various media outlets. Another modification which needs to be
made is that in Russia we can witness the merger of market and state, and in
some cases even though the newspaper of a TV channel are owned by business
corporations, it does not mean that there is no 'trace of the state's hand' in its
ownership structure. The same business corporation can easily be controlled by
the state or have close ties with it.
Advertising
In the context of the free market, advertising becomes another powerful tool in
reshaping media content. To be able to get more investments and financial
support, the media have to align their policy with advertisers' interests.
Basically, at the stage of forming the corporate policy, a media organ might
consider such questions as whether it wants to publish information which will
be of interest to the biggest percentage of its audience, or it might think of
rearranging information in order to attract the attention of a certain segment of
the audience. More than 20 years have passed since the PrM was presented by
Herman and Chomsky, and some filters do need to be revised and adapted to
the modem environment: advertising has become even more important and
influential due to the greater dependency of the media outlets on income from
this activity, the development of the advertising industry in newly developed
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capitalist economies (such as Russia) and also due to 'greater competition
among traditional media outlets and between those outlets and the internet' for
the same fmancial pool of advertisers (Herman and Chomsky interview with
Mullen 2009: 14).
Advertising lets media make more profit and sell newspapers at below
production costs. It is very valuable for newspapers since most do not make a
profit (in order to make people interested in buying newspapers media
managers are often forced to ask for less money than what was spent on
production). Advertising makes media production a participant in the free
market where the advertisers' willingness to invest in newspapers depends on
the demand. Like other participants of the free market media owners are
interested in buyers (advertisers) in order to sell their product (audience)
(Chomsky 1989b). So, eventually, newspapers become more interested in
wealthier audiences, or the 'audience with buying power' (Chomsky and
Herman, 1994 [1988]: 16). In their tum, advertisers do not just choose the
media with the most suitable audience but also they try to stay away from
politically questionable media outlets. However, as Goodwin (1994) notices
'this sort of conscious discrimination is rarely necessary, given the sort of
people who own and manage the media to begin with, but it can have a useful
chilling effect,.as far as advertisers are concerned' (ibid: 106). On the other
hand, according to Herman and McChesney (1997) even though advertisers
treat audiences as 'consumers', 'it does not make consumers "sovereign" in the
sense of allowing them to choose what is offered' (ibid: 190): owners and
advertisers pick the range of programmes within which audiences can exercise
their right of 'free choice' .
As a consequence advertisers are not likely to sponsor programmes on
environmental issues, which tend not to attract audiences, and environmental
groups are very likely to be left unheard. As Hearns-Branaman (2009: 127)
explains it: 'in an advertising revenue-based system, groups without a high
disposable income are not serviced by a media of their own, nor are their
opinions taken as mainstream.' Even though companies become more aware of
investing in their environmentally-friendly image, they still try to avoid
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sponsoring media which sends disturbing, alarming messages which might
contradict consumerism and the policy of advertising. As Lewis (2010) argues
'environmentalists concerned about global warming have to compete against a
flood of commercial messages that urge us to consume without worrying about
the consequences' (ibid: 344), and largely because of this reason Lewis (2010)
states that 'climate change, for all its cataclysmic consequences for large
sections of the planet's population, still struggles to become a serious electoral
issue.ts (ibid: 344). Cromwell and Edwards (2006) in their argument of how
dependence on sponsors influences media coverage of climate change point to
the omission in the media of 'the on-going strategies of corporations to stop
any rational action from being taken to combat climate chaos' or 'about the
millions of dollars spent on propaganda and corporate advertising' (see' in
Pedro 2011a: 1882).
In order to represent the 'perspectives and interests of the sellers, the
buyers, and the product' (Chomsky 1989b: 8) in their coverage, the media
could look for some compromises in the climate change coverage. For instance,
from newspapers' pages the public can be convinced to buy a certain product
because it was made out of recycled materials or some amount of profit from.
every sale goes to environmental non-governmental organisations like
Greenpeace and so on (which already goes on to a significant extent). This
might be seen as an answer for media actors to attract more advertisers and
business loyalty, however, 'green consumerism' is still consumerism, and its
role in fighting climate change or substituting environmental regulations is
very questionable (see more on this in Eriksson 2004).
As was mentioned above, the 'ownership' and 'advertising' filters often
interlink and can be perceived as a 'dual threat' to the 'public sphere' or as
Herman and McChesney (1997) state, the 'media/advertisers complex' prefers
'entertainment over controversy, serious political debate, and discussions and.
documentaries that dig deeply, inform, and challenge conventional opinion'
(ibid: 6). These arguments are specifically relevant to the implementation of
15 This takes us back to Schumpeter's (1943) view of foreign news discussed in
chapter one.
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the 'advertising' filter for the Russian media system, in which 'ownership' and
'advertising' filters are not just interlinked but both are significantly influenced
by the 'government filter'. Another specifically Russian characteristic of this
filter is likely to make it less significant than it is in the US case. Even though
the advertising market has been growing it still is not as big as its American
equivalent.
Sourcing
Sourcing shapes media content because it does not matter how big media
conglomerates are, they cannot have correspondence staff everywhere and are
forced to prioritise their sources and pick the most newsworthy and trustworthy
ones and produce news from there ona routine basis." Contemporary changes
in technology and society have led to the 'greater sourcing dependence on wire
services, public relations offerings, and official and establishment-expert
claims and press releases' (Mullen 2009: 14). Usually on the federal scale
those news sources would be major government representatives, like
parliament, the president's residence, state defence agencies or major business
corporations. All of them under normal circumstances hold press conferences
on a daily or weekly basis, which are organized by a professional public
relations department. It should be mentioned that most government or business
organizations spend a lot of resources on managing media relations.V They
attempt to provide all information in an adequate media format so journalists
will have to spend the minimum time on distributing information to the general
'public.
There are also other reasons for media to refer to aforementioned news
sources: they are not only very convenient for journalists to gain newsworthy
information but also government and big business are very recognizable for the
16 Lang and Lang (2004) disagree with Herman and Chomsky on this matter
and argue that the restricted number of sources does not reflect the priorities
amongst journalists' choice of sources, but simply it shows that (in regards
with American foreign news) it is easier for journalists to get access to certain
countries due to cultural and strategic ties.
17 See more on the 'corporate propaganda' and the role of public relations
industry in Chomsky (1998).
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general public and tend to be considered a credible source. Herman and
.
Chomsky (1994 [1988]: 19) point out that for media, official sources help 'to
maintain the image of objectivity, but also to protect themselves from criticism
of bias and the threat of libel suits.' Such an approach to picking news sources
can possibly lead to major problems of the mass media being dependent on a
particular group's opinions. For instance, the government by giving exclusive
information to certain media outlets might expect them to return the favour in
the form of portraying its activity in a benign way. Furthermore, by constantly
providing information, news sources are able to create a certain plot line and
lead the coverage of events in a desirable direction because 'part of this
management process consists of inundating the media with stories [... ] to help
chase unwanted stories off the front page or out of the media altogether' (ibid:
23). Hearns-Branaman (2009) argues that 'the sourcing filter shows a great
similarity in any capitalist-based media system' (ibid: 127). In research on the
application of the PrM to the news production process in the People's Republic
of China, he comes to the conclusion that journalists' tendency to use official
sources is a 'universal' phenomenon (ibid). Hearns-Branaman (2009) does not
restrict sourcing to the state, but mentions that '[the PrM] framework also
includes news generated by businesses and corporate-funded think-tanks' (ibid:
128).
Zollmann (2009: 106) discusses the rise of PR in the UK which
contributed to the 'new propaganda strategy' in the news media. The effect of
the information produced by government or business PR departments is
incredible. As was mentioned before, it does not just go to the majority of news
outlets, but furthermore it 'spreads like a virus [... ] until they [facts] become
'common sense' and what largely constitutes 'the truth' (Hearns-Branaman
2009: 127).As the other elements of the PrM, claims about this filter have been
criticized. Cottle (2006) states that the relationship between media and news
sources are complicated and under certain conditions, such as crises, media
choice of sources might be totally unpredictable, because the crises could call
into question the authority of the established sources and make media seek new
sources of information (see in Zollmann 2009). Furthermore such factors as the
wider political spectrum or journalists' ideology might motivate journalists to
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be more critical of the established information sources (Hallin 1994; Spraks
2007 citing in Zollmann 2009).
Besides the tremendous importance of the PR industry within the
'sourcing' filter there are also significant roles played by the 'experts', who
'serve the purpose of legitimizing the elite consensus by virtue of their position
of authority and credibility' (Pedro 2011a: 1885). Thompson (2009) through
applying the PrM to the financial news analysis brings out the argument that
for such topics as the economy and finance, journalists need to have access to
expert knowledge in order to understand the issue. The sources (in his case
financial analysts working for large corporations) also experience certain
constraints and their information goes through 'filters' too before it will reach
the journalists. Thompson (2009) concludes that 'in regards to financial
markets, the filtering process occurs partially outside and prior to the news
production process itself' (ibid: 89). Herman (1999) also brings an interesting
example of 'corporate junk science' acting as a 'source' filter for the chemical
industry, which according to the author aims to 'reassure the public that
pesticides and other chemicals are not a public health threat and are essential to
economic growth and welfare [... and] to create enough confusion and
uncertainty among legislators and regulators, as well as the public' (ibid: 232).
This is interesting in the context of the media coverage of climate change
whereas was discussed previously (see chapter one) science plays a very
important role and sometimes, as in the case of Russia, it is very difficult to
distinguish between the position of official science and positions sponsored in
the interests of fossil fuel industries or government.
Moreover, implementing the PrM in the Russian case, with regards to the
'source' filter the following issues should be considered. Firstly, as much as the
public relations industry keeps growing in the country and interacts with the
media, journalists still prioritize the personal connections with sources of
information. Also, the official position of the source in the organisation can
influence the credibility of the information, and at the same time the NGOs, so
powerful in western media, do not play as big a role in Russia and their
authority is limited (see more on this in chapter three).
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Flak
'Flak' is a negative reaction to media activity and can act as a form of control
on media. It can be expressed individually or organized by a group in the form
of phone calls, e-mail, petitions and other activities. Cromwell (2002) gives an
interesting example of 'flak' in the United States which was created by the
Global Climate Coalition (founded by the leading fossil fuel and automobile
companies) in order to discredit climate change science. It needs to be
mentioned that 'flak' is another opportunity for government or business actors
to take control over media policy. Pedro (2011a) distinguishes three
'dimensions' of 'flak'. The first one is concerned not with the flak itself, but
the journalists' or editors' apprehensions about it - if they think that an article
might cause unnecessary problems with the elite or certain groups of
stakeholders, they would prefer not to publish it at all. Secondly, if information
that is unsuitable for the elites is published, 'flak' would be there to attack and
neutralize it. Lastly, Pedro (2011a: 1886) argues that 'on a more general level,
the pressures from powerful entities act as a reinforcement of the media
tendency to accept pro-elite opinions and interests' .
In this way, one can also see 'flak' as another method to implement
censorship without breaking the law or maybe ignoring the law or even
changing the law in a way which leads to more restrictions of mass media
policy. Since 'flak' is related to power, it seems that governments produce
more often than others, sometimes in the form of threatening and assailing.
Hearns-Branaman (2009) points out that even though Herman and Chomsky
say that in the United States flak is produced by NGOs, that practice is not that
popular in some countries. For instance, in the People's Republic of China, the
press functions in a certain frame which does not allow it to cover. topics
besides the government approved ones and 'if they do step out of line it is often
the government [that] creates flak, usually internally and away from the
public's gaze' (ibid: 132). The author of the article suggests that such
inconsistency in implementing that filter in different countries is explained by
arguing that because 'flak' consists of society'S reaction to the media
information it is 'the only socio-cultural filter in the PrM, [that] is based more
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on culture and historical differences' (ibid: 138). Another interesting example
of the 'flak' production, was introduced by Jacksonand Stanfield (2004) who
argue that in their case of the US media coverage of the Iraq war, the media
outlet in question (Fox News) acted as a 'flak' filter, by actively criticizing
anti-war movements. demonstrations and coverage Fox news led the way for
other American media in terms of pro-governmental support during the Iraq
war.
As was mentioned above, the 'flak' filter goes very closely with the
concept of censorship. If in the authoritarian societies such as China. North
Korea or the former Soviet Union we can talk about open and institutionalised
censorship, in the capitalist democratic countries such as the United States, we
are discussing more subtle forms of press restrictions. As the PrM suggests, its
mechanism works in a way that it results in journalists' 'self-censorship
without any significant coercion' (Klaehn 2005: 1) when they are not told to do
something in a certain way, but rather they cooperate willingly. It should be
mentioned that the notion of self -censorship could be considered a key concept
of the PrM. Practically, it embraces all of the earlier discussion points of the
'subtle' means of elite control over the media production processes, in which it
is very difficult to see open pressure on journalists, but instead they willingly
submit to the elites' interests.
In the Russian case. the 'flak' filter is significantly modified. Russian
media are still quite restricted and do not produce much information which can
elicit a reaction from society. At the same time. Russia does not have a
developed system of institutions (representing civil society) powerful enough
to produce 'flak', such as strong and authoritative NGOs, hence, as in the case
of China, the main producer of 'flak' will be the government. Finally, when
journalists do cover topics which are not in favour with the Russian authorities
or interested groups they get their portion of 'flak' in the most extreme form.
including violent actions (such as being assassinated).
Dominant ideology
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The fifth filter, 'anti-ideology', seems to be the most controversial one and has
been changed significantly over the years since it was originally created as an
ideology of 'anti-communism'. In 1988 Herman and. Chomsky wrote
'communism as the ultimate evil has always been the spectre haunting property
owners, as it·threatens the very root of their class position and superior status'
(1994 [1988]: 29). In the United States anti-communist ideology provided a
conception of a common enemy against which society, including the media,
had the opportunity to be united. The whole idea of communism as an external
threat was quite abstract and could be used in all kinds of situations, such as
criticizing anybody who was supporting Communist countries or presenting a
danger to 'property interests' .
Since the split of the Soviet bloc and the failure of the Communist
ideology, this filter lost its actuality and needed to be revised. Herman stated
that they should have named this filter 'the dominant ideology' to give it a
broader spectrum (see in Alford 2009: 148). In an interview in 2009 Herman
and Chomsky gave their new vision of this PrM element (Mullen 2009). First
of all, they still think that 'anti-communism' can be applied in some cases and
used in the argument against supporters of Stalin, Mao or Soviet Russia.
Secondly, whilst 'anti-communism' is fading away, other 'ideologies' are
increasing in their popularity, .for instance 'anti-terrorism' or the ideology of
'free market'. When Herman and Chomsky introduced their model, they stated
that the main idea behind it that the PrM sees the media as a part of the free
market economy and an active actor of this capitalist system, in which
communist ideology represented everything bad which could happen to
American society if it does not support official government policy. Even
though the Soviet Union is not there anymore to represent that 'evil' against
which American media were fighting, capitalism is still in place and gives
media the opportunity to support it. Herman and Chomsky suggest that
considering contemporary processes of globalization the fifth filter deserves
more attention, as well as the media's 'dependence on government for favours
and service, aggressive government news management, the rise or
strengthening of right-wing mass media institutions, talk shows and blogs, and
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real but thus far weaker growth of other alternative media (including those
based on the internet)' (see inMullen 2009: 15).
Another alternative for the 'anti-communism filter' which became
extremely popular in the United States in recent decades is the ideology of
'anti-terrorism' or the 'war on terror'. It works in a very similar way as the
'anti-communism' filter and allows us to see the world in the 'us and them
dichotomy' which helps 'to galvanize public support for elite interests since' the
end of the Cold War' (Mullen and Klaehn 2010: 224). Continuing this theme,
Hackett (2006) states that Herman and Chomsky's findings are similar to the
postulates of War Journalism 18 - 'double standards consonant with elite
perspective, that portray 'our' side as moral and righteous, and 'them' as evil
and aggressive' (ibid: 3). Indeed, several scholars applied the PrM ideas to the
media coverage of war in Iraq (for example, see Boyd-Barrett 2004; Freedman
2009; Hale 2010; Jackson and Stanfield 2004) confirming its reliability and as
Scatamburlo-D' Annibale (2005) determinedly points at the 'egregious' role the
media played 'in the terror which has been unleashed on the Iraqi people under
the guise of the 'war on terror' (ibid: 52).
Pedro (2011a: 1889) argues that in terms of understanding of how the
PrM operates, it is necessary to look at ideology in a broader sense as 'war
propaganda, economic indoctrination, or political persuasion' (ibid: 1889).
Klaehn (2009b) also believes that the fifth filter of the PrM has not lost its
relevance and may be utilized in 'a range of case studies' (ibid: 45). According
to him, the dominant ideology filter can be generalized so as to be applicable to
a variety of social phenomenon. Klaehn (ibid) also points out that 'the
dominant ideology' filter can be relevant for studies focusing on power
relations and how this intersects with political, economic and social aspects of
society and as one of the issues where the PrM can be of particular use, Klaehn
(ibid) names environmental problems. Taking into consideration Pedro's
(2011a) and Klaehn's (2009b) arguments, as well as the original ideas behind
18 In this sense, Jensen (2005) provides an interesting discussion of American
journalists' work after 9/11 and 'patriotic journalism' and whether journalists
should 'follow the flag' in the time of war or provide independent information
in order for people to make their own decisions and judgements of state policy.
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the PrM, in the Russian case the 'dominant ideology' filter will be studied from
the perspective of the developing ideology of capitalism and the free market,
but also of the influence of the strong state. Thus when analysing the media
coverage of climate change, the media should potentially be considered a tool
for the implementation of state policy as well as a propaganda tool for free
market ideas. In terms of this research the 'dominant ideology' filter will also
be studied more specifically in the context of Russia's climate change policy,
what actors are involved in it and how they influence or maybe gain influence
through media policy towards this complicated issue.
Conclusions about the PrM filters
One of the ambiguities with regards to the elements of the PrM which make
some researchers question its adequacy and utility is the question of whether all
of the named filters are equal with each other (Goodwin 1994). The same issue
is raised by Thompson (2009) who points out that it is unclear whether any
filter becomes more or less influential in a particular economic or political
situation. This statement is quite arguable, since even though the original study
of Herman and Chomsky does not give instructions on how to modify the PrM
in each specific case, but as the example of Russia will demonstrate the
alterations and adjustments of the PrM filters are quite straightforward if one is
familiar with the political and economic context of the case study.
Boyd-Barrett (2004) does not argue that one or another filter is less
valuable, but insists on adding another filter to the model- 'buying out'. The
author acknowledges that originally the PrM did not suggest that one person or
a group of people consciously direct or censor the media, but rather explains
the system within which the media content is shaped. Boyd-Barrett (ibid) finds
it useful to enter the 'buying out' filter into the model which 'suggests the
exercise of direct but covert control of news media [... ] for the purpose of state
manipulation of public opinion and propaganda, a degree of fusion between
state and news media practices that goes beyond the dynamics of everyday
political economy' (ibid: 437). Applying this modified version of the PrM to
the news coverage of the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, Boyd-Barrett (2004)
admitted that it is extremely difficult for the researcher to find direct evidence
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of the 'buying out' filter even though its influence could in some cases be
extremely significant such as happened in the case of the New York Times
reporter Judith Miller who according to the author acted as 'a conduit for
stories originating in US military and intelligence agencies' (2004: 438) in her
coverage of the US invasion in Iraq. This indeed is quite an interesting concept
in extenuation of the model and as will be discussed further on in this
dissertation, in the case of Russian media the problem of journalists being
bought by interested parties throughout the years has created problems in the
development of the democratic media system. Scientifically speaking, this
filter would be extremely difficult to prove and also it will put the PrM under
even greater attack for its conspiratorial nature, besides. it is not quite clear
how it is different from censorship.
Zollmann (2009) does not raise the question of which filter should be
removed or added to the PrM per se, but stresses that the strength of the PrM is
in interactivity between its filters, whenever in some particular cases one filter
becomes weaker or cannot be applied at all, other filters can take the lead in
directing media to stay faithful to the needed informational policy. As will be
discussed in the next chapter, in the Russian case the same conditions or
characteristics of Russian mass media have to be mentioned in the analysis of
several filters. For instance, the concept of power or the role of the state enters
almost each of them. Chomsky states that there is no way to count the
importance of each filter in general, since as much as we need to adapt the PrM
to the particular cases, so too we need to vary the importance of the filters to an
equal degree (Alford 2(09).
Critical evaluation of the Propaganda Model
As was mentioned at the start of this chapter, when Manufacturing Consent
was published, the book in general and the PrM in particular, did not receive a
very warm welcome from the academic community. Even though some of the
criticisms are quite specific, and in some cases refer to the personalities of the
authors, this chapter has tried to outline the common trends in the critique of
the PrM and recommendations for its improvement or further development.
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Geographical application of the model
As was mentioned earlier, initially, the PrM was developed for the United
States and mostly tested through analysis of US coverage of foreign news. This
raised the issue of whether it was possible to apply it in different political,
economic or social systems (Hesmondhalgh 2006; Lang and Lang 2004;
Robertson 2010; Schlesinger 1992) or was it only useful for the 'exceptional'
media system of the United States which is arguably 'the only advanced
capitalist democracy without a significant labour or socialist party and,
consequently, the one in which large corporations have the freest rein'
(Goodwin 1994: 108). Comer (2003) claims that the PrM has 'very little by
way of new theoretical insight that the Propaganda Model can bring to
European media research' (ibid: 367). He maintains that it is questionable how
this model will help us to understand media-political relations in countries with
different histories, cultures, institutions and market developments. For instance,
ownership structures might drastically differ from country to country,
depending on who traditionally is allowed to be in charge of news production.
Another important factor is market development, how much media depend on
it and what is the role of advertising in particular countries." And of course,
such filters as 'sources', 'flak' and 'dominant ideology' are very much rooted
in specific state's social and political history.
On the contrary, Herman and Chomsky argue that 'ownership and
advertising belong to straightforward institutional analysis' (see in Mullen
2009: 13) and the media will adjust themselves to the processes of 'flak' or
'sourcing' regardless if we are talking about 'the elite US or British media or
the elite media under Stalin and Hitler' (ibid). At the same time, Herman (2000)
notes that the PrM is analysed within a very complex context and gives a very
general base for analysis, therefore when the model is applied to different cases
it has to be changed in order to respond to specific local factors (cited in
Zollmann 2009: 114).
19 For instance, Pedro (2011b) cites the case of the Scandinavian public service
media model, which is to lesser degree dependent on the media market and
mostly serves the interests of its audience.
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In reality, several researchers have demonstrated that the PrM can work
in different geographical areas (for example see Eglin 2005, Everton 2005,
Gibbs 2003, Hearns-Branaman 2009, Herring and Robinson 2009, Klaehn,
2009b, Mullen 201Oa, Robertson 2004). Interestingly enough, Herman and
Chomsky themselves mentioned that:
globalisation and cross-border integration and the spread and
increased importance of commercial media and advertising as a
funding source, have made the Propaganda Model ever more
widely applicable, but it has to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis
given the varying degrees and forms of penetration, and different
cultural conditions and levels of government intervention. In some
cases, like Russia, we may have a slow merging of an older form of
state propaganda with an emerging market-based system (see in
Mullen 2009: 18).
By utilising the PrM for his study of the Chinese news media, Hearns-
Branaman (2009) concluded that when the model is applied to media systems
during their transition stage, ideology becomes of vital importance and, in
particular, 'the hegemony of global capitalist ideology' (ibid: 120), which
becomes more and more powerful even within post-communist countries. He
also demonstrates that some filters such as sourcing and advertising are pretty
much universal, but at the same time, filters like ownership structures and flak
are quite different and very specific to China with supreme control lying with
the state. Furthermore, one of his main conclusions is that 'a capitalism-based
economy could have [effects] on any news media system, no matter what its
governmental structure' (ibid: 138) and that the model can benefit research on
any media system due to the great influence of capitalism. Mullen (20 lOa)
seconds Hearns-Branaman's (2009) arguments by stating that 'the globalizing
nature of the media suggests that the PrM may have a much wider, perhaps
near-universal, application' (ibid: 230).
Therefore it allows us to suggest that the PrM is applicable to the Russian
case and can help to analyse Russian media coverage of climate change.
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However, the different filters may be somewhat more or less useful in the
Russian case as the specific characteristics of the state have to be considered.
The PrM - another conspiracy theory?
Another popular reason behind the marginalization of the PrM is that
sometimes it is perceived as a model based on conspiratorial assumptions about
media activity. This view of the model was a result of its central assumption
about the media's dependence on state and market. Klaehn (2003a) states that
this argument is totally mistaken, since 'conspiracy implies secret controls that
are divorced from normal institutional channels' (ibid: 359) and the PrM makes
no such claim. Keeley (1999) gives another definition of conspiracy theories,
which says that this kind of theory gives explanations of events by redirecting
responsibilities to the restricted group of people secretly handling social
processes (see in Clarke, 2(02). This definition would be even more
contradictory with the main principles of the PrM. The model approaches
media from the point of view of the free market principles of organising the
production process. It talks about a complicated set of institutions, media
production principles and ideologies, which eventually create certain
conditions under which particular topics become more or less in favour of mass
media. Herman and Chomsky also commented on conspiratorial criticism (see
in Mullen, 2009) and stated the PrM has no conspiratorial base but is 'rooted
mainly in market-oriented processes' (ibid: 17). Klaehn (2002) quotes
Chomsky (from their personal correspondence in 1998) 'my work [... J is about
as much of a 'conspiracy theory' as a study of GM that suggests that its
management seeks to maximize profit and market share' (ibid: 149).
Herman and Chomsky argue that the main idea behind the model is that
the market's tools are powerful enough tobe able to get the desirable outcome
.without implementing secret forces into the media production. The PrM can be
considered a conspiracy theory only if one considers it to be conspiratorial that
institutions involved in media production act in order to pursue their own
interests. In some exceptional situations certain media actions are influenced
by factors besides economic ones, such as state pressure and 'government or
one or more private actors may take initiatives and mobilize coordinated elite
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handling of an issue' (Herman 1996). However, in the rest of the cases the
market is the main actor.
In his earlier work, Klaehn (2002) provides an explanation as to why
Herman and Chomsky were always fighting against attaching that conspiracy
quality to their model. One of the reasons is that 'conspiracy theory' is a label
which gives an easy reason not to take all the findings and reasoning that the
model suggests seriously. Secondly, although the model analyses media
activity in correlation with the market, state and social institutions, it does not
propose that there is any kind of conspiracy. It works closely with 'institutional
imperatives': since it is a 'structural model' (ibid: 360). It gives a framework
and explains how social institutions function within this framework and how it
comes to the result we can observe.
Media effects
There is another important aspect that the PrM is missing and for which it has
been criticized: the model does not take under consideration the effects media
have on audiences. As Mullen (201Ob) rightfully notices 'the very title of the
book Manufacturing Consent and the authors' frequent reference throughout to
the 'propaganda system', seems to suggest that the PrM is concerned with
effects' (ibid: 675) (see also in Hackett 2006). However, the PrM studies how
the media are organised and what processes are involved before the actual
target audience can see the product, and it intentionally misses out the impact
this product will have on them and it does not predict how people will perceive
the information (Klaebn 2003a). Klaehn (ibid) argues that the model assumes
. that the way information is perceived and understood depends on the discourse
in which information is circulated. The model does not underestimate how
complicated the process of reading media messages is and that their effect
depends on various factors such as the personal and social characteristics of the
audience. It also includes how often news appears in the paper and how often
people will actually see it.
Herman and Chomsky note the audience's limitations in perceiving the
media's messages, as it can have freedom of choice to a certain extent (see
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Mullen 2009). People still will have to choose among the information that
media present, but also if audiences resist some information, propagandists can
always reinforce the information flow. Moreover, Herman (1996) in his
revisions of the PrM points out that 'the PrM is about how media work, not
how effective they are' and in support of his statement he refers to the Soviet
experience - 'as many Soviet citizens did not swallow the lines put forward by
Pravda, this [does not] demonstrate that Pravda was not serving a state
propaganda function'. Furthermore, the PrM's authors do not see audiences as
'passive victims of systematic ideology control' (Klaehn 2003b: 379), but on
the contrary, as Chomsky (1989b) states, 'citizens of the democratic societies
should undertake a course of intellectual self-defence to protect themselves
from manipulation and control, and to lay the basis for more meaningful
democracy' (ibid: viii). Herman (2000) also specifies that they do accept (as
part of the PrM functioning) the role of alternative media, grassroots
movements (acting as information sources) or 'public scepticism', as well as
the possibility for disagreements within the elites which lead to more diverse
coverage.
The audience's effect is quite important in the scholarship in the media
and perhaps in order to eliminate this drawback to the PrM, as Miller and
Dinan (2010) argue, it needs to be 'supplemented by other sorts of theories and
models examining other elements of the circuits of communication and power'
(ibid: 2). So, one can consider the lack of interest in media effect as a major
limitation to the implications of the PrM on media coverage of environmental
problems in Russia, however, this research does not aim to study the effects the
media have on the audience, but what factors influence their policy. It looks at
the components of media production before the actual newspaper or TV show
reaches its reader or viewer and what actors and factors influence this coverage.
Journalists I professionalism
Along with neglecting the media effect on the audience, the PrM demotes
journalists' professional norms and treats journalists more like actors without
much power to influence the fmal outcome. Indeed, in their methodological
and theoretical considerations Herman and Chomsky ignore journalists' work
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routines. They do not include in their research interviews with reporters or
editors, they do not try to find out how exactly certain information ended up on
the pages of newspapers, but instead they mostly rely on content analysis of the
news and the contextual analysis of the political, economic and social
situations. As Goodwin (1994) brings to our attention, it is not particularly
clear to what extent each filter influences journalists' everyday practices and
how much of this is influenced by journalists' personal considerations or by
other unrelated factors. Allan (2004a: 55 in Hackett 2006: 4) states even more
categorically:
reducing the news media to tired ideological machines confined to
performing endlessly, and unfailingly, the overarching function of
reproducing the prerogatives of an economic and political elite
through processes of mystification. Journalists would then become
little more than well-intentioned puppets whose strings are being
pulled by forces they cannot fully understand.
In their defence the PrM!s authors argue that if journalistic norms played
a crucial role in media production and were directly relevant to the PrM, the
model would not work and would not be supported by empirical evidence (see
in Mullen 2(09). By empirical evidence Herman and Chomsky mean their
comparative media analysis. For example, they looked at events similar in
nature (Indonesian massacres in East Timor and Serb killings in Kosovo) in the
same newspapers and argued that if the coverage could be explained by
journalistic professional norms then there would not be any difference between
these two events. However, the number of articles differed drastically despite
the fact that both events were 'timely, interesting and important' (Herman and
Chomsky 2004)20 hypothetically have equal value for journalists.
Once again Klaehn (2003a) points out that the PrM is a structural model
and was never intended to test the influence of the organisational aspects of the
newspapers on the final outcome. The famous comparison of journalists with
20At the same time Herman and Chomsky noted that in reality they did speak
with several journalists, however, as explained above, did not find it useful or
significant for the application of the model (Herman 2(00).
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workers on the factory floor who cannot really decide for the industry (for
example see Alford 2009), catches the essence of the PrM's understanding of
the media production process and journalists' place in it and drives the
opponents of the model to judge it even more categorically by stating that it
underestimates journalists' power and their professional ethics. Interestingly,
Zollmann (2009) provides an analysis of the journalists' professional norms
and corporate control (which is assumed by the advocates of the PrM) in which
he concludes that there is a strong dependence between journalists'
professionalism and the 'corporate-market constraints' (ibid: 108) suggested by
the PrM'. He describes it as 'two sides of the same coin' (ibid: 110), where
professionalism lets journalists be freer and independent in their work,
however, the market puts restrictions on it by limiting debate in the mass media.
More specifically, Zollmann (ibid) discussed the norm of 'objectivity' and how
'when it comes to the coverage of military aggression and state-terrorism,
'objective' reporting is highly questionable because violators of international
law should not get equal space for comment' (ibid). The previous chapter
discussed in detail how journalists' norms affect the media coverage of climate
change and how more recent studies have started to move away from this
approach of concentrating on the micro-factors of media analysis, to look at the
macro-structure. Further on in this dissertation, the role of journalists'
professional norms and values will be discussed in greater detail and whether
they do play a role in coverage of climate change in Russia will partly
determine whether the PrM is applicable in this case, or if its implementation is
restricted to the previously mentioned geographical areas or socio-political
issues.
Determinism, oversimplifying and functionalism
The model's previously mentioned tendency to underestimate the journalists or
audience has led to the accusation that it presents a simplistic picture of the
media system. The model is also called functionalist due to its tendency not to
leave any room for changes within the system. For instance, journalists might
want to show independence or social responsibility in informing society or
other social actors such as NGOs or activist groups might influence the process.
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This critique might seem to be fair, however, as it has been mentioned
beforehand the PrM does not insist that the media are always closed to internal
disagreement or that the process of media production can never be modified. It
also does not undervalue the complexity of some cases or rule out
modifications of the model.
Klaehn (2003a) claims that the PrM cannot be considered deterministic
or functionalist since it does not ignore debate or in some situations dissent on
newspaper pages (ibid: 365). In their tum, the authors of the model argue that
the PrM cannot be blamed for being deterministic because all models can be
considered deterministic to some extent. It is also normal for a model to be
simplistic since it aims to study complicated processes by providing a broad
framework. The question is whether their determinism and simplicity are
beneficial for describing and understanding particular social patterns or not. So
far. it seems that these characteristics did not limit the PrM's potential in
describing and predicting the media's behaviour in the cases it was applied to.
so that criticism is not fatal to the model (Mullen 2009).
For instance, Alford (2009) analysed the Hollywood movie industry on
the subject of its compliance with US foreign policy (in particular its
engagement in the Iraq war), and by applying the PrM filters to his case study
Alford confirmed and explained the reformist position of Hollywood
celebrities and managers. Gibbs (2003) through her extensive content analysis
of two Hawaiian newspapers (the Honolulu Weekly (an alternative newspaper
which was used as a primary object of analysis) and the Honolulu Advertiser
(as a comparative case» as well as a series of interviews, concludes how the
work of alternative newspapers is also constrained by the factors identified by
the PrM: 'the reality of the Weekly is that the "alternative" label at best only
thinly disguises its deep roots in capitalist modes of production' (2003: 603).
Jackson and Stanfield (2004) analysed the US media coverage of the Iraq war
and after looking at each PrM filter individually, they confirmed that 'the Iraq
War coverage demonstrates the plausibility of the Propaganda Model',
moreover they state this coverage was 'an example of extreme patriotism
where the media functioned as fme-tuned government propaganda machines'
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(2004: 476). Robertson (2004) also looks at the Iraq war coverage but this time
in four Scottish newspapers which makes him question the applicability of the
PrM since the newspapers analysed to some extent did not comply with the
elite consensus, but in some cases took a strong anti-war stance. As Robertson
discovers they all failed to look at the problem from the Iraqi point of view:
damage to their environment, infrastructures and of course numerous civilian
casualties, which makes him conclude that perhaps it 'represents evidence of
the kind of unconscious self -censoring to be expected where pressure is
hegemonic as opposed to directly coercive and that this is entirely in
accordance with the PrM' (2004: 477). However, he suggests that this could
also be explained by 'an ethnically based insensitivity and discrimination' (ibid:
479).
Despite these examples of the PrM's applicability, because Herman and
Chomsky do not analyse all aspects of media production, their opponents have
questioned how much the PrM can be a 'theory of media-political relations'
(Comer 2003: 369). Comer (ibid) argues that the PrM does not introduce
anything new and the ideas presented in it have already been studied, however,
the model differs from the previous studies by emphasizing the importance of
its five filters, and oversimplifying the micro-processes of media production.
'Filters' are meant to symbolize the barriers media messages go through and
get modified, however, Comer (ibid) says that Herman and Chomsky attribute
too much power to them, since according to the PrM, they do not just shape
media coverage, but generate it.
The PrM does not refer to any other studies or media models, which
might be considered as another weakness (Comer 2(03). For instance, some
scholars compare or contrast the PrM with the 'gate-keeper' models (McNair
2(03), which also aim to explain how media messages are selected and
modified before they reach the audience. However, as Klaehn (2003a) argues,
unlike the 'gatekeeper model' the PrM does not suggest that journalists or
editors ('gatekeepers') consciously decide how to shape the media content in
order to respond to someone's' interests - '[the PrM] is a structural model and
does not theorize social psychological processes. The PrM's overarching
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concern with power and social class firmly distinguishes it from the gatekeeper
model' (ibid: 226). Further examples of comparisons between the PrM and
other models can be found in the work of Robertson (2004) who compared the
PrM's approach with the Indexing Hypothesis of Livingston and Eachus (1996)
and Said's (1978, 1993) critique of Orientalism, or Ang and Hermes (1996)
who referred to the PrM in conjunction with feminist studies (see in Pedro
2011b: 1907), or Klaehn (2002) who brings in the discussion of Critical
Discourse Analysis.
Lastly, Klaehn, the main opponent of Comer and a vigorous supporter of
the PrM, points out that the model 'offers an analytical, conceptual framework
[... ] to theorize the operation of power in relation to dominant structural
elements' (2003a: 361). It does not talk about the conspiracy of the editorial
personnel to rewrite news in a desirable way, however, it talks about meanings
which go through filters built in the existing social system until eventually they
become common sense. Klaehn (2002) also says that the PrM cannot fully
describe all processes which constitute the media production and the authors do
realize that it does not take into account several aspects of news creation
processes such as some practical issues. of the journalists' and editors'
professional life. By realizing all the possible changes in the society and the
complex process of its development, it does not give a 'finalizing closure' and
leaves some space for adjustments and modifications (Klaehn 2003b: 379).
Even though the PrM does not provide all of the answers, it provides the main
direction in which many cases could be explained and understood. In spite of
all the critique, it can be argued that the model has undeniable logic which is
supported by empirical findings and has been proved by a reasonable amount
of research and literature on the practicality of the PrM and in the support of its
main hypothesis (Klaehn 2003b).
The future of the PrM in the age of the Internet
The PrM was first introduced more than 20 years ago, before the end of the
Cold War, re-arrangements of power in the world order, the speedy progression
of globalisation and of course before the spread of new types of media.
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Specifically the development of the internet and interactive forms of media
have led observers to question the effectiveness of the PrM. It seems
impossible to maintain consent among media when people seemingly have
ample opportunity for alternative sources of information. McNair (2003) states
that the PrM 'developed in the very different ideological and political
environments of the 1970s and 1980s, no longer corresponds to the openness
and diversity of view present in much Western journalism (and certainly,
British) in the current period' (ibid: 75).
In the 2002 edition of Manufacturing Consent, Herman and Chomsky
updated their vision of the model and concluded that the PrM did not lose its
relevance, but 'the changes in politics and communication over the past dozen
years have tended on balance to enhance the applicability of the Propaganda
Model' (ibid: xvii). They argued that the media business had become more
monopolised than it was in the preceding decade and competition for
advertisers had got fiercer. The sourcing filter had become even more
dependent on the PR industry: 'There are, by one count, 20 000 more public
relations agents working to doctor the news today than there are journalists
writing it' (ibid: xvii). According to Herman and Chomsky (2002), due to the
reduction of the resources at their disposal the media became even more
dependent on other actors. Lastly, as was discussed before, the 'anti-
communism' filter lost its relevance, however, the authors state that it was
replaced by the more powerful 'force of the belief in the "miracle of the
market'" (ibid). There is only one possible scenario under which Herman and
Chomsky believed the PrM would not work: if the class differences were to
disappear and social hierarchy were replaced by egalitarianism. The PrM stays
relevant so long as economic or state elites need a tool to justify their socially
unfair policy (Mullen 2009: 20) and as Mullen and Klaehn (2010) argue due to:
the globalizing economy and the ever-increasing (global) power,
reach and influence of large, transnational corporate and financial
institutions - in the face of growing poverty and powerlessness
amongst the vast majority of the world's population - ... the PrM is
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even more relevant today than when it was initially advanced (ibid:
225, see also in Klaehn 2(05).
As far as the development of the new media is concerned, it could be
suggested that the internet as a more democratic way of communicating makes
the PrM outdated and irrelevant for the modem world. In. support of this
argument Rampton (2007) applied the PrM to internet news and concluded
that each filter does not act quite as Herman and Chomsky described in their
case. With regards to the ownership filter, it does not require great financial
investment to set up your own blog or web-site, nor does advertising play as
big a role as in the traditional media (on the contrary it can repulse website
visitors). The internet gives a space for 'citizen journalism' in which anyone
can become an 'information source' by sharing their comments on the events
or uploading pictures, likewise, anyone can produce 'flak' against politicians or
business elites in the forms of personal blogs or commentaries underneath
news items. Finally, where the ideology filter is concerned, in the case of the
internet, there is a plurality of various ideologies where anti-Islam co-exists
with pro-Islamism and so on. However, Rampton (ibid) admits that such
traditional media sources as TV still prevail amongst the American population.
In reply, Herman and Chomsky think the PrM was not threatened by the
development of the new media in general. In support of their statement, they
also argue that traditional media still have quite a strong position and most of
them have their online versions which dominate in internet informative space.
They acquired this advantage due to the resources they already had, such as
trusting audiences and financial stability (internet media also heavily depend
on advertising and other sources of funding) (see Mullen 2009). Moreover, if
the media outlet, regardless of whether it is a news website or an alternative
newspaper (Gibbs 2(03), needs in any way to make profit to sustain itself, then
the PrM will always be relevant even though the degree of its applicability
might vary.
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Concluding remarks
The PrM suggests 'an institutional critique of mass media' (Klaehn 2002: 170).
It demonstrates the media's dependence on sources of funds and power and it
argues that everyday media practices are bounded by propaganda and media
are forced to fit around the interests of the elite. It gives a broad framework of
analysis for a very complicated system of social events, so it needs to be
modified from case to case.
To sum up, the first two filters, 'ownership structure' and 'advertising',
are closely integrated into the political-economic relations which direct media
coverage at the macro-level Klaehn (2009b). The third filter, 'sources', is the
one which shows how news is shaped by social constraints, it demonstrates
what social institutions provide news for the media and make them dependent
on their version of news. The fourth filter, 'flak', is connected with the concept
of power and demonstrates another way of influencing the media's
performance by the means of petitions, phone calls, lobbying but also through
hidden or open forms of censorship. The fifth filter, 'anti-ideology', went
through major changes over the last decade and became 'dominant ideology
filter'. The last filter brings out the concept of power, by defining the sources
of the dominant ideology and how this ideology is imposed on powerless actors
of society. Over all, the PrM assumes that the news discourse in general is
closely connected with power, and it makes predictions that the sources of
power and sources of information most of the time will be the same.
Despite years of marginalisation and criticism, Chomsky is still
convinced that the PrM is 'one of the most tested models within the social
sciences' (see Mullen and Klaehn 2010: 215) and should be a vital part of
modem academic research. He draws attention to such arguments as that the
contemporary mass media more rapidly lose their independence due to
changing ownership structures and the increasing influence of advertising, and
even in the eyes of their audience are seen as propagandistic organisations
(Klaehn 2(02). Some supporters of the PrM compare the propagandist
functions of mass media with 'cancer' (Everton 2(05) which erodes the system
from inside, while others blame media for certain policy outcomes (Eglin
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2(05). One way or another, the media are still considered a key element of
democratic society (or its destruction):
The media are the preeminent vehicles of communication through
which the public participates in the political process, and the
quality of their contribution to the public sphere is an important
determinant of the quality of democracy (Herman and McChesney
1997:4)
Despite the grim picture Hermann and Chomsky drew of how the media
are subordinate to the interests of the elites, there is a positive outlook for the
future with room for change in the world system. This could be 'based on
principles of cooperation, equality, self-government, and individual freedom'
(McChesney 2008: 290) and as a consequence there is hope in the possibility
for change in the existing media situation at the grassroots level where the set
pattern can be broken, and in this case the PrM would help activists to
understand how they can find weaknesses in the mainstream media coverage
and influence it (Herman 2000; see also Jackson and Stanfield 2004). In
developing their work on media systems, Herman and Chomsky do not only
aim to describe and analyse the way media operate, but also to represent their
vision of democratic media and the ways to reach it. Democratic media from
their point of view would be 'controlled by ordinary people' and information
flow would go in various directions rather than from the limited number of
officials and experts, whilst people would all be actively involved in the
communication process instead of passively receiving media messages.
Herman (1999) argues that the best way to achieve the 'democratisation of the
media'is:
[t]o enlarge the civic sphere by every possible avenue, to
strengthen the public sector by increasing its autonomy and funding,
and lastly to contain or shrink the commercial sector and work to
tap its revenue for the civic sector. Funding this sector properly will
require government subvention. Media democrats should be
preparing the moral and political environment for such financial
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support as they do their utmost to advance the cause of existing
democratic media (ibid: 313).
When adapting the PrM to the Russian case of media coverage of climate
change it is important to take into consideration the country's political,
economic and social characteristics and be prepared to adjust the PrM filters
where necessary. Overall it is hoped that the application of the PrM to this case
study will not only theoretically benefit the body of media studies literature,
but also as Herman and Chomsky idealistically suggested, it will provide an
opportunity for environmentalists and grassroots movements to see their way
around the system and perhaps to some degree change it.
81
CHAFfER 3 - THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RUSSIAN MASS
MEDIA: STATE AND MARKET
The applicability of western models to the Russian media system has been
questioned by various scholars. Sarah Oates (2007) points out that due to the
interdependence of economic and political powers in Russia with regards to the
media system it becomes difficult to classify it and even to question whether
Russian media can be characterised by Western media models. In particular,
Oates claims that it is difficult to compare it to the 'heavily commercialised
media system in the United States' (ibid: 1279). The PrM was originally
developed in order to analyse this 'heavily commercialised' American media
system, however, as analysis has shown the PrM does not deny the influence of
political actors on the media production system. Rather it states that depending
on the social, political and economic context of the particular case study, the
media will be dominated by state or market forces or both depending on which
sector the dominant elite groups belong to. Following Herman and Chomsky's
arguments, this chapter argues that with some modifications to the PrM filters,
the model is applicable to the Russian case in general and in particular in the
case of media coverage of climate change.
One of the suggested modifications will be mostly concerned with the
role of the state in the Russian media production process which has been
examined by Russian and international scholars. In the majority of the cases
the importance of the state has been confirmed. Since the time when Peter the
First founded the first newspaper (Vedomosti), the government of the Russian
Empire and then of the Soviet Union supported the popularisation of the media,
but it could also be argued that Russia became an 'inventor' of 'total
censorship' coming from the top21(Markov 2010: 206). For decades, Russian
press freedom had been suppressed by the government to a lesser or greater
degree depending on the regime or leader In power.
21Markov (2010) argues that censorship appeared in Russia long before the
press was introduced - during the time of Alexis' I (1645-1676). However,
official censorship of the media appeared at the end of the reign of Catherine IT
(1762 - 1796) and under Paul I (1796-1801) it became formally
institutionalised (see more in Esin and Zasurskiy 2(03).
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In the second half of the 1980s, Mikhail Gorbachev proclaimed the
policy of glasnost22 and after the end of the Soviet state (and probably for the
first time in history) there was hope for freedom of speech and independence of
Russian media. As a result of introducing the ideology of capitalism and the
free market, new actors entered the arena and as Oates (2007) suggests '[i]fthe
system is consumer-driven, then it is much less vulnerable to manipulation,
either by a powerful group of elites or by inchoate masses' (ibid: 1281).
However, even in the contemporary era of free market ideology, when
censorship was officially banned, the debate surrounding the degree to which
Russian media can be considered free is still on-going. The application of the
PrM will allow us to understand and justify to what extent this freedom is
restricted and by whom. Furthermore, this model will allow for an
understanding of the characteristics and peculiarities of the Russian media
policy on climate change issues.
The chapter will discuss the Russian media system through the prism of
the PrM. Each filter will be applied to the Russian case and consideration given
to how it has changed over time and what were the dominating factors which
led to the current state of the Russian mass media. Based on data from a series
of in-depth interviews the analysis will be situated within the context of the
discussion of climate change coverage, hence, before the chapter will embark
on the suggested study, it will briefly discuss some peculiarities of the 'elite
interviews' method with regards to this research study.
Interviewing 'elites': methodological considerations
As mentioned in the introduction of this thesis, for this research I conducted 30
in-depth interviews throughout Russia with key figures who are either directly
involved in producing information on climate change, influence climate
coverage, are connected with the state policy making process in the area of
climate change, or represent Russian climate science. It has to be noted, that by
using elite interviews for data collection this project contests the ideas of the
22 See more on the role of media during the period of glasnost in Mickiewicz
(1999).
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main theoretical approach. Herman and Chomsky purposefully did not use
interviews in their study since according to their ideas even if some journalists
state that they do not feel any constraints in their work, it does not mean that
much (see more in chapter two). The whole system, the context in which they
operate, influences the media production process everyday and in such a way
that journalists would indeed not feel any influence on their work, but willingly
adjust information according to elite interests. However, in this research on
media coverage of climate change in Russia, elite interviews serve two
purposes. Firstly, by diversifying the methods for data collection, elite
interviews allow the researcher to not blindly follow the PrM's approach but
critically examine its applicability by testing various factors involved in media
coverage. For example, all of my respondents pointed out that the main
problem of media coverage of climate change in Russia is not that some
interested groups actively twist the information, but that there is a general lack
of interest in the topic (see more in chapter six). This is something which could
not be concluded from either content or discourse media analysis. At the same
time, as interviews were conducted with journalists and representatives of
NGOs, policy makers and climatologists, a better understanding of what
constitutes elite interests as well as what shapes the broader politico-social
context of climate change problems in Russia was achieved. Considering the
scarcity of literature on the subject, elite interviews also allowed for an
understanding of the interviewee's personal attitudes towards the problem as
well as to reconstruct events which were missing from the written information
(Tansey 2007).
Elite interviews suggest that a low number of respondents is substituted
by the interviewees' high rank or their key position and deep knowledge of the
subject. Mostly because of the respondents' status and importance to the
project, elite interviews require advanced skills from the researcher. A number
of researchers outlined various mistakes or obstacles which could be
encountered by the interviewer. Among them: difficulties with getting
interviews in a sense of identifying the key figures or getting access to high-
profile policy makers (Goldstein 2002); defining the purpose and structure of
the interview (Aberbach and Rockman 2002, Leech 2002); choice and
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construction of the questions (Berry 2002); and ethical aspects of interviews
(Woliver 2(02). Conducting interviews in Russia also involves some other
specific problems which to a certain degree were reflected by Werning Rivera
et al. (2002). These include: difficulties in gaining access to key people and
arranging interviews (the absence of secretaries or personal assistants for
politicians or inefficient use of emails are important challenges); less
experience with the interview process (in comparison to Western countries);
unfamiliarity with academic research (it is difficult to explain the purpose of
your inquiry and to get an adequate response).
All of these problems were experienced and resolved during this research
project. Interviews were arranged in advance through emails or telephone calls.
The nature and purpose of academic research was explained beforehand, with
full disclosure of how the material will be used. All interviewees were asked on
questions of anonymity (one of them agreed to speak only if hislher name and
position are not mentioned and in some cases only parts of interviewees'
responses were anonymised) and they were informed that the transcripts of
interviews and any published material would be provided upon request. In one
way or another all questions were based around the five filters suggested by the
PrM inviting interviewees to share their opinion on how ownership structure,
advertising, information sources, flak or ideology might influence the media
coverage of climate change in Russia. The interview questions were modified
depending on what group an interviewee belonged to (journalists, activists,
scientists, policy makers) and respondents were also invited to share their
opinions in case they think that none of these factors play any role.
In addition to the above mentioned challenges with conducting
interviews, researching climate change media coverage presents another
specific obstacle: there is an extremely limited number of people with
sufficient knowledge on the subject matter. Only four journalists were
identified who regularly work on the problem of climate change in Russia. In
other cases, journalists were either generally writing on environmental topics
or randomly covering the climate change topic without any specialised
knowledge. In the case of policy makers, the situation was even more
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pessimistic, as will be discussed in detail in chapter four, in Russia there is a
very vague understanding of which institution is in charge of climate policy,
hence, once again it makes it complicated to fmd the 'right' person with
sufficient knowledge of the problem (unfortunately, high ranking politicians
involved in this process were not reached). An extremely valuable source of
information became NGO representatives. Due to their diversity and deep
understanding of the problem, they did not only provide the vision of the
problem as activists, but also they themselves acted as journalists, news
sources, scientists (often they have an advanced academic degree), and some of
them actually contribute to developing Russia's climate policy or take part in
international negotiations as members of Russia's official delegation.
The data collected by means of 'elite interviewing' will be applied in this
chapter in order to demonstrate whether coverage of the climate change topic
in Russia can be explained through the application of the PrM, however, the
gathered data will also be utilised throughout the dissertation in order to
support or clarify certain arguments.
Ownership structure
When talking about the barriers created by the 'ownership' filter Herman and
Chomsky (1994 [1988]) warn of the monopolisation of the media market in the
United States, where a few major conglomerates own and provide financial
security for the major media outlets in the country and occasionally steer their
information policy in the 'right' direction. The ownership structure of Russian
mass media only distantly resembles the American situation, being
significantly transformed over the last 25 years, it has become a hybrid where
market forces do playa role but are subordinate to the state.
During the Soviet era the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union)
was the general manager of mass media in Russia, regulating its activity
through official party legislation. The Party strictly controlled all aspects of
news production processes starting with volume, frequency, content, design
and ending with the editor's relations with the audience. Media was the
propaganda tool to achieve the aims of the Party (Strovskiy 2011). As Coyne
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and Leeson (2009: 9) state the 'media was central to the Soviet propaganda
system', supporting this argument they refer to Lenin's understanding of the
mass media's role in achieving the revolution and building the new societal
order. Indeed, in Lenin's (1969 [1902]) famous work 'Chto delat'?' (What is to
be done?) he proclaimed newspapers to be a collective propagandist and
collective agitator, but also collective organiser. In his definition Lenin
compares newspapers with scaffolding which are not a part of the house, but
without them you cannot build it. Voltmer (2000: 478) states that Lenin's
vision of mass media is 'in obvious contradiction to western journalistic
norms', albeit she also admits that some of his postulates are still relevant in
the current situation.
Even when the time of the revolution passed, the ability of newspapers to
organise people remained quite similar - 'to implement the directives and
policies of the central government' (Mickiewicz 1981: 68). Lenin's ideas were
carried on by Stalin and Khrushchev, who were 'using mass media to
communicate official news, educate and instill ideology, and present an
idealized view of Soviet life' (Coyne and Leeson 2009: 9). Throughout the
Soviet era many newspapers were unprofitable but their financial problems
were always solved by their owner - the Party. The CPSU committee was also
in charge of hiring editors and journalists, practically all of them were the
Party's workers and they were achieving the Party's goals through the means
of language. Work under such conditions demanded certain behaviour from
journalists. Their professional norms were restricted by discipline, acceptance
of editorial decisions and fear of breaking rules (Grabel'nikov 2(01). Self-
censorship is a related problem and is discussed in greater detail below.
After the split of the USSR, the CPSU which used to determine Soviet
press policy became part of history. Some argue that after decades of being the
propaganda tool of the Soviet government, during perestroika Russian mass
media 'turned against' its patron and played a significant role in bringing it
down. Not undermining other crucial reasons for the Soviet system's collapse
Coyne and Leeson (2009: 11) conclude that 'eroding economic, political, and
social conditions were important factors giving media the space to create the
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common knowledge required to activate the tipping point necessary for this
change'. The new regime and new role of media in society demanded a new
type of ownership structure. To be able to speak on behalf of the whole society
and critically assess the government's performance, and give different
perspectives on the political, economic and societal events, Russian mass
media in an ideal situation needed to become as independent as was possible.
So, the law of mass media which was accepted in 1990 and then changed again
in 1991 established the right to own mass media for not only the Party, but also
for non-governmental commercial organisations and even private individuals.
As a result the majority of the Party media outlets were replaced by
independent press created on the basis of journalists' collectives. The vertical
system of media press (from the state central newspaper Pravda to regional
press), which was functioning on the territory of the USSR for several decades
(Richter 1995, see also in Mickiewicz 1981), was replaced by a horizontal
structure which was more appropriate for the democratic principles of the new
state. Unfortunately, the newspapers did not stay in the hands of journalists for
a long time and instead of the CPSU press, Russia got media with various
ownership structures. Along with state and NGO ownership, mass media
belongs to individuals, closed joint-stock companies, open joint-stock
companies, limited liability companies and so on.
The reduction of state controlled to a competitive market for mass media.
From that point on, media outlets have had to solve problems connected with
the economic side of the media production process on their own and find ways
to exist in the developing capitalist society and to make profit (Kuznetsov
2(03). According to the postulates of the PrM discussed earlier, this sort of
pressure should make media find support with more financially stable and
powerful actors in the free market system which indeed has happened in the
Russian case. Simultaneously, these 'powerful actors' very quickly came to the
realisation that mass media can be a source of making a profit, and, perhaps
more importantly, it might also be a tool to realize corporate and commercial
interests (Zasurskiy 2(01).
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The law of mass media which brought long-desired freedom also had
some loopholes which worsened the situation by not clarifying the role of the
media's owner (Zasurskiy 2004), in particular how much the owner can
interfere in the news production process. This ambiguity along with other
factors led to negative consequences. The media found themselves in a
situation where their owner would not openly demonstrate his influence on the
news flow, pretending that the media organ is just there to inform people up
until the time when he needs to use it in his own interest (such as to conduct an
information war against the rivals) (Grabel'nikov 2(01). In this period of time
Russian media once again started to lose their independence, but this time due
to commercial reasons rather than ideological ones, is famous for the
emergence of oligarchs into the media market (see more in Lipman and
McFaul 2(01). For example, at some point Berezovsky's group owned ORT
(now the First Channel), TV-6, Kommersant, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Novye
Izvestiya, Ogonek and others. Another infamous oligarch, Vladimir Gusinsky,
owned NTV, NTV+, TNT, the newspaper Segodnya, magazines ftogi, Sem'
dney, Karavan istoriy, radio Ekho Moskvy; whilst the newspapers Izvestiya,
Komsomol Iskaya pravda, Afisha and Bol Ishoy gorod belonged to Vladimir
Potanin. Among the obvious negative consequences of the media monopolies
created by these people Mikhail Nenashev (2010b) connects these negative
events with the change in Russian mass media towards open manipulation of
its audience in the interests of their owners.
Herman and Chomsky's (1994 [1988]) original vision of corporate
influence over the American media industry and the monopolisation of the
market can be compared with the role of oligarchs in the Russian case, who
arguably represent very similar market forces. What seems to be different in
this situation is not so much the media's relationship to its owner, but rather the
close relationship of the owners to the state. For example, now most of the
above mentioned media outlets do not exist or the owner has changed. This
mostly happened due to the last dramatic change in the Russian media
ownership structure when Vladimir Putin first took the post of Russian
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President in March 2000.23 Shortly after the start of this new era in Russian
domestic politics, a series of events restricting press freedom and centralising
its ownership in the hands of government started to occur (Zassoursky 2004).
Oligarchs who were not in favour with the current leader eventually had to give
up their media empires, which then became the property of organisations with
tight state connections (governmental or private sector, or something between
the two) or another oligarch but one who supported the Kremlin24 (see more in
Orttung 2(06). Gusinsky's Media Holding owned the last major TV channel
without the government's influence but after he was forced to leave the country
his media conglomerate was sold out (Pasti and Pietilainen 2(08).
Currently, the number of fully independent media organs is very limited2S
and they exist only due to their insignificance, restricted target audience or
their limited territorial influence (the major TV channels which cover 99
percent of Russian territory are all under government control). Ellen
Mickiewicz (2008) refers to a case in 2006 when Putin, in response to the
critique of media freedom in Russia, stated that according to his information
the state's share in the media market was declining and the number of
newspapers is growing, so it seemed impossible (to him) to control over 53,000
periodicals. Mickiewicz (2008) points out that among the impressive amount of
23Becker (2004) states that due to Putin's policy, the Russian media situation
significantly dropped down in the various ratings measuring freedom of speech.
For example, in 200 1 the Committee to Protect Journalists included him in the
'Ten Worst Enemies of the Press' list. Russia became one out of only five
countries on the list of the states 'endangered with becoming repressive'
(International Press Institute's Watch) and 'the Reporters without Borders'
referred to Putin's media policy as 'too grotesque to be true' (ibid: 140).
24Even though the owners of the major media entities often state that they try
to stay aside from media policy and their corporate arrangements, recent events
which happened with the influential newspaper Kommersant- Vlast' tell the
opposite story. After its provocative coverage of the parliamentary elections in
December 2011 (with references to frauds by the United Russia and a
photograph of one of the ballots with insults towards Putin), its owner oligarch
Alisher Usmanov recommended the dismissal of the editor-in-chief and the
~eneral director of the publication's holding company (Schwirtz 2011).
_5 According to the former Russian Ministry of Press, in 2003 only around 10
percent of press media had relative economic independence (predominately
managed through the collective ownership of the journalists), whilst the
majority of media organs belonged to the state or private owners (Nenashev
201Ob).
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Russian press mentioned by the president there were only a very limited
number which had 'a decent circulation' and the influential ones were indeed
to a great extent controlled by the state or 'clients of the government' .
Besides the vast formal state ownership of media outlets, the state also
has influence through the Ministry of Culture and Mass Communication which
gives licences, publishes laws and regulations. The state also has a monopoly
over information transmitting equipment such as satellites (De Smaele 2(07).
Coyne and Leeson (2009) argue that the negative picture of Russian media
ownership structures is threatening Russia's democratic development and
'could not reinforce political and economic reforms' (ibid: 11). Nenashev
(2010a) shares the same views on the problem by stating that the independence
of the journalists' professional community is impossible due to the
confrontation of the great administrative resources of the state and the financial
resources of big business.
As far as the problem of the coverage of climate change goes, the
changes which happened during Putin' s centralisation of power has also had a
long-term effect. The majority of the most important and popular media belong
not only to the government and its close partners, but also they belong to the
individuals and organisations with heavy interests in the oil, gas or other
industries which significantly contribute to Russia's GHG emissions.f'' The
climate change and economic justice programme coordinator in Oxfam (Russia)
Yulia Yevtushok states that these specifications of the Russian media
26 For example, Gazprom-Media Holding owns federal TV channel NTV, radio
stations 'Ekho Moskvy', Relax FM, magazines ftogi, Karavan /storiy,
Panorama TV, and the newspaper Tribuna (Gazprom-Media website 2013).
Alisher Usmanov, the main shareholder of Metalloinvest (one of the largest
steel producers in the world), co-owns media-holding Kommersant and the TV
channel 7TV. ONEXIM Group (a private investment fund with interests in
energy, mmmg and other industries) owns the news agency
RosBimesKonsalting, the newspaper RBK daily, magazines RBK, M2, Nashi
Den 'gi, Autonews, and Lifetime. An even bigger company but with similar
interests, Interros, owns media holding ProtMedia which manages TV channels
TV3, MTV-Russia, and 2x2, the radio stations Avtoradio, Energy, Radio
Romantika, and Humour FM, newspaper Afisha, Russian search
engine www.rambler.ru and websites www.lenta.ru, www.afisharu,
www.lOl.ru (Media Atlas 2013).
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ownership structure are the main reasons why so often (until a few years ago)
newspapers and TV would report that climate change is a lie, a deception
created by the West (interview, Moscow, 22 July 2011). The media outlets
with an ownership structure significantly dominated by the state are obviously
much more heavily influenced by it. For instance, the predominantly state-
owned information agency RIA Novosti (which will be discussed later on in
greater detail) started to cover the climate change topic shortly after President
Medvedev introduced the Climate Doctrine and made his appearance at the
Copenhagen Conference in 2009. As a journalist of another state-owned media
outlet 'GTRK-Novosibirsk' Olga Salagina said:
I was almost forced to write about environmental problems around
three years ago. My editor told me to do it which has never
happened before. I guess there was some kind of task set for my
management. When we started our project [series of video news on
environmental problems] even people in the city council said that
probably 'federals' [state official at the federal level] started to care
about it [environment] (interview, Chemal, 13 August 2011).
Nevertheless, in the situation of strong interdependence between the
energy sector and the state, it always has to be considered with caution whether
it matters if the media outlet is straightforwardly owned by the government or
by, for instance, gas giants like 'Gazprom'.
Concluding, with regards to the 'ownership filter' of the PrM, it is
important to realise the great influence of the state. In Russia the majority of
the media belongs to people or"organisations with their main interests outside
of the media industry (Koltsova 2(06) and since media entities themselves are
largely unprofitable businesses, their owners 'see media first of all as weapons
to gain political capital' (Koltsova 200 1: 322). Even in the original study of the
Western (capitalist) media system of the United States, Herman and Chomsky
in their discussion of the ownership filter also pointed to the 'impressive
political ties with media'. Once again, it should be noted that if in the
American situation business can be both influencing and influenced by the
state, in Russia it is more of a one way street with government imposing its
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rules of the game on businesses. So, because it is very difficult to separate in
Russia the state and business then regardless of whether the newspaper is
owned by the government directly or by a large corporation, the goals of its
owners are the same. Lastly, as was demonstrated by examples in the case of
climate change coverage, this filter is also influenced by the fact of the merging
of the state and the energy sector - the main contributor to Russia's GHG
emissions.
Advertising
Herman and Chomsky (1994 [1988]) described the 'advertising' filter as a
powerful free market tool for altering media content. In Russia advertising
came into the media sector relatively recently along with the collapse of the old
state system. The old ideology of production, which was supported by the state
and should have benefited its prosperity, was replaced by the new ideology of
consumerism which aims to satisfy individual needs (Grabel'nikov 2(01). This
thought is echoed by Oates and McCormack (2010: 122)who claim that 'there
are two significant trends in Russian media content, one linked to market
forces and the other to political pressures'. Political pressures have been
discussed in the section on the media ownership structure and will be discussed
further on in the chapter whilst the 'market forces' are the most relevant for
this section in the context of the 'advertising filter'.
Due to the emerging ideology of the free market, Russian media have
been adjusted accordingly. For instance, politically-oriented newspapers lost
their circulation and can exist only by relying on the money of the supporting
party. The so called informative-commercial press have the biggest circulations
and popularity. This type of Russian media organ is very close in its format to
the Western tabloids, which are eager to attract their readers by writing about
scandals, show-business or sensationalist stories (including climate change).
The informative-commercial press is very flexible and depends on the market's
supply and demand logic and that is why its quantity is always changing. Some
papers replace others or change their content to fit audience interests
(Grabel'nikov 2(01). Ironically, these media organs are considered to be
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independent because they can exist without state support by giving lots of
space to advertising. However, by getting their independence from state
ideology, the media are becoming the most powerful tool for the propaganda of
the ideology of consumerism. This said, it should be.acknowledged that when
advertising was first introduced in Russia in the early 1990s it took some time
for people to get used to it and for the industry to adopt it, so for the majority
of media organs advertising remained just a supplementary source of income."
Overall, the advertising market in Russia has steadily grown over the last
decade. Krylov and Zuenkova's (2003) analysis has showed that by 2003
advertising growth exceeded the country's GDP growth by five times. Even
though advertising budgets still might be lower than in countries where
advertising is very important like the United States, the market is increasing
and it cannot be ignored. Viktor Kolomiets, a professor at the faculty of
Journalism of the Lomonosov Moscow State University, explains the growth of
advertising in Russia by such factors as political stabilisation of the society
which led to the growth of investments, including in advertising, the growth of
the purchasing capabilities of the audience and an increase in the
competitiveness among businesses (see in Krylov and Zuenkova 2(03).
Grabel'nikov (2006) vigorously argues that throughout the years of
market reforms Russian media also acquired the market features of 'bourgeois
journalism' by copying the Western models where ratings and advertisers take
the first place and move the audience's interests to the background. From
another point of view, a Russian 'special way' of doing things could be
observed in this case as well, as Russian media did not simply copy the
Western way of conducting media business, but reproduced it adjusting for its
national context. For instance, in the Russian case the boundaries between the
powers of advertisers, owners, sponsors or investors ate blurred, but owners
still remain at the top of this hierarchy. As was discussed in chapter two
27 Koltsova (2006) names three reasons behind the slow development of
advertising in Russia: first, the low purchasing capacity of the audience; second,
people were not ready for this new way of goods-promotion and businesses did
not have experience of how to use this tool to their advantage; and last,
unfavourable legislation which was rather limiting for media which were trying
to build their business on income from advertisements.
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Herman and Chomsky do not suggest the absolute equality of all filters or on
the contrary the domination of one filter over another (and in their research the
domination of the owners was not demonstrated), but rather they state that the
importance of the filters depends on the politico-economic specifications of the
particular case study.
A number of scholars who applied the PrM in their research (for example
see Hearns-Branaman 2009, Lewis 2010, Edwards and Cromwell 2006),
noticed that according to its logic the 'advertising' filter substantially
influences the coverage of environmental topics in general and climate change
in particular. For the Russian media this does not seem to be the case. For
example" the TV news programme 'GTRK-Novosibirsk' journalist Olga
Salagina shared her experience on writing an article which created tension with
the channel's advertisers. Some time ago Salagina found out that one of the
industries not far from her city had major faults in utilisation of its waste,
hence, she decided to raise the alarm, but the channel's bosses asked her 'to be
nice' to the company, because they had a good contract with this organisation-
'we help them with PR and they pay'. Despite the 'recommendation' Salagina
still prepared her programme, after which they indeed had problems with this
company, but it did not last long and their relations were soon re-established
and carried on (interview, Chemal, 13 August 2011). Other interviewees also
denied noticing advertisers' direct influence on their everyday work. As the
former news editor at the Channel One Yuriy Bakhnov suggested, 'I doubt that
advertisers are only interested in numbers [ratings], but they want to know a bit
about the content, for example, they would avoid programmes with open
criticism of the Kremlin. Still, disagreements with the advertisers will not
cause much trouble; the media outlet might just lose a bit of money' (interview,
Moscow, 22 July 2011). Perhaps this filter is more of an issue for the editors
rather than correspondents, or in the Russian case its influence is quite
marginal in comparison to other fllters.28 Belin (2001: 328) argues that the
28 Interestingly, even the limited influence of advertisers is perceived in Russia
much more negatively than the one exercised by the media owners (Koltsova
2001). This may be related to the country's past, in which people were quite
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number of media outlets in Russia (in particular in Moscow) does not represent
'the consumer demand or the size of the advertising market', because of the
priority of the political use of the newspapers, when owners are willing to have
financial losses in order to have access to the 'political' mass media (see more
in Vartanova 2012).
Another specific characteristic of the Russian filter is that the advertising
market is quite centralised and connected with ratings mostly in the central part
of the country or large cities (for example, Moscow or Novosibirsk); on its
outskirts it is more hectic and is missing any kind of systematisation (Koltsova
2011). The regional media outlets struggle to maintain contact with sufficient
amounts of advertisers and to gain their loyalty media become much more
dependent on advertisers and as Koltsova (2001: 324) concludes, from her
research based on extensive fieldwork in Russia, that this situation leads to a
'large amount of hidden advertisement'. This way of solving financial
problems was especially popular during the early 1990s by writing articles with
hidden messages promoting certain interests within them (so called 'dzhinsa'
or 'zakaz') (Zhukova 2007). When they did so, journalists or editors were
getting extra profit (Belin 2(02). These articles were paid unofficially (directly
to the editor or a journalist) and unfortunately, sometimes they contained some
aggressive accusations against certain political figures" or businessmen. Since
they were disguised as objective journalistic opinion pieces, they would gain
greater audience attention than the official advertisements. Currently this
problem still exists to some extent, though the quality of articles has
significantly improved. Returning again to the PrM, the existence of such
used to state control, whilst attributes of the new capitalist ideology are still
new to them.
29 One of the most famous examples would be Sergey Dorenko's 'TV war
campaign' against the then mayor of Moscow Yuriy Luzhkov and the Prime
Minister Evgeniy Primakov who according to different sources was one of the
main opponents of Vladimir Putin (who was running for the presidential post).
Dorenko's position was argued by a journalist from another TV channel -
Evgeniy Kiselev. As Strovskiy (2011) states this battle was motivated by
political ambition of the TV channels owners - oligarchs Berezovsky and
Gusinsky (see more in Belin 2001, Zassoursky 2004).
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phenomena as hidden advertising makes it difficult to separate advertiser from
information sources (Koltsova 2006).
In conclusion, the advertising filter in the Russian media system has
some very specific differences to the one introduced by Herman and Chomsky
for the United States. These start with the very recent appearance of
advertisement as an industry in Russia and its slow development due to the
economic problems the country faced in the 1990s, and end with the blurred
boundaries between advertisers' and owners' interests and even more with the
merging of the state and advertising industry'? (Koltsova 2006). This last point
fits within the larger problem of the extremely close interrelations between the
state and business, which will be discussed further on in this dissertation with
regards to the energy sector. It can be suggested that in the Russian case the
advertising filter on its own is quite weak (which was also confirmed by the
interviewees) and can quite easily be ignored in some situations.
Sourcing
Referring again to the recent past of Russia, it can be said that the 'sources of
information' filter is one of the most modified filters (not considering the
advertising filter which did not exist before at all). Under the rule of the Soviet
government, journalists have been immensely restricted in the ways they could
fmd information on the topic or receive comments from the parties involved,
which led to the situation when 'a limited flow of information was the norm'
(de Smaele 2007: 1300). Due to the journalists' inability to fully inform people
of the acute problems. the existing informational gap was filling up through the
informal ways of communication when Soviet people through their personal
connections were trying to make sense out of current political or social events.
After 1990 citizens' right to seek and obtain information (as well as
distribute it) was recorded in the new Russian Constitution (1993) as well as in
30 One of the examples of the close connections between the state and
advertising markets are companies Premier SV and Video International which
throughout the last decade have had exclusive rights to sell the advertising
space in major national TV channels and which have demonstrated close ties
with the state (Belin 2(01).
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the Law on Mass Media. Theoretically from that time onwards journalists can
'knock on any door' and ask almost any questions they wish and nobody
should prevent them from doing so or refuse to give information as it would be
considered illegal (of course apart from some sensitive topics such as personal
data, state or military secrets which are specified in the law"). Furthermore,
the change in the Russian media system at the end of the last century was
accompanied by the establishment and development of new professional
activity - public relations. The role of PR services has been discussed by
various researchers with regards to the 'sourcing' filter of the PrM. Russia as
well as other Western countries encountered the same problems here: various
'press centres, press services, press secretaries [... ] were intended to facilitate
journalists' access to information' (De Smaele 2007: 1301). In reality PR
services became another obstacle in the way of obtaining data, since their goal
was to provide information which only or largely benefits the organisation.
Governmental, commercial and other press centres tend to face opposite
problems to the journalists' problems. They compete with each other to be able
to get their information published or broadcasted, it is not a secret that to
present a company's information as news is a free and more effective way to
advertise the company. At the same time, only certain information needs to be
popularized whilst other information needs to be hidden or at least presented in
the most beneficial way (Chumikov 2001).
The phenomenon of journalism being replaced by PR technologies in
Russia has often been criticised by scholars studying the Russian mass media.
Skilfully prepared information by corporate media specialists does not leave
much space for the journalists' investigation, analysis, or reflection' on the
problem (Bogdanov cited in Grabel'nikov 2006). Arguably, it leads to the
degradation of the profession as such and allows sources of information not
only to provide valuable opinions on the subject matter, but also to dictate the
way that it will be written and delivered to the audience.!t can be suggested
31 Interestingly, in the new law ecological data fell into the category of
information which requires full exposure so it cannot be hidden from public
whilst during the Soviet Union on contrary it was under the taboo (de Smaele
2007).
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that because of well-developed PR services, business or state organisations do
not need to control media as often (Koltsova 200 1), the distribution of
information that is needed happens 'naturally'.
De Smaele (2007) argues that one of the specific characteristics of
journalism in Russia is the relatively important role in gaining information
through personal connections. She refers to a study conducted in Voronezh in
2002 on the subject of the usefulness of personal connections for journalists.
The results of this research showed that 70 percent of official written inquiries
from journalists and the public were declined, whereas only 36 percent. of those
inquiries which were made through personal approach got rejected.
Interestingly, as Konovalov (see de Smaele 2007: 1303) suggests in the
Russian case informal communication is the way to work within the constraints
of secrecy mentioned earlier (such as vague definitions of state, military or
business secrets). Furthermore, Russian journalists tend to have some kind of a
rank attached to each newsmaker. Katja Koikkalainen (2008) suggests that for
journalists the most preferable sources would be the ones with the highest
position in the organisation or with whom journalists have informal
connections.
Another peculiarity of the Russian mass media is that they are
concentrated under the large media holdings and controlled by a few owners,
hence media outlets are united horizontally (various newspapers share the same
owner) or vertically (different types of media such as TV channels, radio and
newspapers are part of one media entity). As a result different mass media
organs receive information from the same information source (Yushchenko
2007), for instance, from the same information agency such as RIA Novosti,
which will be discussed below. as one of the major information sources on
climate change in Russia.
Informing about climate
Considering the scientific complexity of the climate change topic, the choice of
information sources is extremely important and at the same time challenging
(Boykoff 2011: 59). In Russia (as in any other country). one of the main
99
information sources is the 'expert' - climatologists or other natural scientists
who directly study the problem on a daily basis and supposedly have the most
up-to-date and objective information. Also, representatives of environmental
NGOs such as WWF-Russia, Greenpeace Russia, Oxfam-Russia and so on, can
act as experts.
Throughout the series of interviews with journalists conducted for this
project, several conclusions have been reached with regards to the information
sources for the climate change topic. Firstly, Russian climatologists are not
very public people and journalists find it quite difficult to get in touch with
them besides the time when they meet them during climate change conferences.
The main scientific sources of information on this topic in Russia are the
Voeikov Main Geophysical Observatory, the Federal Service for
Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring (Roshydromet) and the
Institute of Global Climate and Environment, whose members often become
part of the Russian delegation at the UN conferences on climate change.
At the regional level the situation is much worse, journalists struggle to
identify who they need to approach. A correspondent of the regional newspaper
'Svobodnyy kurs' (Altay region) admitted that when she started to write about
climate change she could not find any experts in her city and she was forced to
look for sources in other cities and regions (interview, Chemal, 13 August
2011). Sometimes journalists cannot get the necessary information because
scientists do not want to give their opinion if it goes against official interests
(various interviews, July-August 2012). As a result journalists often remain
alone with their problem: 'even if we [joumalists] understand that officials or
businessmen do something wrong like damage the environment, we cannot
object to them because our opinion is not qualified on the topic' (Salagina,
interview, Chemal, 13 August 2011). Another problem of addressing scientists
and experts as information sources was voiced by the correspondent of BBC-
Russia Oleg Boldyrev (interview, Moscow, 25 July 2011), he stated that one of
the main reasons behind the low coverage of climate change in Russia is a
disagreement within the scientific community and even a great degree of
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scepticism among Russian scientists which was quite popular until very
recently (for more on this problem see chapter four on Russian state policy).
In the case of climate change coverage NGOs play a great role, for
instance, the prominent climate change spokesperson and climate change
programme coordinator at the WWF-Russia, Alexey Kokorin, has become one
of the most quoted people on climate change in Russia. His expertise on the
subject as well as skills to communicate with the mass media helps him to
build long-term and mutually favourable relations with journalists. Kokorin
states that his motto in communication with media is 'never say 'no' to them',
so he always tries to explain and advise journalists on the problem, which will
hopefully contribute to better coverage. However. he adds that this rule does
not apply to TV talk-shows or some scandalous cases when journalists try to
create a scary spoof story rather than discuss the real problem (interview,
Moscow, 27 July 2011). Caution when providing information for TV
journalists was also raised by another NGO representative. The manager of the
project on energy efficiency in Greenpeace Russia, Igor Podgorny, said that it
is easier for him to deliver his message to print media where he has more
control over the final outcome, whilst in the TV programmes words often get
taken out of context and do not fit within the overall content of the programme
(interview, Moscow, 27 July 2007).
Interestingly enough, in some cases during the major international
conferences on climate change when the official Russian delegation fails to
provide any kind of information for mass media through NGO representatives,
even Russian journalists themselves help to deliver the Russian official
position on climate change to journalists from other countries. This paradoxical
situation is a result of the poor publicity of the official Russian delegation at
the UN conferences. As Olga Dobrovidova from RIA Novosti noticed 'it seems
that the Russian delegation has a position that it is better not to say anything at
all in order not to get unwanted questions' (interview, Moscow, 22 July 2011).
Another criticism of the Russian official delegation as an information source
relates to the composition of the delegation: 'during the conference on climate
change in Bonn, the American delegation which did not sign the Kyoto
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Protocol had 25 members whilst the Russian one only 7, and they simply did
not have expertise on some questions' (Yevtushok, Oxfam-Russia, interview,
Moscow, 22 July 2011). In some cases NGOs even try to defend Russian
officials. Kokorin explained this paradox: 'when we are here, in Moscow, I
always criticize our officials, but in front of media from other countries, it
becomes more important to explain Russia's position rather than let it be
blamed for all the sins' (interview, Moscow, 27 July 2011). In general Russian
environmental NGOs 'use' international conferences to attract as much
attention to the problem as possible by creating special web pages, blogs,
press-releases and other print or electronic material. It seems that only in
exceptional situations Russian NGOs fmd themselves in demand by journalists,
whilst during. 'quiet' times attracting their attention becomes a struggle:
'especially until the end of 2009, almost nobody was interested in the topic
despite all of our 'inventions'. We tried to organise various events and action
days, but the results were almost negative', - said Yulia Yevtushok from
Oxfam-Russia (interview, Moscow, 22 July 2011).
The above mentioned organisations are mostly located in the central part
of Russia (mostly Moscow), in other regions the situation is even less
optimistic. The attention of mass media is even more difficult to attract
especially because it is more difficult to make the topic relevant to specific
geographical areas. However, NGOs have found another way to provide
information on climate change and attract attention to the problem by
organising seminars devoted to climate change problems for journalists. In
August 2011 the NGO 'Centre of environmental innovations' (Tsentr
ekologicheskikh innovatsiy), with the financial help of. the United States
Agency of International Development (USAID) and with the local support of
the NGO Altai Regional Public Fund 'Altai - 21st Century' organised a media-
training event: 'Les i izmeneniya klimata: problemy i resheniya' (Forest and
climate change: problems and solutions (which this author attended)). The
training took place in the picturesque village of Chemal in the Republic of
Altai, where over four days journalists from the various central and regional
media outlets learnt how to cover climate change related topics and also had a
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chance to talk to experts and get information first hand on climate change
consequences for Russia.
According to one of the organisers of the seminar, Elena Surovikina,
their goal was to bring together journalists from different regions (centre and
periphery) and different types of media (print, TV, radio) so in addition to
other outcomes of the seminars they would share with each other their own
experiences of working on this topic (interview, Chemal, 14August 2011). By
the end of the seminar each journalist prepared at least one article devoted to
climate change, but for the organisers of the training the main goal was to
educate journalists about the problem and interest them in the long-run, so that
they would pay greater attention to the problem throughout their careers. They
are convinced that the seminars they organised before significantly improved
not only journalists' knowledge and understanding of the problem but also the
general level of awareness of the problem among the population (Andrey
Stetsenko, Centre of Environmental Innovations, interview, Chemal, 14August
2011). Journalists-participants also consider this kind of activity a way to solve
the problem of scarce sources of information on climate change, since it allows
journalists to understand what the problem is about and who they should
approach in case they want to cover it and also what the consequences of
climate change are for everyone, including people who read their articles or
watch their programmes (various interviews and observations, Chemal, 12-15
August 2011).
State official information sources - main newsmakers on climate change?
'Impenetrable!' ('Neprobivaemye!'), - this was how the journalist of the
regional radio station 'GTRK-Altay' and a host of the radio-programme
'Perekrestok' ('Intersection') Yuliya Mikhaylova described the local officials
in their role as information sources (interview, Chemal, 13 August 2011). She
added that when she tries to talk to officials about such sensitive topics as
environmental change it is extremely difficult to get through to them:
In our 'city - Barnaul (Altay region), there is a divide:
representatives of the city authorities are very closed for
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communication (they demand endless confmnations with their
press-service) whilst regional authorities easily agree to give a
comment, but their usual response is that everything is good and
that they are working on all problems, so it is almost impossible to
get the real information out of them.
Mikhaylova admitted that eventually she stopped trying to organise
meetings with them since it always comes down to the official line rather than
any kind of discussion. The climate change host at the radio station, 'Voice of
Russia', John Harrison shared a similar opinion:
It is very difficult to find somebody in the government to take part
in my programme. Because until recently [Medvedev's
announcement of the anthropogenic character of climate change],
half of the government did not consider that climate change would
be a problem at all, therefore appearing on the programme on
climate change would be counterproductive to them, and the other
half are afraid to take part in any media show or articles (Skype
interview, 18 June 2012).
From another side, quite often interviewees stated that in one way or
another the main 'newsmakers' in the country, which for the topic of climate
change includes President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir
Putin (their posts at the time of the interviews). There is a mutual agreement
that in the last few years the climate change topic caught on mostly due to the
'right' information coming from the heads of state: 'it is already good news for
us that Medvedev started to admit the existence of the problem - the
Conference was somehow covered only because at the last moment Medvedev
decided to go there' (Podgorny, the energy efficiency project campaigner at
Greenpeace Russia, interview, Moscow, 27 July 2011); 'the situation has
changed after the Copenhagen Conference, Russia saw economic benefits and
the President announced a new direction' (Davydova, correspondent for the
newspaper 'Kommersant', Skype interview, 7 July 2011); 'I would like to
believe that our main newsmaker [Putin] will change the situation and make
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climate change a public problem' (Dobrovidova, RIA Novosti, interview,
Moscow 20 July 2011).
All of the above mentioned interviewees and a few others also expressed
hope that more attention will be paid to the climate change topic with the
appointment of the President's advisor on climate change issues, Professor
Alexander Bedritsky (see chapter four for more about this appointment).
Because of the importance of the Russian official elite in the question of
climate change coverage, one of the main concerns which arises out of this
situation is whether the newly elected President Putin will continue
Medvedev's more educated and more coherent policy and stance on climate
change and will keep Bedritsky, as his advisor or if we will witness more
comments such as: 'wind turbines kill worms' or 'less money will be spent on
fur coats'.
The role of information agencies as information sources - case study of RIA
Novosti
According to Koltsova's (2006) research on the Russian media system, the
hierarchy of the information sources is headed by the information agencies.
Indeed, information agencies very often become the starting point for
journalists writing articles or conducting independent investigations. The
Russian international news agency RIA Novosti is one of the biggest agencies
in the country, it also became one of the first media outlets which has devoted a
separate sub-section to climate change problems ('Pogoda i klimat' - 'weather
and climate,)32 within its bigger section on the environment. RIA Novosti has
been providing news for over 70 years and started as the Soviet Information
Bureau in 1941with the main purpose of delivering news from the battlefields
of the Second World War. Currently, it provides information for Russian and
foreign mass media, the presidential administration, Russian central and
regional governments, various ministries and diplomatic services, NGOs as
well as numerous business organisations (RIA Novosti 2012c). Through its
32After the modernisation of the website in 2012, Ria Novosti does not have
sub-sections within its main section, hence, climate change news is now
published together with other environmental news under the heading 'Ecology'
(Ekologiya).
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website the agency's information RIA Novosti targets ordinary people who
prefer to look for their news on the internet. In spite of RIA Novosti's long
history and an impressive record of service, the climate section was launched
quite recently in 2009. On a weekly basis the agency usually publishes one or
two information articles on climate change or a topic related to it, excluding
times when something extraordinary happens such as the international
conferences on climate change, in these cases the number of news articles
might rise significantly.
All news could be divided into several thematic blocks: Russia's
involvement in the problem (acceptance and realisation of the Climate Doctrine,
the work of Hydromet, Joint Implementation projects), international
negotiations, scientific findings, reports produced by the UNEP or IPCC and so
on. According to the RIA Novosti special climate correspondent Olga
Dobrovidova, since these news items are very narrow and quite complicated,
only specific people are involved in covering them (interview, Moscow, 20
July 2011). Thus around two years ago (when the section on climate was
opened) Dobrovidova was appointed to work specifically on this topic, which
made her one of the very first (and very few) journalists in Russia who
specialise on topics related to climate change. The extremely limited number of
Russian journalists writing about this topic is shown by their representation (or
under-representation) at the UN conferences on climate change, where
occasionally Dobrovidova meets a couple of her countrymen but mostly gets
'attacked' by her colleagues from other countries who are genuinely surprised
to see a Russian journalist and very curious to hear how this topic is covered in
Russia. The initiative to create such an unusual position for Russia as a
'correspondent-climatologist' was triggered by the UN Climate Change
Conference in Copenhagen in 2009 (COP-IS), as Dobrovidova said:
before it nothing was practically written about climate change (in
Russia), but after the Copenhagen [Conference] it became apparent
that from now on it will be discussed a lot. Before nothing was
happening in Russia, but after the Climate Doctrine acceptance, it
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became a topic ... however, I am not sure if there was an 'order' [by
the state] on the topic per se (ibid).
Dobrovidova describes one of the main challenges in writing about
climate change as the 'high entry barrier' - the topic demands an understanding
of quite sophisticated issues and at the end without a degree in natural sciences
'you just have to believe that there is a consensus that climate change is
happening' (ibid). Even though RIA Novosti acts as an information source for
many other mass media entities, finding its own sources on climate change
issues becomes a problem for the agency. According to Dobrovidova, it is
impossible to get a press-release from the Institute of Global Climate .and
Ecology of the Roshydromet and the Russian Academy of Sciences and most
of the time she has to spend lots of time looking for the necessary people. Also,
it is difficult to provide a balanced picture, since climate sceptics in Russia are
'insane' and they mostly think that climate change is a plot against Russia.33
'So in the end we just translate the official flow of information, trying to add
some information from abroad but we cannot create a proper discussion on the
topic, though that is not our job to do. We are just an information agency'
(ibid). Perhaps at the moment RIA Novosti is one of the most influential media
outlets in terms of covering climate change problems. However, since the
agency is also partly owned by the government their impartiality is often
questioned. Thus Yulia Yevtushok (Oxfam-Russia) admitted that their world
famous organisation Oxfam is struggling to get the attention of RIA Novosti, as
Yevtushok puts it: 'They are used to working with the WWF-Russia and
Greenpeace-Russia, but they are not sure if we are not 'harmful' [for the state]'
(interview, Moscow, 22 July 2011).
In conclusion, as much as the 'sourcing' filter has some internationally
common features due to the nature of journalism and the growing institution of
PR, when analysing media coverage of climate change in Russia it is important
33 Interestingly, a few other journalists also evaluated the difficulty in finding
an adequate sceptical position on the problem as a negative one. As was
discussed in chapter one, by internalising the 'balance norm' which rather
distorts the information on climate change, Russian journalists follow the trend
which was observed in the Western media several years ago and which has
been acknowledged as no longer relevant.
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to keep in mind the specifications of the Russian media. De Smaele (2007)
argues that due to the restricted access of information during the Soviet period,
information became an 'elitists' commodity who's flow was controlled by a
'powerful minority' (ibid: 1310, see also in de Smaele 2(02). In the modem era
the situation drastically changed, however, the selectivity of the information
flow and privileged access to it remains. Even in the case of global problems
like climate change, which affects absolutely everyone regardless of their
social status and level of knowledge on the subject, Russian journalists struggle
to find information. Experts possess valuable knowledge but prefer not to get
involved in such politicised issues. News agencies are very useful, but most of
the time they are good only for journalists to get a general idea (it is a starting
point for further development of the story). Russian NGOs are not so
authoritative (especially on the regional level and especially in comparison to
their foreign colleagues), so the media often discount them, or are reluctant to
work with them. At the end the most authoritative newsmaker becomes the
state, which to a great degree (on purpose or not) manages the information flow
on climate change. Once again, Russia's specification is not alien to the PrM
concept. Herman and Chomsky also mentioned that mass media protect
themselves by referring to official sources which, arguably, are more
trustworthy among the public. Perhaps, in the Russian case (especially in the
climate change situation) this trend is taken to the extreme.
Flak
As discussed in the previous chapter, Herman and Chomsky (1994 [1988])
connect the 'flak' production process with the concept of power. In other
words, in order to produce the media critique, the institution or individual has
to have some substantial administrative or financial resources and authority to
do so. The PrM authors as well as other scholars who utilised the PrM (for
example see Cromwell 2002, Hearns-Branaman 2009, Pedro 2011a) give
various examples of the 'flak' producers starting with NGOs, business lobbies
and fmishing with the media outlet themselves, however, Herman and
Chomsky (1994 [1988]: 28) conclude that 'the government is a major producer
of flak'. This chapter argues that in countries like Russia this statement is
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particularly relevant, and the 'state' is by far the major source of 'flak'. It
should be noted that other actors who also might produce 'flak' are not
disregarded and will also be mentioned in this section.
In the USSR 'flak' was a well established practice. Methods of Party
control could have included editors' regular meetings and reports to the Party
representatives or, on the other hand, presentations by the Party's secretaries at
the editorial meeting with the clarification on what should be featured in the
new issues. 34 During the perestroika these methods started to lose their
effectiveness (from the point of view of CPSU leadership); and in the cases
when they did work they were slowing down the democratic processes that had
appeared in the media. Specifically, it was apparent when media tried to follow
the principle of a plurality of opinions. Local Party committees still preferred
to see on newspaper pages the ideas which would not discredit the Party's
leaders. At times they would even destroy all issues of the newspapers which
they found outrageous. Voltmer (2000: 472) points out that 'the press under
Gorbachev was still controlled, albeit the style of supervision changed from a
confrontational to a cooperative relationship.P' Grabel'nikov (2001) argues
that these control methods, in the end, played against the Party. The more
media were forced to be a propaganda tool in support of the state, the more this
backfired against the government. The media became one of the first
institutions which turned against the Party and criticized it with even more
power.
34 Interestingly, during the time of total censorship by the Soviet government,
freedom of speech existed in the form of the samizdat: 'This involved the
underground production and distribution of a wide range of media including
political and social commentary, full length manuscripts on a variety of topics
[... ] the underground media provided alternative ideas to those the state
disseminated through official media' (Coyne and Leeson 2009: 9). Quite often
people involved in it were prosecuted, however, the existence of samizdat
shows how people try to find a way to express their opinion and fight the
system, even if they do not succeed. .
35 Former chairman of the Gosteleradio USSR and former editor of the
newspaper Sovetskaya Rossiya professor Mikhail Nenashev in his opinion
peace for the newspaper Pravda in 1990 (see Nenashev 201Oa) wrote that party
members and its leaders were not ready for being so actively criticised by
media and advocated that critique (therefore freedom) should be limited and it
would be better if it actually was coming from the party itself.
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As perestroika progressed the media gained more and more freedom and,
arguably, a few years after 1989 can be called the 'honeymoon' (Voltmer 2000:
472) period of press freedom in Russia.36 In 1991 for the first time in history
freedom of speech and expression was legally defined in the form of the state
law on mass media which 'prohibited censorship and barred government from
shutting down media outlets ... except by court order' (Coyne and Leeson 2009:
10). Unfortunately, this fundamental change did not bring the expected
freedom and despite legal restrictions, it is commonly accepted that though
during the hectic years of the ·1990s Russian media experienced some degree of
freedom, eventually for different reasons it kept losing its autonomy. Currently
many agree that censorship does exist in Russia, and it can be more or less
obvious depending on the importance of the covered topic, whose interests are
involved in it and significance of the media outlet.
Dewhirst (2002) quotes six types of censorship in Russia (which were
first discussed in print in 1996 by Russian scholar Aleksei Simonov). They are
administrative and economic censorship (the officials' power to control
resources needed for media operation such as printing plants or their influence
on businesses to advertise or not to advertise their products in media),
censorship resulting from actions by or threats from criminals (there were
various cases of Russian journalists' murders which arguably were connected
with criminal showdownsj.i" censorship resulting from editorial policy and
editorial taste (which might range from how an article fits within the media
outlet's overall information policy to personal preferences of managerial
boards which then get imposed on journalists)" and, finally, self-censorship.
36 Mikhail Nenashev (201Ob) states that now 20 years after the collapse of the
USSR, it became obvious that press was the main opposition and the most
important tool in destroying the Soviet societal order. Ellen Mickiewicz (1999)
also describes media during perestroika as a 'central component' (ibid: 11), she
refers to her interviews with Gorbachev and other members of his Politburo
where they all confirmed that 'every Politburo meeting started with the mass
media' (ibid).
37 The good discussion of the 'state and non-state agents of violence' in regards
to the Russian mass media system see in Koltsova (2006).
38 Perhaps this type of censorship can be met in all countries around the world
and, on some definitions, this would not be 'censorship'.
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Self-censorship was discussed earlier with regards to the original study of
the PrM, where it was concluded that this type of censorship does not just fit
within the 'flak' filter, but can be seen as a key concept of the PrM, since it
assumes that regardless of the presence of institutionalized censorship,
journalists 'willingly' adapt to the elites' interests. Oates (2007: 1288) states,
'Russian journalists have a finely developed sense of self-censorship and self-.
survival' and this awareness of their own limits derives from 'the Soviet
experience of journalists, in which the action of a censor was rarely needed, as
Soviet journalists understood the party "line" and the way all stories should be
formulated by the time they received their first job' (ibid: 1286). Supporting
evidence of this can be found in an article written by the former Soviet
journalist Somov; in which he confessed that a censor was "planted" by the
party inside everyone's soul, and this inner censor was worse than the official
censor from outside. He explains it as follows: you could have tried to argue
against censorship from outside, but nothing could have been done, when you
sincerely believed in the necessity of the rules imposed by the system (see in
Strovskiy 2011). As a result 'according to a survey conducted by RV] in 2005-
2006, more than 80 percent of Russian journalists [... ] faced different forms of
censorship in their everyday work, and almost all admitted to self-censorship'
(Yakovenko 2006 see in Azhgikhina 2007: 1259). The chief editor of Ekho
Moskvy, Alexei Venediktov stated that with regards to self-censorship 'the key
taboo topics are corruption among the elite and Chechnya, particularly the
abuses by the Russian troops and pro-Moscow Chechens' (see in Orttung
2006). Further on, by referring to the data collected throughout the series of
interviews, it will be argued that any open or direct forms of censorship are not
quite relevant for the media coverage of climate change, however, self-
censorship may still be important.
Censoring climate
During interviews with journalists from various media outlets and different
geographical locations, interviewees often stated that in their work of covering
environmental problems in general and climate change in particular, they do
not experience any kind of censorship. 'Climate change is such an abstract
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topic, I cannot imagine the situation when an editor would tell me not to write
about it', - says TV-journalist Salagina (interview, Chemal, 13 August 2011).
She admitted, however, that she had extremely negative experience with
covering another environmental topic, when she was threatened by the
.managers of the organisation she was writing about. Salagina also noted that
there are some 'political issues' which are implemented into the editorial
policy, but journalists (especially ones who write about the environment) do
not really notice it. For instance, if 'tomorrow the governor wants to come to
our studio and talk about his work, he will be able to do it; of course money is
involved, but it does not concern us (journalists)' (ibid). Journalist,
Dobrovidova (RIA Novostiy also said that it is difficult for her to say if there is
any censorship, and that she always tries to discuss problems as objectively as
possible, though she did admit the possibility of censorship amongst her
colleagues(interview, Moscow, 20 July 2011). The situation of the censorship
on writing about environmental problems was well summarised by a
correspondent of the Altay regional newspaper 'Svobodnyy kurs', Tamara
Dmitrienko, who confessed that nobody stays above her, nobody will tell her
what to write and how: 'they trust me and think that I am more knowledgeable
about this subject', however, she also admitted that if she goes too far and
topics intersect the interests of the big industries, military forces or government,
she finds herself alone in the confrontational situation:
Once I wrote an article about waste management problems in the
city and my editor was very happy with me; he even took my
article to a presentation at an international symposium. But when
people involved in this problem started to threaten me and filed an
action against me, my editors said to accept the charges and pay the
fine even though I was right, and of course the fine would come out
of my pocket; the newspaper would at best pay half of it. So, I feel
that I am free in my actions, but in the situation like this I find
myself one-on-one with the problem (interview, Chemal, 13
August 2011).
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Of course the example given by the Altay journalist might be more
relevant for the regional media outlets, as correspondent of the newspaper
Kommersant Davydova confirmed - the further away from the centre, the more
journalists are restricted in their work (Skype interview, 7 July 2011) (see also
Belin 2001).
The internet - a road to freedom?
The internet's role and place in the Russian media system deserves a separate
discussion, especially in the context of the PrM filter 'flak'. As was argued
before, from one side, the internet can be seen as a free platform for the
production of 'flak' - public reaction to media activity through various social
networks, blogs, and online comments. From another side, if 'flak' is studied
from the perspective of censorship and the state is considered its main producer
then the internet can be seen as a way to avoid this state control. The internet
was confirmed to have a capacity for altering the fundamental principles of the
PrM, to the extent that even Herman and Chomsky (2002) appeal for civil
society actors to make more use of it.
In Russia just a few years ago high expectations had been assigned to this
new form of communication (for example see in Vinogradov 2006). As
Yushchenko (2007) concluded even though in modem Russia the political and
fmancial elite dictate the rules of the media production process, the internet
might serve as an alternative. Its interactivity, lack of censorship and
possibilities for open discussions attracts a broad audience. As time goes by, it
becomes more apparent that the internet's role and degree of freedom was
exaggerated and it did not really become a 'saviour' of Russian freedom of
speech.
It is quite obvious that all of the types of censorship mentioned earlier to
some extent contribute to Russia being placed by the Press Freedom Index
(2011-2012) in the 14tMlposition out of 179. A couple of years ago the reasons
behind such a negative situation were explained by the state's influence over
media information and journalists' inability to freely perform their work and by
the extreme situations of journalists' struggle for freedom of speech such as the
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numerous cases of reporters getting killed while their murderers are not always
punished/" Among other reasons the lack of diversity in TV and radio news
were named by the Press Freedom Index, but recently the internet is becoming
more and more restricted (Reporters without Borders 2012). In 2012 an article
describing press freedom in Russia paid close attention to the censorship which
now has spread to the internet, which arguably was provoked by state officials'
realisation of the internet's growing significance. For instance, it is widely
accepted that massive civil protests against the results of the Duma and
presidential elections in December 2011 and March 2012 respectively were to
a great degree organised through various social networks and blogs. This in
tum led to negative reaction from the government as a result of which many
websites got banned and bloggers got sued." Furthermore, sometimes online
activity or the independence of online media is simulated by officials. For
instance, Kemerovo's 'independent' or 'alternative' city website is actually
unofficially supported by the regional administration (anonymous source,
Skype interview, 27 May 2011). As Oates and McCormack (2010: 133) notice
'Russia is shaping the internet, rather than Russian society being shaped by the
internet. This is a particularly clear and compelling image of how the internet is
constrained by domestic, rather than international. political communication
norms'.
As far as media coverage of climate change goes, the internet also does
not play as great a role as could be imagined. Traditional media duplicate
information on their web pages or blogs.?' There are some discussions on
39 See the report 'Partial justice' on murderers of Russian journalists from 1993
until2oo9 produced by the International Federation of Journalists in 2009.
40 One of the most notable scandals raised around the infamous Russian activist
and blogger Aleksey Navalny who due to his online activity against corruption
in Russia and more recently against the unfair parliamentary and presidential
elections became 'the enemy of the state' which led to his arrest and
imprisonment for 15 days and numerous cyber-attacks on his website (Ennis
2012).
41 The limited role of the Internet in the climate communication process is not
unique for Russia. For example, Neil Gavin (2009b: 130) in his research on the
role of the Internet in UK climate change politics, states that 'for British
citizens to make effective use of the web, they need to be a good deal more
connected, interested, persistent, and "web-savvy" than they actually are.
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social networks which are usually started by the relevant NGOs and serve as
another resource for not only expressing opinion on the topic, but also for
journalists to get in touch with the necessary experts and to learn new
information about the problem. The programme coordinator for climate change
and economic justice at Oxfam (Russia), Yulia Yevtushok, shared her negative
experience of an attempt to create a website about climate change for the
younger audience - www.clicr.ru. The idea was to unite resources of various
Russian NGOs working on this problem (something like http://tcktcktck.org)
and make it accessible for the youth. However, Russian NGOs could not agree
on how it should look and some of them confmned that original websites of
their organisations with webpages devoted to climate are enough (interview,
Moscow, 22 July 2()11).
Another aspect connected with the implementation of the 'flak' filter in
the Russian context and the role of the internet is that from one side Russian
NGOs are not very powerful, so they cannot be institutions which actively
produce flak, at least in a way that it can be noticed (in chapter four the role of
environmental NGOs in Russia's climate change policy is discussed in more
detail). The internet allows them to express their reaction to some questionable
media articles or programmes. Thus when in 2009 Channel One broadcast the
documentary 'The History of a Certain Lie, or Global Warming' ('Istoriya
Odnogo Obmana, ili Global'noe Poteplenie'), which debunked the 'myth' of
climate change. Greenpeace Russia immediately reacted and published online
Consequently, its influence on climate change politics may still only be
marginal.' The Internet does provide an open space for various opinions and a
vast amount of information on the topic, however, as Gavin (2010: 469) argues
'the web perhaps generates more heat than light, its contribution to informed
debated being mixed at best, and very unedifying, or even distasteful, at worst' ,
.and not many people have the skills and patience to work their way through the
questionable or sceptical information on climate change. On the other side,
often the Internet just re-duplicates the messages popularised by the
conventional media (Gavin and Marshall 2011a), the dominance of traditional
media over the Internet was also noticed by Herman and Chomsky in their
argument on the PrM's relevance in the new age (see chapter two).
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video responses and articles in which it explained how the documentary was
misleading (Greenpeace 2009).42 The WWF-Russia reacted the same way.
In conclusion, scholars and practitioners agree on the presence of
censorship in Russia, which indeed leads to a situation where in the weak civil
society 'flak' or reaction to media products is produced by the state and even
the development of the relatively new way of communication - the internet did
not break this pattern. Herman and Chomsky (2002) suggested that the internet
can provide a good opportunity for grassroots movements to communicate their
message, but it is very unlikely that the internet will make the PrM irrelevant. It
should be stated that the degree of censorship in any type of media depends on
the importance and sensitivity of the topic, such as climate change, being so
'abstract' and until recently being ignored in the state's policy, does not require
much control. However, it is very difficult to prove or disprove whether the
coverage of climate change has been influenced by journalists' self-censorship.
In this sense, the PrM is extremely relevant with its idea of the 'subtle ways' of
media control, unlike with other sensitive topics such as Chechnya or
corruption, journalists write about climate change in a certain way not because
they are forced or told to do so, but because, as the PrM authors explain,
working in a certain political and economic context reporters willingly respond
to the elites' interests.
Dominant ideology
The initial name of this filter was 'anti-communist' ideology. Herman and
Chomsky (1994 [1988]) explained how the sense of a common enemy
(communism) united American society, including the media which directed
their coverage of foreign news in a particular (anti-communist) way. After the
42According to Igor Podgorny from Greenpeace-Russia, they also got in touch
with journalists and with the producers of the TV channel with the appeal that
such information should not be broadcast (personal communication, 27 July
2011). A year later a documentary with an absolutely different message on
climate change was broadcast and Russian NGOs took a big part in its
production, however, it is extremely difficult even for NGOs themselves to
judge whether it was solely their achievement or a result of the change in state
policy.
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end of the Cold War Herman and Chomsky broadened the concept of 'anti-
communist ideology' to the 'dominant ideology'. Regardless of the name this
filter still represents 'a political-control mechanism' (Herman and Chomsky
1994 [1988]: 29) and relations between media and the agents of power. Hence
with regards to the PrM 'dominant ideology' filter, Russian media will also be
looked at in the context of their relations with the actors of power which in the
Russian case are often defined by the state.
Just over 20 years ago, the dominant ideology of Russia was very clearly
defmed and its constraints on the media system were acknowledged and even
institutionalised. The understanding of the media as a powerful tool of
propaganda was central for the government of the Soviet Union and if in the
US case the media had to operate within the ideology of 'anti-communism', in
Russia it was 'pro-communism'. The mass media were not a subject of socio-
economic relations, but middlemen which would accumulate ideas about the
main doctrine and then would pass them on to the people. It is quite interesting
in the context of the discussion of the PrM's applicability to the Russian
context, which according to its authors explains the 'manufactured consent'
within media, refer to Jonathan Becker's (2004) discussion of the
'manufactured diversity' created by the Soviet media. Becker explains this
concept through the examples of 'small differences in press coverage
encouraged by the state in order to appeal to audiences of different regions,
education levels and occupations' (ibid: 155), and in his opinion this was 'a
tool to make media messages more effective' (ibid). Arguably, both of these
concepts ('manufactured consent' and 'manufactured diversity') describe the
same idea of the media's dependency on external actors or factors and their
role in propagating someone's ideas.
During the perestroika when the 'country was slowly moving from the
totalitarian towards the fragmented political culture' (Strovskiy 2011: 235), the
role of mass media changed and their everyday work routine was influenced by
the surrounding ideological transformation. Further on, when the old state
ideology ceased to exist, the media got an opportunity to become a member of
the society powerful enough to influence the processes happening in the state
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and to become a political institution on their own. Indeed, the media can be a
way for people to express their view of the political situation. The media can
also inform and educate people and, therefore, help them to build a democratic
society.
The new ideology and, in particular, plurality in party representations in
modern Russia made it possible for each political movement to be able to have
their own media outlet and, hence, be able to state its ideas and programmes.
However, these new political media did not have much power, they did not
have enough mass to be noticed and to be able to make a change or convince
people to be supportive of any particular political movement. Grabel'nikov
(2001) also mentions the so-called hidden political affiliation of the media,
which would not admit that they supported a certain side but would quite
obviously deliver information in favour of that hidden owner or investor.
Nezavisimaya gazeta (Independent newspaper) or NTV (Independent television
channel) were independent only in name. In support of this, Grabel'nikov cites
the words of NTV's former manager, Malashenko, who admitted that the word
'independent' in the abbreviation of NTV does not mean anything. The channel
belonged at that time to the Russian oligarch' Vladimir Gusinsky, who,
according to Malashenko, had the right to exercise his power and fire the
manager anytime he wanted to.43 This situation gets worse depending on how
far away regions are from the centre. During an interview, an anonymous
source from Kemerovo's" city council who on a daily basis works with the
media claimed that:
43 Currently NTV belongs to the Russian gas giant corporation 'Gazprom'
(Media Atlas 2011). Incidentally, the politicians and businessmen of the new
Russia very quickly came to the conclusion that if you own television station
then you have power. In the middle of the 1990s, when 80 percent of the
population reached the poverty line, people did not have an opportunity to buy
subscriptions of newspapers and magazines; therefore radio and television
became only sources for free information. So, in spite of the freedom of speech
coming into power, business and state elite took under their control almost all
radio and television channels (Grabel'nikov 2001).
44 Kemerovo is the capital of the Kemerovo Oblast which is situated in the
biggest coal mining area in Russia (Kuznetsk Basin).
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we do not have independent media; they all have their political
agenda which is defined by the municipal or regional
administrations. Journalists write according to our press-releases,
and their articles should not deviate from the 'party line'. Everyone
knows about environmental problems in our region [high level of
air pollution due to coal mining industry] and how it damages our
health but nobody wants to touch this topic. It is out of the
ideological frame (Skype interview, 27 May 2011).
According to the ideas of the PrM, from one side the media have to fit
within the state official ideological framework, from another side, the media
have to operate within the dominating ideology of capitalism. Hence, at
different stages of state--development, the Russian media also needed to find
their place inside the state ideology: whether it was the implementation of the
communist ideas or popularising ideas of the free market, ideology of
consumerism and so on, but as the PrM predicts the media never really
becomes an independent power on its own - a 'fourth estate', where it does not
fit into the ideology, but starts to create it. This kind of power was only
possessed by the media for a relatively short period of time during the first
Chechen war (Grabel'nikov 2(01). In 1994 the conflict in Checbnya brought
major disagreements in society where people took sides depending on their
pro- or anti-war moods, the mass media took a very strong anti-war stance and
generated a strong campaign against the government and army (Zassoursky
2004). Grabel'nikov (2001) even reveals that in the zone of war in Chechnya,
the government was trying to intercept the signal of the radio stations because
their messages had a negative influence on soldiers. The government lost the
information war by failing to explain to the people inside the country and
abroad what the purpose of the war was.45 This exceptional case in some ways
supports the legitimacy of the 'dominant ideology' filter, even though for some
time the media behaved as actors in domestic politics, quite soon the state
understood its mistake. After this war the media ownership structures were all
45 See more on the Checbnya coverage in Mickiewicz (1999).
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reorganised again (see the section 'ownership'). People in power realised that
media can be just as powerful as they are, so they need to be taken into account.
The current regime in Russia is often characterised as 'a managed
democracy'. in which all formal attributes of the democratic regime are in
place (such as elections, a constitution, divided branches of power, plurality of
political parties and active civil society), however, they do not properly
perform due to the corruption, centralisation of power by the small group of
elite (or even worse by one person - an extremely powerful president or prime
minister, depending on the period). Richard Sakwa (2011a) studies this duality
of Russia's modem political regime and even defines Russia as 'a dual state' in
which 'the legal-normative system based on constitutional order is challenged
by shadowy arbitrary arrangements' (ibid: viii). For instance, when Putin
throughout his two terms centralised and strengthened his presidential power,
he did not break constitutional law and did not run for a third consecutive term,
but instead found an obedient successor for his policies and after allowing
Medvedev to be elected as president for one term, Putin again came into office
in 2012 without officially breaking any laws. The same example of duality can
be used in describing the Russian media system. Maria Lipman (2009: 3) in her
report on Russian media for Chatham House claims that 'in today's Russia [... ]
the media are reduced to being a political tool of the state or marginalized to a
point of making no difference in policy-making'. She explains this by 'the lack
of an enabling environment' in which there is no place for 'political pluralism,
the separation of powers and the rule of law' (ibid). Becker (2004: 149) also
argues that a state controlled media system like the one which can be observed
in Russia is a sign of democratic degradation (the author defines this system as
'nee-authoritarian' ).
In this type of system, ownership of media is not restricted (as discussed
above, Russian law allows anyone to own a media outlet), however, whilst
state-owned media are quite openly controlled, media with other types of
owners can be influenced through economic pressure or ambiguity in the law.
Oates (2007: 1296) notes that due to the 'new controls and pressures on
[Russian] journalists, notably market forces' the system of Russian media can
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be called 'nee-Soviet'. Whilst many changes have happened after the collapse
of the USSR, the media remain 'a tool for the elites rather than a watchdog of
the masses' (ibid: 1297). This idea is also echoed in the co-authored work of
Oates and McCormack (2010) in which they state that neither society nor
journalists or politicians see the Russian mass media as 'objective' or
'balanced', and 'while there is no overt system of top-down state censorship in
Russia today, the media are not free to contribute to the democratic process'
(ibid: 118).
Nevertheless, despite all the criticism of the Russian modem mass media,
Becker (2004) still stresses that the 'nee-authoritarian' media system should
not be equated with a 'totalitarian' or even a 'post-totalitarian' one since
despite all of the restrictions and 'hiccups' discussed earlier, there is clear
media variety, the legally supported media and journalists enjoy independence,
and also the new ideology, which even now (with Putin in his third term) does
not fully parallel the former communist regime. In the words of Yuriy Bakhnov,
the former news editor of Channel One:
Putin and Medvedev both support the atmosphere of freedom of
speech, so you cannot deny its existence. If you want to criticize
Putin, do it, but you need to support your statement. So it is all
within the ideas of the 'law-based state', but then you might be
called to the court to hold a response for your article and there
because of the corruption and vague laws, you might pay for your
words. So, freedom of speech exists, Putin and Medvedev - it is
not a bloody regime, it is Pinochet with a human face (interview,
Moscow, 22 July 2011).
But the contradictions described do not just exist in the system as such,
but are even demonstrated throughout the statements of its main mastermind.
Burrett (2011) provides an example of one of Putin's speeches on media given
in 2000, where he states that 'without truly free media, Russian democracy will
not survive' and at the same time shares his concern that by following their
owners' (the oligarchs') interests, media become 'means of struggling against
the state' (ibid: 5).
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As Strovskiy (2011) concludes, one of the reasons for restrictions on
press freedom is that Russian media were unable to maintain their
independence during the transformation phase from the ideology of socialism
towards the ideology of the free market. In the course of two decades, most
Russian media organs did not manage to find a way to achieve financial
independence and became severely dependent on businesses, which in tum (in
the 2000s) were taken over by the state. Once again we return to the specific
characteristic of the current Russian political and economic system: the tight
connection between the Russian state and business, where 'the state clearly
rests on top of the food chain' (Becker 2004: 152). Soldner (2008) argues that
these strong connections between state and economy in Russia are typical
characteristics of 'political capitalism'. He borrows this concept from Max
Weber, who makes a distinction between 'rational market-oriented capitalism'
and 'politically oriented capitalism' (Weber 1980: 158 see in Soldner 2(08).
For example, in Russia people go into politics to make profit in their businesses
or control major industries in order to maintain political power. In this situation
the media are treated as a 'political resource' (ibid: 172) and their functions are
'to provide information support, to establish communication contacts with
voters, to mobilize resources and to lobby political decision-makers'
(Zasurskiy 1999: 133). Soldner (2008: 160) argues that 'one of the most
important consequences of 'political capitalism' is that it suppresses the
emergence and establishment of alternative societal actors, such as political
parties, trade unions, independent mass media and NGOs' and this is the exact
problem which was discussed in the section on the 'flak' filter.
It is suggested here that in regard to the research of media coverage of
climate change in Russia, the dominant ideology filter has to be studied in
greater detail, but in the context of the state's climate policy, which will be
presented in the next chapter. The importance of the state has already been
demonstrated in shaping other filters of media coverage of climate change, and
a detailed study of the climate policy will show whether media policy indeed
was in consent with the state's position on the issues.
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Concluding remarks
Starting with Lenin's appeal to use mass media as a 'propaganda tool' , in order
to mobilise the masses for the purpose of the revolution, in Soviet Russia
media indeed served as a 'tool' in the hands of the state leaders. During
perestroika and especially during the early 1990s, the media reached its 'golden
age' (Belin 2(02) when it even managed to influence some political and social
processes, but as a prominent Russian journalist, Nadezhda Azhgikhina (2007:
1248) states, 'clearly, after the temptation of being the 'fourth power', the
media lost its real independence and quite quickly became a convenient tool for
elite power and structure'. So, once again media are seen as and called a 'tool'
(even by journalists themselves) and their freedom is questioned, but now there
is no revolution to make and no communist state to build. Russia is supposedly
an emerging democracy with, among other attributes legally established and
guarded freedom of speech. But despite the democratic reforms as Azhgikhina
(2007: 1246) pessimistically concludes, 'the media are becoming more and
more primitive, combining propaganda and entertainment which is steadily
edging out serious analysis and free voices are hardly audible. ,46
The key to this riddle of the controversy lies within the structure of the
current media system. In summary, the analysis has shown that the Russian
media as well as the American media in Herman and Chomsky's original
research have to fit with elite interests. However, if in the US case Herman and
Chomsky talked about the PrM in terms of the ideology of capitalism and the
free market, in Russia, we can talk about political capitalism, where market
and state are not just largely interlinked but the state rests at the top of the
system and the elites to whom media are subordinate are significantly
dominated by the state.
46 Vartanova (2012) sharing a similar view notices that 'entertainment became
an attractive and politically risk-free content concept for many Russian media'.
Journalist Grigorii Pasko, who himself was imprisoned for reporting on the
environmental threat of nuclear waste and nuclear submarines of the Pacific
Fleet, goes even further by referring to the Anna Politkovskaya's posthumous
article and the activity of Russian journalists as 'farce of "clowns''', whose
purpose is 'to entertain the public' and 'if they do write about serious matters,
then they only say how great the "power vertical" is in all its manifestation'
(Pasko 2006: 8).
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The state or large industries with close connection to the state own the
majority of the influential media in Russia. In the case of climate change, this
factor plays a crucial role since the state policy for a long time was very
controversial and these industries, predominately, come from the energy sector.
The advertising market in Russia is not as significant as it was in the original
case study of the PrM - the United States. The key difference between the
United States and Russia is that even though in both cases the media are
dependent on financial investments from the business sector, in the United
States these corporations are more independent from the state, whilst in Russia
the line is blurred. As Bagdikyan (cited in Zhukova 2007: 42) states, the United
States media has 'holy cows' (owners, their family or friends, advertisers)
which can influence any article, whilst in Russia these 'holy cows' mostly exist
in the form of the state authorities. With regards to the filter 'information
sources', despite the fact that climate change is a scientific topic, state leaders
were acknowledged to be amongst the main newsmakers in Russia The filter
'flak' was studied from the perspective of censorship and it was concluded that
indeed de jure censorship is banned in modem Russia, but de facto it exists in
various forms. Even though, the climate change topic is not significant enough
for the state to censor it and, as Soldner (2008: 170) admits 'where power is not
at stake, the Russian mass media can and sometimes do offer a wide range of
viewpoints', but quite often journalists writing about various environmental
topics face or choose to face 'self-censorship'. Finally, the last filter, 'dominant
ideology', pointed out that the new regime in Russia ('dual' or 'managed'
democracy) puts the media within constraints where from one side they have to
adjust to the new ideology of the free market, and from another side, still have
to coordinate to some extent with the authoritative power of the state.
As the PrM demonstrates in the case of media coverage of climate
change in Russia, the process of 'manufacturing consent' does not need to be
purposely controlled or forced, but because of the way the Russian media
system operates then coverage would go up when Medvedev accepts the
climate doctrine, when gas companies see economic benefits from climate
change mitigation or when NGOs are not opposed by the government and
being heard by the journalistic community. With the rising threat of global
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environmental problems such as climate change, media can be seen as a
mechanism to stimulate or protect sustainable development. As Shumilina
(2010) argues, eventually, the media can lead to a change of paradigms of
values and tum mass consciousness towards the new societal model
(supposedly with the environment being more prioritised and being included
into other spheres of life). I argue that change is happening, as various
interviews demonstrated, but the question remains: what is the rationale behind
it and for how long will it last? In order to answer these questions I propose
looking at the changes and rationale behind the state's climate policy (which
will be discussed in the next chapter) and the actual media coverage of climate
change in Russia by analysing media texts devoted to this topic in chapter five.
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CHAYfER 4 - RUSSIAN CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY: TOWARDS
,'CLIMATE PRAGMATISM'
As has been argued in the previous chapter, the Russian state has a significant
influence over media activity, following this logic in order to understand the
media coverage of climate change in Russia we first need to study the state
policy on this issue. Hence this chapter examines Russia's climate change
policy in order to conclude whether it has changed in the past decade or so and
if it has in what ways this can affect alterations in media coverage of climate
change.
Russian climate change policy is an ambiguous and complex
phenomenon, which can be interpreted in different ways. During the interviews
conducted for this research project, the same introductory question which
aimed to invite interviewees to discuss Russia's climate policy provoked polar
responses: from the straightforward 'it does not exist' to the optimistically
sarcastic 'now it does exist, and that is already a positive sign'. Indeed, signing
agreements, implementing laws and creating special inter-institutional
committees coexist in Russia with very limited practical outcomes, a lack of
coordination and persistence as well as sometimes contradictory policy
decisions.
As one of the key controversies, Russian state officials have a history of
referring to Russia as an 'environmental leader' or an 'environmental donor'.
Russia was labelled an 'environmental leader' in the 1990s because of its
drastic, but involuntary, drop in GHG emissions (after the collapse of the
Soviet Union) (President of Russia website 2009a). It was referred to as an
'environmental donor' due to its natural geographical resources, in particular
the vast areas of boreal forest (which act as a 'carbon sink') (Medvedev 2012).
At the same time, national and international environmental communities
characterise Russia as an 'anti-leader' of climate change mitigation policy
(RSEU 2012) which, along with other countries including Canada and Poland,
were 'honoured' with the 'fossil of the day' anti-award during the Doha
Conference (2012) due to its resistance to the negotiation process (Ekoreporter
2012).
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Indeed, due to Russia's geographical position, its heavy reliance on the
export of fossil fuels and the low energy efficiency of its economy Russia is
now one of the main emitters of GHG (CRS 2008, Perelet et al. 2(07). It has
been argued that the environmental situation is worsened by its subordinate
position towards the state's economic interests (Henry and Douhovnikoff 2008,
PorfIriev 1997, Yanitsky 2009) which has resulted in the downgrading of
environmental institutions and the concentration of power in a limited circle of
the ruling elite (Crotty 2003, Kotov 2002, Oldfield and Shaw 2002, Peterson
and Bielke 2001). These factors have contributed to the development of a
policy of 'de-environmentalism' ('de-ekologizatsiya') (Yablokov 2010).
On the other hand, due to the significant drop in GHG emissions seen in
the 1990s and its vast natural reserves, Russia has the capacity to be considered
an 'environmental leader' (Klyuev 2002, Tynkkynen 2010) with the ability to
influence the world's climate change policy. The Russian government
exercised this influence to a great extent during the Kyoto Protocol
negotiations (Afionis and Chatzopoulos 2010, Andonova 2008, Buchner and
Dall'Olio 2005, Korppoo 2(08).
This chapter contributes to the debate outlined above by examining how
Russia has hitherto prioritised economic growth over environmental protection.
However, it is increasingly in Russia's own economic interest to cut its carbon
emissions, which also helps the country to promote its global integration.
Based on content analysis of 72 presidential speeches made by Medvedev
(2008-2012), this chapter argues that the governing elite, especially Medvedev,
have started to recognize the economic benefits of Russia's proactive climate
policy. These economic considerations are driving Russian climate policy, in
two ways: the direct benefits from mitigation (for instance, by improving
energy efficiency), and the indirect benefits from integration with the global
community (for example, bringing 'green' investments into the country or
portraying Russia as a modem trade partner that cares about its 'green' image).
Hence with regard to Russia's climate policy we can witness the evolution of
'climate pragmatism', where the state can see the benefits from remaining
'faithful' to its economic development plans and at the same time becoming a
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'real' environmental leader that actually cuts its emissions rather than relying
on a fortuitous drop in emissions, as in the past.
This chapter first looks at the evolution of Russia's climate change policy
through the perspective of two competing views: firstly, Russia as 'de-
environmentalist' and secondly, Russia as an 'environmental leader'. Then it
explores the new course in climate policy in Russia which has coincided with
Medvedev's presidency, hence, through the analysis of his official speeches,
the chapter explores how the new emphasis on economic modernisation has .
become beneficial for climate policy.
Between 'de-environmentalism' and 'environmental leadership'
The concept of 'de-environmentalism' or 'de-ecologisation' (de-ekologizatsiya)
has been popularised by the former special adviser to President Boris Yeltsin
on environmental and public health affairs and a current chairman of the Green
Party faction of the political party 'Yabloko', Alexey Yablokov. He states that
'Russia's environmental problems are the result of the state policy of 'de-
environmentalism', where dealing with environmental problems is postponed
until the country reaches a certain level of wealth, and until then it serves as a
"reservoir of natural resources'" (Yablokov 20 I0: 3). Yablokov argues that this
approach began to develop under the rule of Yeltsin and advanced during the
time of Putin (lSltwo terms) and Medvedev. He identifies several stages which
constitute the process of 'de-environmentalism', among them are 'the
dissolution of The Environmental Protection Agency[ ... ], a weakening of
environmental protection legislation[ ... ], the obstruction of environmental
NGOs[ ... ], a reduction of funding for environmental programmes' and so on
(ibid: 4). Even though Yablokov does not specify the particular area of
environmental problems which could be characterised by the phenomenon of
'de-ecologisation', he explores the country's general environmental
degradation (starting with air pollution and finishing with public health
problems associated with it). It can be argued that this concept accurately
describes the Russian climate policy.
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Another leading Russian scientist, Nikolay Klyuev (2002) states that the
academic and public debate emerged at the end of the 1980s (to talk about
Russia's ecological situation in a highly pessimistic way) lacks any foundation
and damages the country's investment and recreational appeal. Furthermore, he
argues that Russian territory is the main natural purification system of the
planet, it compensates global pollution and overall acts as an environmental
donor (ibid: 19). Vladimir Zakharov (2011: 6) shares a similar opinion -
'[because of the recent] economic growth, rich natural resources, and the
search for ways of optimal development[ ... l [tjhis will make it possible to rank
Russia not only as an energy power but also as an environmental donor.' In
Klyuev's (2007) later work on the comparative analysis of states' 'eco-
industrial pyramids' (the correlation between a country's industrial capacity,
resources consumption and waste production) he concludes that in order to
become an environmental leader Russia still needs to improve its industrial
production process. The argument of Russia's environmental leadership was
promoted by Russian officials and covered by the media during the Kyoto
Conference in 1997 to the extent that it was claimed that 'the Russian
delegation performed a diplomatic miracle' (Izvestiya 1997) and led the
negotiations (see more in chapter five). As has been mentioned before, Nina
Tynkkynen (2010) suggests that the media exploitation of the 'Great
Environmental Power' concept in the coverage of Russia's climate change
policy diverts attention from Russia's resistance to the Protocol's ratification
and the carbon intensity of its economy, and highlights Russia's drastic drop in
GHG emissions and its natural capabilities (due to its forests) to solve climate
change problems - 'a source of environmental solutions rather than a source of
environmental problems' (ibid: 182).
The outlined controversies in Russia's climate policy to some extent are
embedded in its geographical specifications where, as discussed below, the
wealth of natural resources coexists with extreme vulnerability to the effects of
climate change.
Russia's geography and climate change consequences
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Russia's rich natural resources reserves and vast territory define the state's
economic orientation and its influence on the global environmental situation. In
fact, even after the split-up of the USSR, Russia remains the largest state in the
world, containing such different climate zones as arctic, sub-arctic, temperate
and subtropical zones (Perelet 2007; Shaw 2009). Russia holds the record for
the maximum temperature range in the world: 116.6C. Natural zones vary
drastically from polar desert, tundra, taiga, mountains, and mixed forest to
steppe and semi-desert. Another key geographical characteristic is Russia's
leading position in reserves of natural resources such as natural gas, oil, coal,
iron ore, bauxite, nickel, tin, and so on (Orlenok et al 1998). Significantly,
most of these resources are situated in predominantly permafrost territory
(which covers 65 percent of Russia's territory) and in severe climatic
conditions leading to the high cost of their extraction and transportation.
There is the possibility that the large size and geographical nature of
Russia's territory, the diversity of climate zones, the location of natural
resources as well as the country's very low population-density might lead to
positive consequences from climate change for Russia. For instance, the
majority of Russia's territory is situated in the area of maximum warming and
so the softening of climate conditions could extend the zone of 'comfortable
living' to the Northern border, reduce energy expenses during the heating
season, facilitate access to natural resources, prolong harvesting seasons,
decrease cold-related illnesses and deaths, improve transportation through the
Arctic seas and facilitate the development of the Arctic shelf (Kattsov et al.
2007; Perelet et al. 2007; see also in Fay et al. 2010). This promotes a largely
falsely-optimistic vision of climate change among many Russians. However,
lately more and more people in government and science come to the realization
of climate change's damaging character for Russia's ecosystems, economy,
security, infrastructure and so on. In this case, the climate zone diversity of the
country is considered a weakness rather than a strength. Renat Perelet, Sergey
Pegov and Mikhail Yulkin (2007) in a Human Development report describe in
detail what the vulnerabilities of each. zone could be. For example, the most
fertile regions will suffer from droughts. Russia's famous forest zones such as
taiga, and tundra will shrink and be exposed to outbursts of forest diseases. The
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steppes will also experience more droughts, loss of harvest, and replacement by
other ecosystems. Deserts will suffer from increases in strong winds and storms.
Some scientists state that climate change is taking place quicker in Russia .
than in the rest of the world'" (Charap 2010), and that its impacts can readily be
observed (Bogdan et al. 2009). For example, 2010 was an extreme year which
exceeded the 'normal' temperature (the norm being 1961-1990) by 0.65°C:
Even though it can be characterised as only slightly anomalously warm, it
consisted of an extremely cold winter, extremely hot summer and extremely
warm autumn (Kattsov et al. 2011). These extremes led to severe
consequences for Russia's economy, nature and people's health. Moreover,
some areas of Russia are more vulnerable to temperature increases than others,
as climatologist Nataliya Kharlamova stated, that without the moderating factor
of the sea, climate change is particularly apparent in the Altay region, Tyvy
and next to the borders with China and Mongolia (email communication,
February 2012).
Another fact stressed by climatologists is that climate change in general
happens quicker in the polar territories, which means that Russia, with its large
proportion of territory of permafrost, might see wide-spread permafrost melting
which could lead to severe economic and social damage (most of the oil and
gas industries are located in this type of territory, for example)" (for more see
Gotz 2007). It will also make it impossible to transport timber by 'winter roads'
which will lead to more expenditures on building new routes (Roshydromet
2008).
This introduction to the geography of Russia highlights the factors which
initially put the country into an ambiguous position where resource wealth
exists parallel to severe weather conditions. This,. along with industrial
production and other economic activities, has resulted in Russia being the third
biggest C02 emitter in the world after the United States and China (if the EU is
considered, then Russia is fourth) (CRS 2008) so the way Russia deals with
47 From 1907 until 2006 the global average temperature rose by 0.74C, whilst
in Russia it increased by 1.29C (Bogdan et al. 2009)
48 Tsalikov (2009) stresses that the biggest danger of melting permafrost is in
the region of Novaya Zemlya - an area of nuclear waste storage.
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this complex situation and governs its assets naturally makes it one of the
leading countries influencing global climate policy.
The next specification that needs to be considered in the analysis of
Russia's climate change policy, is the country's administrative structure which
does not only explain the heterogeneous attitude towards the problem amongst
various subjects of the state, but also the supremacy of Russia's executive
branch.
Russia's administrative structure and climate policy
Russia is a federation consisting of 83 federal subjects with different status and
degrees of autonomy (Constitution of the RP 1993). The importance of the
acknowledgment of the federal structure of Russia goes along with the
consideration of the particular region's distribution of powers to enact and
implement its budget and laws. Depending on the status of the particular region
(whether it is a republic or an oblast) it will have a certain degree of autonomy
from the federal budget and laws. Moreover, authorities at the regional level
might be more aware of the ecological problems in the area. Some regions are
heavily populated by fossil fuel industries, some areas are more vulnerable to
the impact of climate change, and so on (Firsova and Taplin 2007). This
diversity of regions to a degree influences their support for climate change
policy which was demonstrated by the WWF survey conducted prior to Russia
signing the Kyoto Protocol (see in Buchner and Dall'Olio 2005). The central
and European parts (especially Northwest) of the country were mostly pro-
Kyoto, whilst more remote areas of Siberia demonstrated a lack of support."
The federal structure of the country has also influenced its legislative
branch. The Russian Constitution (1993) established divisions between areas of
federal and regional jurisdiction and confirmed the priority of federal law in
areas where they overlap. The environmental protection legislation falls into
49 For instance, in the Arkhangelsk region the necessity to import coal and oil
for its industrial needs from other regions, has led to a great interest in
cooperating with the 'energy saving and environmental investment agencies in
order to improve the attractiveness of implementing the Kyoto mechanisms'
(Buchner and Dall'Olio 2005: 363).
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the area of joint jurisdiction (Buchner and Dall'Olio 2(05). In this case the
blurred boundaries between federal and local responsibilities could really
damage the development of environmental protection actions, as occurred after
the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. As an environmental activist from Altay
region admits: 'frankly speaking even though we now have a presidential
advisor on climate change, it did not change much here in our region. I am not
even sure who is in charge of this problem. I suspect that it is spread
throughout different departments and it has become (for them) just another line
in the report' (Oksana Yengoyan, interview, Barnaul, 9 August 2011).
Laura Henry and Lisa Sundstrom (2007: 62) have pointed out that after
the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol 'the fundamental question of property
rights' was not defined. It was not clear who would be allowed to trade carbon
emissions and get the profit if Russian businesses stayed below the permitted
level: the federal or regional governments, or maybe business. One of the
interviewees mentioned that local authorities would be very interested in the
benefits the Kyoto Protocol might bring for the region, but that due to the
absence of a legislative base nothing could be done. There was also a fear that
without working laws on the subject matter, it might lead to abuses of power
and corruption. So, in the case of the Kyoto Protocol the necessary legislation
at the domestic level were not signed until 2007, and then they were changed in
2009, which led to the first joint implementation (JI) projectSO in the country
not being approved until July 2010 (Henry 2010a).
Even if legislative problems are clearly solved through different laws at
the federal and regional levels another peculiarity of the state's legislative
system is that Russia has very strong presidential powers (and when Putin
exchanged this post for the Prime Minister position [2008-20121,it had a very
powerful Prime Minister too) (see more in chapter three). It means that though
the Federation Council is supposed to represent all subjects of the federation on
50 11mechanisms (or projects) allow a country with an emission reduction or
limitation commitment under the Kyoto Protocol (Annex B Party) to earn
emission reduction units from an emission-reduction or emission-removal
project in another Annex B Party, which can be counted towards meeting its
Kyoto target (UNFCCC 2011).
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legislative matters the president has power to 'unilaterally overturn regional
acts and laws in his role as a protector of the constitution' (Buchner and
Dall'Olio 2005: 363).
Interestingly enough, many NGO representatives referred to Putin's
'special attitude' towards climate change problems. One of them mentioned
that Putin did not even like the word .'Kyoto' (Anonymous source, interview,
Moscow, July 2011a), whilst another environmentalist claims that while Putin
is in power, climate policy will remain in its infancy: 'Whatever Medvedev
says, it is just plans which are not getting fulfilled, while for Putin Gazprom
and Rosneft are his interests which he will never abandon' (Anonymous source,
interview, Moscow, July 2011b).
Unfortunately, even when other actors express direct interest in climate
change affairs, in most cases it comes down to the decision of the country's
leader or leaders. Moreover, even the president's advisor on climate change
Alexander Bedritsky, just before the UNFCCC in Qatar, stated that the
decision of Russia's position on the continuation of the Kyoto Protocol was
made at the 'highest political level' and could be changed only by the President
himself (RIA Novosti 2012d). Dobrovidova (2012b) goes so far as arguing that
Russian experts on climate change are 'in essence taking part in a ceremony'
and all of the debates around Russia's climate policy do not really effect the
final decisions or as Dobrovidova states 'in climate policy terms - discuss all
you want, as the real decision makers are as far from the debate as Europe is
from New Guinea' (ibid). This pessimistic picture of the fate of climate
change concentrated in one set of hands is worsened by the cumbersome
structural changes of the environmental institutions and the state's dominance
over the energy sector.
Institutional change: ministerial paradox
When the new state of the Russian Federation was created in 1991 it inherited a
poor environmental record which had led to the degradation of the environment
in Russia (Feldman and Blokov 2009, 2012). Even though in the early 1990s
the idea of environmental protection grew and among other concepts became
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quite fashionable, it was also employed as cover in order to recreate the
country's image and position internationally as a liberal country which
followed modem world trends. The euphoria did not last long, as is shown by
the institutional change in environmental protection that the state has
experienced over the short period of time since the 1990s (Henry and
Douhovnikoff 2(08).
Some argue that this transformation and degradation of the relevant
environmental institutions became one of the stages in the development of the
'de-ecologisation' policy (Oldfield 2001; Yablokov 2010; Yanitsky 2011).
However, looking at the changes happening within the Soviet and: Russian
environmental institutions, the concept of 'de-ecologisation' raises a number of
questions. For instance, the term suggests that Russian policy was at one time
'ecological', but this idea of the superiority of the economic development over
the environment and the use of nature as a means in order to achieve the state's
goals is very much a Soviet concept 51 (Feldman and Blokov 2009). As
Yanitsk~2 (2009: 754) states 'until the 1970s, the dominant worldview rooted
in Soviet culture was strictly utilitarian. Nature was seen as an unlimited
resource pool that had to be (re)constructed in accordance with the goals of the
construction of a socialist society' (see more in Oldfield 2(05). In his extensive
research of the shift in environmental debate in Russia, Yanitsky states that this
utilitarian approach to the nature in the mid-1980s to early 1990swas replaced
by the 'greener' idea of Russia as being a 'limited space [which] must be kept
clean and safe' (ibid). From the mid-1990s and early 2000s the concept of
Russia as an area of 'unlimited resource' re-appeared in the public space. The
findings of Yanitsky's research discussed above and the following discussion
of institutional change, lead us to the conclusion that the so-called policy of
51 As an example, one might think of the 'grand' Soviet idea of the Siberian
river reversal: when instead of allowing northern rivers to 'uselessly' fall into
the Arctic Ocean, Soviet scientists came up with a plan of diverting them
towards the densely populated and agriculturally valuable territories of Central
Asia.
52Yanitsky has based his conclusions on the extensive field research he has
conducted over two decades (1985-2007), his personal experience of working
in UNESCO's 'Man and the Biosphere' programme, as well as participation in
a number of international research projects (Yanitsky 2009).
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'environmentalism' could only be traced back to the time of Gorbachev's
policy of glasnost and perestroika (see also Feldman and Blokov 2012).
Historically, in the USSR environmental issues were the responsibility of
different ministries, so there was not one legal authority responsible for
environmental protection. It was only in 1988 that the State Committee on
Environmental Protection (Goskompriroda) was founded. Many saw this as a
governmental response to the recent environmental catastrophe at the
Chernobyl nuclear power plant in 1986 (Henry and Douhovnikoff 2008). After
the collapse of the Soviet Union for a short while environmental protection
advanced in the hierarchy of the political agenda as well as the Goskompriroda,
which in 1991 became the Ministry of the Environment. Already by 1996 the
importance of environmental protection was downgraded and the Ministry
became the State Committee on Environmental Protection (under a slightly
different name - Goskomekologiya). In 2000 even this committee was
dissolved whilst some of its functions were transferred to the Ministry of
Natural Resources (Henry and Douhovnikoff 2008; Oldfield 2001; Peterson
and Bielke 2001). Finally, in 2008 the Ministry of Natural Resources became
the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Protection, and until now
it remains the main authority in the country which at the state level deals with
environmental problems.
The dissolution of the Goskomekologiya was perceived as a partially
positive decision, as it lessened the amount of bureaucratic obstacles in the way
of environmental management (Kotov 2002) as well as giving to one
organisation the opportunity to have expertise and responsibility on
environment-related issues53 (Firsova and Taplin 2007). On the other hand, the
53 After the dissolution of Goskomekologiya Jo Crotty (2003) conducted
research in one of Russia's regions - Samara Oblast - and she argued that at
the regional level the institutional restructuring was not that noticeable; 'the
monitoring and control function of the old environmental bureaucracy had been
largely retained, albeit with some staff cuts, under the new Ministry' (ibid:
473). In a more recent article, Crotty and Rodgers (2009) reinvestigate the case
of Samara Oblast and conclude that after the merger of Goskomekologiya and
Ministry of Natural Resources 'there has not been a subsequent decline but in
fact an expansion of bureaucratic controls and regulatory bodies in the area of
environmental protection in Russia (ibid: 12).
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fact that its functions were transferred to the Ministry of Natural Resources
weakened the state's domestic policy towards environmental protection
(Firsova and Taplin 2007, Oldfield and Shaw 2002) and stimulated to an even
greater degree the growth of the economy heavily based on the exploitation of
natural resources (Henry and Douhovnikoff 2008). When the final institutional
transformation took place, the former chair of the Goskomekologiya, Professor
Viktor Danilov-Danilyan (who along with Yablokov claims that Russia is
pursuing a policy of 'de-ecologisation') declared:
[it] is a signal for thieves. The law says, 'Hey guys, there is no one
watching over nature so come and take what you want! [... ]
Authorising the Natural Resources Ministry to deal with
environmental problems is like asking an alcoholic what the price
of vodka should be' (see in Peterson and Bielke 2001: 69).
The fate of domestic climate change policy was also influenced by the
confusion between institutions of environmental protection and the ones which
would somehow be responsible or concerned with it. As the head of the
department of the sustainable development and partnership at the Sustainable
Energy Development Centre, Vladimir Berdin, noted, 'any changes in such
institutions lead to the temporary stagnation of all processes; it takes time for
people to distribute responsibilities and get back to the routine work'
(interview, Chemal, 13 August 2011). Even at the time when the Ministry of
the Environment and later the Goskomekologiya still existed and had some
powers, climate change policy had involved various ministries and interest
groups. In order to manage relationships between different institutions on the
issue, the Interagency Commission of the Russian Federation on Climate
Change was established in 1994 (Climate Change Action Plan report 1999).
The commission united representatives from 21 ministries and interest groups
such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Federal Service for
Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring (Roshydromer"), Gazprom
54Roshydromet is a federal executive authority that provides public services
in hydro-meteorology, environmental monitoring, pollution. observation of
the influence on the meteorological and other geophysical processes. It
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and so on (ibid: 15). The commission was supposed to be the supreme
authority in deciding climate change issues. At the same time, it did not have
any legal authority and could not regulate concrete projects or deal with
investments. Its powers were weakened when the Goskomekologiya was
abolished. Buchner and Dall'Olio (2005) argue that, at first, Goskomekologiya
had a much bigger interest in climate change policies than its successor the
Ministry of Natural Resources and, secondly. Goskomekologiya simply had
more expertise and resources on the topic.
Eventually, the Interagency Commission proved to be inefficient and
even though officially it was supposed to be the main approval body for
documents on climate change regulations its functions became part of the
Roshydromet. The Commission did not meet at all for several years, and then
was dissolved. Vladimir Kotov (2002) has commented on the inefficiency of
the commission that '[it] was a typical institution of the transitional period: old
form but without old possibilities, a remainder of the old system not adapted to
the new institutions' (ibid: 16). The idea of inter-Ministry and interagency
collaboration is still very popular and discussed by the scientific community as
well as representatives of the government and NGOs. For example, Kattsov,
Meleshko and Chicherin (2007) give examples of how exactly different
ministries and state agencies will be interested in dealing with issues connected
with climate change (see table 4.1.):
Table 4.1. Examples of possible climate change-related problems which might
concern different Russian federal institutions
Ministry Examples of interests related to climate
change
Minister of the Interior Migration processes
Ministry for Civil Defence, Increase in natural disaster frequency
Emergencies and Elimination
of Consequences of Natural
ensures that Russia fulfils obligations under international treaties including
the Convention of the World Meteorological organization, the UN
Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Protocol on
Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (Roshydromet 2011).
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Disasters
Ministry of Foreign Affairs International agreements on environment
and climate change.
Ministry of Defence ·Defence of the borders in relation to
changes of the geopolitical situation and, in
particular, defence of Russia's sovereignty
in the Arctic region
Ministry of Health and Social Climate change related threat to the
Development population's health
Ministry of Education and Preparation of qualified scientists in order
Science to serve Russia's interests
Ministry of Natural Resources Climate change negative impact on natural
resources; easier access to the resources in
Arctic and as a consequence its
environmental pollution.
Ministry of Energy Problems of energy saving, alternative
energy sources, sustainable technology.
Monitoring of GHG emissions.
Ministry of Regional Climate change impact on regional
Development economy and local infrastructures such as
melting of permafrost.
Ministry of Agriculture Change in harvest, land used for
agriculture, fishing and new types of
parasites.
Ministry of Transport Development of the new Arctic route.
Impact of melting permafrost on motorways
and railways.
Ministry of Information Participation in IT support for climate
Technology and research and monitoring of the climate.
Communication
Ministry of Finance Financing the priority scientific research on
the climate.
Ministry of Economic Economic justification of political and
Development and Trade economic decisions on climate change
issues.
Source: Kattsov, Meleshko and Chicherin (2007)
To sum up. the dissolution of the State Committee on Environmental
Protection and the transfer of some of its functions to the Ministry of Natural
Resources led to 'an institutional paradox' in which the institution responsible
for the exploitation of natural resources also has to be in charge of its
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protection. It leads back to the theoretical paradox discussed above, where the
state's resource wealth and capabilities of becoming an 'environmental donor'
are undermined by the downgrading of the environmental institutions which
once again contributes to the development of a policy of 'de-ecologisation'. At
the same time the multifaceted nature of climate change problems and the
interests of different state organisations presents an opportunity (rather than a
burden) for inter-institutional collaboration and not only at the state but at the
international level as well. Realising and using the benefits of climate change
collaboration will not be possible without a consideration of Russian economic
interests and in particular the peculiarity of its energy sector, which also works
in both directions: heavy reliance on natural resources stimulates the
degradation of the environment, but their vast amount gives Russia power in
international discussions of climate change regulation.
The role of the energy sector
In the introduction of this chapter the importance of economic interests was
listed among the major factors which affect Russian climate change policy.
Over the decades, 'the legacy of the conservative command-and-control
processes' and 'the transitional state of development in Russia' contributed to
the prioritisation of economic growth over environmental protection which
.relegates environmental protection to the background or postpones dealing
with it until 'better times' (Porfiriev 1997: 148, see more in Henry and
Douhovnikoff 2008).
The natural resource wealth of the country (especially gas, coal and oil)
carried on playing a significant role in the transition of Russia's economy after
the collapse of the Soviet Union. Russia has the largest reservoirs of natural gas
in the world and it heavily depends on these for domestic consumption and as
an export commodity. 55 Sergey Aleksashenko (2012: 43) argues that the
55 According to the EIAreport (2010) these reserves contain 1,680 trillion
cubic feet (Tcf), representing about 25 percent of the world's reserves. Most of
these reserves are in Siberia. Russia is not only one of the world's largest gas
producers, but it is also the biggest exporter of gas in the world. Oil reserves
are also the second largest in the world, making up 60 billion barrels, which
again are mostly situated in Siberia (specifically the western part).
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Russian economy is 'de facto monocultural' since 'more than 85 percent of
Russian exports are either raw materials or primary commodities' and 'during
2010-2011 the share of hydrocarbons in Russian exports fluctuated between
63.5 and 65 percent'. Russia's resource-oriented economy is reinforced by its
carbon intensity (the amount of GHG emissions per unit of GOP) which
'exceeds the leading European countries by 3.8 times, the average for transition
economies by 2.6, the USA by 2.4 and Canada by 2 times,S6(Perelet et al.
2007: 10)making Russia one of the most polluting economies.
The significance of the energy sector in domestic policy on climate
change should also be considered from the perspective of the close connections
between the energy sector and the state. Nowadays, major gas, oil and
electricity companies are either partly owned by the government directly or by
entities which are close to the Kremlin.s7 It was not always like this, and for a
short period of time private ownership prevailed (Buchner and DalI'Olio 2005).
For instance, during the early 1990s the oil and gas industries were privatized
and this era in the country's history is famous for the rise of the 'new class'
(the 'oligarchs'). After acquiring fortunes through monopolizing the state's
essential infrastructures, very soon some of these oligarchs crossed the line by
not focusing as much on reinvesting profit into their businesses. Instead they
avoided paying taxes and began 'moving cash offshore' (ibid). The era of
Putin's government was characterized by the policy of centralizing the energy
sector and increasing the state's influence over it.
At the time of writing, the major actor in the energy sector is the state. It
owns all shares in the second largest oil company Rosneft. Another oil
company, LUKoil, has a mostly private ownership structure where only 14
percent of shares belong to the government, but it retains close connections
56One of the reasons for this is the severe weather conditions in which most of
the industries are situated making the production process more energy-
intensive (Perelet 2007; Shaw 2009). Another reason is that along with being a
leader in the gas and oil industry comes leadership in the amount of gas flaring.
This side effect of oil production is responsible for 84,000 tons of GHG
emissions a year (Cnews.ru 2007).
57 King (2012) states that according to the 2008 UN report 'Russia was the
most generous country in the world when it comes to fossil fuel subsidies,
spending $40 billion annually to support those industries'.
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with the government. Buchner and Dall'Olio (2005:.365) point out that
'individual companies have very different relations with the state that do not
always reflect the state's share in the enterprise'. Overall, the state is in charge
of 30 percent of oil production in the country, however, if all informal
connections are considered, that figure might be higher. Gas production in
Russia is dominated by Gazprom, of which approximately 51 percent of shares
belong to the government. It is not only Russia's largest gas company, which
controls 90 percent of domestic gas production (ibid), but it is also one of the
world's dominant players in the energy sector and has become one of the most
powerful tools in Russia's foreign policy.
The role of the energy companies in Russia's climate policy is quite
ambiguous. For instance, Henry (201Oa: 767) highlights the aspect of
businesses' reluctant attitude towards environmental issues by quoting some
Russian environmental activists: 'most commercial firms do not want to be
associated with 'democracy, human rights or the environment' and the
wealthiest firms are 'too dependent on exploiting natural resources' to give
funding for environmental causes' .
According to a climate change activist who has approached (and has been
approached by) a number of energy companies during his NGO's energy
efficiency campaign (Anonymous source, interview, July 2011c), business
firms clearly understand that climate change is not a 'PR-campaign' but a
serious science. At the same time they understand they cannot refuse to follow
the government's orders, so they are trying to sabotage the fundamentals of it,
by popularizing the idea that there is no anthropogenic cause to climate change.
In Russia there are no threats to business coming from the climate change
policy (no laws restricting them or judgmental public opinion) and because of
it they are not very active. However, they all have complete information of the
problem and some companies even have calculated their emissions,s8 but 'sit
quietly' so long as it does not directly concern them. Another climate change
campaigner (Anonymous source, interview, July 2011b) shares his experience
58Amongst them are Gazprom, LUKoil, Norilsk Nickel, UES 'Rossiya, joint-
stock company 'Rusal' and Arkhangelsk Pulp and Paper Mill (Bogdan et al.
2009).
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working with one of Gazprom's companies: 'They openly talked to us about
the problem and said that they already include climate change costs into their
projects, because their infrastructure is based on permafrost and changes have
already forced them to reinforce their buildings and structures'. His colleague
(also coming from his work experience) in support of this argument adds that
Gazprom managers understand the danger of climate change for their business,
and their scientists tell them that climate change might make their project
unprofitable, but Gazprom people do not want to discuss this topic in public in
order not to diminish the value of their shares on the market (Anonymous
source, interview, July 2011d).
Indeed, Gazprom's Deputy Chairman of the Board of Directors, Alexey
Miller keeps referring to climate change as having been created by the media
as a 'PR-campaign' (Mason 2011). At the same time this gas giant company,
according to Buchner and Dall' Olio (2005), was supporting the Kyoto
ratification process and was 'keen to maintain a green image'. So, once again
we see a paradoxical situation: as much as Russia's economy is heavily based
on exploitation of fossil fuels, the companies involved in these industries could
treat climate change regulations not as a threat to them, but also as a profitable
venture and a way to attract more investments and to modernize their
production processes'? (Mandrillon 2008, RIANovosti 2012a).
The vast reserves of natural resources that Russia possesses can be seen
as a double-edged sword. Over-dependence on them in the economy
contributes to Russia's leading position among GHG emitters. On the other
hand, the contraction of Russia's economy in the 19908 gave it significant
status during international negotiation processes. As Oldfield and Shaw (2002:
392) state: 'uncertainties about Russia's future must translate into uncertainties
about the future well-being of the global environment in general'. The way the
factors outlined above influence Russia's climate policy is evidenced by the
59 Sberbank (The Savings Bank of the Russian Federation) (which was
authorized by the Russian government to approve and select ]I projects)
estimated that Russian projects have a potential to cut 1.2-1.5 billion tones of
C02 and bring into the country direct carbon investments of 250-300 billion
rubles (around 50-60 billion pounds) by 2020 (Men'she Dvukx Gradusov
2012).
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case study of Russia's involvement in the Kyoto Protocol ratification process.
For six years the official Russian position on Kyoto ratification swung back
and forth, demonstrating the inconsistencies in the government's agenda.
The Kyoto Protocol negotiations or Russia's 'environmental blackmail'
The Kyoto Protocol (1998) was the first document which forced signatory
industrialised countries to 'commit' to certain GHG emissions obligations. It
also acknowledged the developed countries' historical responsibility for the
current accumulated amount of GHG in the atmosphere, and applied more
rigorous restrictions to them. Even though the protocol was adopted on 11
December 1997, it came into force only six years later, on 16 February 2005.
Strangely enough and quite unexpectedly at that time, Russia became one of
the key reasons for the delay in the agreement's implementation (Tipton 2(08).
Due to the conditions under which the protocol could enter into force, it
had to be ratified by at least 55 countries and the participants should be
responsible for at least 55 percent of global GHG emissions (Kyoto Protocol
1998). When Australia and the United States refused to sign the agreement,
stating that the Protocol would damage their economic interests, the fate of the
document ended up in the hands of the Russian government, since with its
contribution the percentage of GHG emissions the protocol covered would
attain the required level. One might argue that during the time of the Kyoto
negotiations, the actual 'ecological power' of Russia could be seen particularly
clearly as well as how it could be converted into political power utilised by the
Russian government in its own national interests (Buchner and Dall'Olio 2(05).
During the difficult years of the early ·19908, the new state of the Russian
Federation tried to re-establish its role in the new world order. It went through
the period of committing itself to numerous international agreements and trying
to join various international institutions. In the sphere of environmental
cooperation Russia signed '30 bilateral environmental agreements and [joined]
more than 25 regional environmental regimes' (Henry 2(08). In 1992 Russia
was among the first countries to sign the UN Framework Convention on
Climate Change and ratified it in 1994. Russia was classified as an 'economy
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in transition' and ratification did not imply any obligations. Very shortly after
the convention came into force, Russia changed its position by raising concerns
over the climate change mitigation policy's impact on its energy policy.
Furthermore, it took the side of the members of the Organization of the
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which questioned the limits set by the
Convention (Afionis 2009; Andonova 2008).
By the time the conference in Kyoto, Japan, took place in 1997, Russia
had left the OPEC camp and was already in the camp with the United States,
Canada, New Zealand and Japan, who lobbied for lower emission restrictions
for industrialized countries. When in 2001 the United States announced its
withdrawal from the Kyoto negotiations, Russia faced two outcomes. On the
one hand, it lost the largest potential buyer of spare emission quotas (Oldfield
et al. 2003). On the other, Russia suddenly gained greater negotiating power
due to its possible impact on the protocol's fate. Afionis (2009) argues that the
EU realized straight away that in order to make the Kyoto Protocol a reality it
had to comply with the demands of Russia, Japan, Canada and Australia (after
the United States and China, the world's largest GHG emitters). Eventually in
200 1 at the conference in Bonn, the EU offered such compromises that it
became impossible to say 'no' without damaging the countries' international
reputation. One of the conditions was to consider 'sinks' towards the
estimation of the state's GHG emissions. For example, countries with massive
forests zones (such as Russia), would be considered less polluting, since a
certain amount of GHG emissions would be sunk by their natural carbon
absorbing reservoirs.
The wave of enthusiasm in Russia that followed the Kyoto Protocol's
ratification soon disappeared, when President Putin radically changed his
position once again and asked for agreement on certain sums to be invested
into emissions trading or JI mechanisms. In addition, a few years later at the
COP-9 (Milan 2(03), Russia managed to announce during a very short period
of time, first, its firm intention not to ratify the protocol, and second, that the
ratification was still very much under consideration and the country was
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moving towards it (Buchner and Dall'Olio 2(05). It took another year before
Russia fmally signed the Protocol on 18November 2004.
As demonstrated above, before Russia signed the Protocol it achieved
certain political and economic bargains. Andonova (2008) argues that Russia
managed to maintain such 'considerable bargaining power' (ibid: 489) because
its participation was vital for the protocol to come into power, whilst Russia
did not have any national interests in the climate change negotiations as the
country's economic development was the top priority. So, Russia stated many
times that it would not commit to any other targets which were under the 1990
level. Itmust be explained that compared to the post-perestroika years, in 1990
Russia was still in its peak period of industrial capacity, which was
accompanied by a high amount of GHG emissions. After the collapse of the
USSR, the country went through major economic decay, which consequently
decreased its GHG emissions by approximately 40 percent'" (Afionis 2009;
Andonova 2008; Henry 2008; Oldfield 2005).
Another explanation why it took so many years for Russia to sign the
protocol arguably was due to the fact that the Kyoto Protocol was opposed by a
group of very influential scientists and economists who were not so sure of the
human contribution to climate change and its negative consequences for Russia,
whilst they were convinced that the protocol would restrict the economic
growth of Russia. Two in particular, due to their positions and authority, had
been the most vigorous opponents of Kyoto's ratification: Yuri Izrael, a former
scientific adviser to President Putin and a director of the Russian Academy of
Sciences' Global Climate and Ecology Institute, and Andrei lllarionov, at that
time the President's chief economic adviser. Izrael was (untiI2008) also a vice-
chairman of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). However,
his confidence in Kyoto's useless and damaging character for the Russian
economy persisted even after Russia's ratification - he asked the President to
annul his signature. lllarionov refusing to acknowledge the anthropogenic
character of climate change, referred to "'Kyotoism" as a new "totalitarianism"
60 Missfeldt and Villavicenco (2000: 382 cited in Oldfield 2005: 81) suggest
that the GHG emissions drop would have been even more significant at that
time if Russia's energy efficiency had not worsened.
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and said that its implementation would be an "Auschwitz for civilisation"
(Rosbalt 2004 cited in Mandrillon 2008: 135). Two years before the
ratification took place, Dlarionov announced an economic model in which he
projected the doubling of Russia's GDP, which would lead to a situation in
which Russia would exceed the GHG emissions limit prescribed by the
protocol and would be forced to buy quotas (Buchner and Dall'Olio 2(05).
After the protocol was ratified, Illarionov," together with Natalia Pivovarova
(director of the Economic Analysis Institute), published an article on the
economic consequences of the ratification (2004). They stated that the risks
and danger of the Kyoto ratification for Russia had become a reality, and that
the government had to deal with them. The authors supported their statement
by looking at the correlation between such positions as the amount of financial
resources which Russian businesses might receive from emission trading, the
amount of money that Russian companies would need to spend to meet the
quotas (and fines for exceeding them), the amount of resources needed to
respond to the protocol's requirements, and the slowing of economic growth
which would be unavoidable in order to meet the protocol's requirements.
Sergey Kuraev, from the Russian Regional Environmental Centre, does
not concentrate on the role of these two prominent scholars, but rather argues
that the general decline in Russian science and in particular in the research area
of climate change was crucial to the state's policy. Kuraev (2011) says that
when in 1992 Russia signed the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, it took only two years to ratify it at the national level, which
was possible due to Russia's scientific community, who provided all the
necessary scientific information on climate change's impact on people's health,
the country's economy, ecosystem and biodiversity. After the Kyoto Protocol
was adopted and was waiting for Russia's signature, the academic community
took firm anti-Kyoto positions and it became, according to Kuraev, almost
61 As was unofficially stated amongst the people involved in Russia's climate
change affairs, it was almost certain that Illarionov's work and position was
funded by international fossil fuel companies (anonymous source, Moscow,
July 2011), in this sense the role of this scientist could be compared with the
role of the Conservative movement in the United States in advocating the
climate sceptic position (McCright and Dunlap 2003).
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fashionable among scientists to say something against its ratification. Among
the reasons he names are personal preferences, academic disputes,
organisations' rivals and also, the decline in the number of new enthusiastic
academics in the field who could have changed the trend.
Peter Haas (1989), in his study on the role of epistemic communities in
the implementation of Mediterranean pollution control, states that 'epistemic
communities may introduce new policy alternatives to their governments, and
depending on the extent to which these communities are successful in
obtaining and retaining bureaucratic power domestically, they can often lead
their governments to pursue them' (Haas 1989: 402). It could be argued that
due to the high positions of these two Kyoto opponents in Russia (lllarionov
and Izrael), their opinion was often perceived as the Kremlin's official position
(Henry and Sundstrom 2(08). On the other side of the domestic debate of the
protocol's ratification were environmental NGOs, other representatives of
scientific communities (some argue it was a majority62)and in fact some of the
biggest businesses in the country. Even though some companies such as Yukos
and Norilsk Nickel were against it (fearing that it would restrict the
development of their industries in the Arctic), companies such as United
Energy Systems, Russian Aluminium, Gazprom, the Russian Union of
Industrialists and Entrepreneurs and others admitted the advantages of the
ratification and supported the protocol (due to the prospects for foreign
investments in these industries through the 11 mechanism) (Henry and
Sundstrom 2(08). Russia's ministries were opposing each other on different
sides of the debate as well. The Ministry of Energy saw it as a way to bring
money into the modernization of the energy sector (Buchner and Dall'Olio
2(05). The Ministry of Natural Resources feared the protocol would restrict the
use of natural resources. The Roshydromet, even though it was affiliated with
the Ministry of Natural Resources, was mostly pro-Kyoto and the Ministry of
Economic Development and Trade changed its opinion from negative to
62During the Kyoto negotiations 250 representatives of Russian science signed
a document in support of the protocol and in the media more and more
statements from Russian academics could be found seeking to change the
Russian people's and government's attitude towards the problem.
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neutral when it realized that the procedures required by the protocol could be
managed by the Ministry of Energy. However, as Henry and Sundstrom (2007)
discovered after the president signed the Kyoto Protocol, the ministries united
in the support of his decision. They concluded that 'bureaucratic battles among
ministries, parliamentary debates, and regional interests are less important than
the overwhelming power of the executive branch of power' (ibid: 56).
Overall, when the protocol was signed and ratified, Russia managed to
achieve favourable conditions out of the agreement, under which it was not
obliged to do anything, as it was very unlikely that it would reach the level of
emissions at the 1990 benchmark. Secondly, it got the opportunity to sell its
spare quotas and bring investments into the country through the JImechanism.
And last but not least, Russia's final decision to sign the protocol coincided
with the EU's support for Russia's' application for World Trade Organisation
(WTO) membership 63 (Andonova 2008; Afionis 2009; Henry and
Douhovnikoff 2(08).
The process of Russia ratifying the Kyoto Protocol demonstrated how
climate change policy was moved to the background of the state's other
political and economic interests, and the 'climate card' was used when
necessary. As discussed earlier, the rebirth of the concept of Russia as a 'world
power' has been mentioned by several scholars during the discussion of
Russia's behaviour at the Kyoto negotiations (Afionis and Chatzopoulos 2009;
Henry and Sundstrom 2(07). However, since Russia's ambiguous strategy
during the Kyoto negotiations managed 'to reduce the credibility of the whole
country in the international arena' (Korppoo 2008: 7) then the Copenhagen
Conference could be seen as a second chance for the country to use its climate
change policy to rebuild its image as a modem liberal state.
63 Joining the WTO was one of Russia's key policy goals. Throughout the
1990s it made several attempts to negotiate its entrance to the organisation,
however, it kept failing to do so. One of the EU's demands was for Russia to
even out its gas prices between its internal and external markets. InMay 2004,
during the EU-Russia summit, agreement was reached that Russia would
liberalize its banking and telecommunications sectors, decrease its import
tariffs, even out its gas prices by 2010 and ratify the Kyoto Protocol (Buchner
and Dall'Olio 2(05).
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A new chapter inRussian climate policy?
If the Kyoto negotiations brought Russia under the spotlight and made it one of
the key players in climate change politics, Anna Korppoo (2008: 7) argued that
during the post-Kyoto negotiation period Russia became a 'reluctant party'.
After signing the Protocol Russia partially lost the attention it had previously
fostered due to new actors coming into play: the United States with a new
administration, along with China, India and other newly industrialising
countries. On the other hand, the Kyoto Protocol's rather tolerant requirements
of Russia were not likely to be maintained under a new agreement where in
order to comply with new GHG emission reduction goals Russia might have to
actually reduce its emissions intentionally through specific policy mechanisms.
Korppoo argued that Russia's government would continue to insist on
'differentiated responsibilities' (ibid: 7) and lobbying to be categorized as an
emerging country so its emissions would not be restricted until it reached a
certain level of development.
At the Copenhagen Conferenc'" 'global but differentiated responsibilities'
became one of the main messages in the Russian president's speech. However,
64 The Fifteenth Conference of the Parties under the UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change (COP-I5) was held from 7 December until 18
December 2009 in Copenhagen, Denmark. Taking into account that the Kyoto
Protocol was due to expire at the end of 2012 and that a new document needed
to be introduced, many politicians, scientists and NGOs set big hopes on the
Copenhagen Conference, expecting that countries would be able to
compromise and reach some degree of agreement. However, even before the
conference started, it was already apparent that it was very likely' that
agreement would not be achieved. When the conference was over, the word
'failure' was commonly used to describe it. The main problem was that the
conference did not manage to produce any legally binding document with
positions similar to those of the Kyoto Protocol. One of the major problems
was the disagreement between industrialised and developing countries, as well
as within the industrialised countries camp. On the other side, the Copenhagen
Conference could not be called a complete fiasco. The Copenhagen Accord
was produced, while not with the legal power of the Kyoto Protocol, it
signified a level of agreement between more than 25 countries. The Accord
concluded that the world's goal is to keep temperature rises under 2°C
(Bodansky 2010) and it allocated the budget for the mitigation and adaptation
processes. But it did not set concrete emission reduction targets, the 2°C
temperature limit is quite questionable, and has a more political than scientific
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once again, Medvedev talked about Russia as the leader among the countries
reducing their emissions. Even though in large part it was just a facade
(Russia's carbon emission reductions were still massive, but not due to any
specific measures, but rather to economic problems in Russia), it demonstrated
the way the government wanted Russia to be presented. Medvedev also
announced that regardless of the outcome of the conference, Russia would
commit to the 25 percent emissions reduction rate by 2020 (baseline year is
1990) (President of Russia website 2009a).
At the national level the day before Medvedev's speech at the conference,
the Russian Climate Doctrine (2009) was adopted. The Doctrine acknowledged
the importance of the anthropogenic influence on climate change and analysed
the risks it might bring for Russia. It states that the consequences of climate
change can be seen at global, regional and national levels. Global climate
change creates a situation which demands a planned governmental strategy for
managing climate change problems (especially considering Russia's
geographical characteristics, climatic diversity, economic structure,
demographic problems and geopolitical interests). The Climate Doctrine states
major principles in Russia's climate policy, such as the orientation of Russia's
national interests in relation to climate change, acknowledgment of the
necessity of international partnership in scientific research, precaution in
planning and implementing measures on protecting humans, the economy and
the state from the undesirable consequences of climate change and a clear and
open information policy on climate change issues. The openness in
informational policy also includes popularizing scientific discoveries in this
area through the mass media. Furthermore, the Doctrine acknowledges the
mass media as one of the actors in climate change regulation policy. According
to this document - realising a possible clash of interests in climate change
policy - the mass media will have to be socially responsible and enter the
process of preventing conflicts and social tension, and lobbying of certain
actors such as oil companies (Climate Doctrine 2009).
basis, and the Accord does not place countries under an obligation but only
recommends sticking to its positions.
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The adoption of the Doctrine (just as any other document on climate
change) caused heated debate in Russia's scientific and political community.
When the Doctrine was accepted many saw it as a positive move in domestic
climate change policy. The rector of the Russian State Hydrometeorological
University, Professor Lev Karlin (2010), in an opinion piece for the website of
the Russian Environmental NGO 'Bellona', said that it was definitely upbeat
news, the fact that the state had turned towards the opinion that climate change
problems would stimulate scientific research. However, a few years after it
became obvious that the Doctrine did not produce any practical outcomes, the
opinion on the Doctrine became more pessimistic - 'the doctrine seems as
irrelevant and abandoned now as a framework document can possibly be'
(Dobrovidova 2012c).
In this sense, Russia's position as announced at the Copenhagen
Conference can also be considered as a positive shift in its climate change
policy. Alexey Kokorin from WWF-Russia stated (Moscow, interview, 27July
2011), 'it is difficult to judge whether Russian climate change policy is good or
bad. Probably by the European standard it is awful, but for Russia the fact that
the anthropogenic character of climate change is admitted already means a lot' .
Other manifestations of the change in Russia's climate policy are
represented by the approval of the Climate Doctrine implementation plan (2011)
and the creation of the position of Presidential advisor for climate change. Prior
to the conference on 27 November 2009 Alexander Bedritsky was appointed as
the President's advisor on climate change and he himself noted his own
appointment in this new position demonstrated that the importance of state
climate policy was rising'" (Bedritsky 2011). This change was reinforced in
March 2010 at the meeting of Russia's Security Council'" which focused 'on
measures to prevent threats to national security in relation to global climate
65 Referring again to the work of Peter Haas (1989) on the role of epistemic
community, the appointment of Bedritsky could be paralleled with the
penetration of marine scientists in the Algerian government and the consequent
fowth of their influence over the state's marine environmental regime.
6 Russia's Security Council draws up the major official documents on Russia's
national and international policy where security threats are evident
(Presidential Decree on the Security Council 2011).
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change'. Here, Medvedev stated that even though it was unclear what the
prospects of international negotiations on the problems of climate change were,
Russia, as a responsible state would follow its chosen strategy - the
development of a sustainable economy and 'so-called green technologies' by
creating a modem energy sector and reducing carbon emissions. Medvedev
underlined that it was necessary to develop a strategy which would help to
prevent or minimise climate change and would also preserve the country's
economic competitiveness in its major export positions (President of Russia
website 201Oc).
In addition, it also must be noted that unlike several years ago during the
Kyoto ratification negotiations, Russian scientists also became more unified in
their opinion on the threat climate change posed for Russia and the world, as
Vladimir Berdin said in an interview (interview, Chemal, 13 August 2011),
'We [scientists] absolutely agree with the IPCe conclusions and we have our
own contributors to their reports, so at this moment the position of Russian
scientists is identical to the majority of their colleagues around the world.'
Perhaps a slight change in state policy will give scientists as well as other
members of the 'epistemic community' on the issue of climate change - a
'policy window,67 (Evangelista 1995) in order to lobby their interests.
Some scholars connect this modification in the state's climate change
policy with Medvedev's presidency and his policy of economic modernisation
including improvement in energy efficiency. Henry and Sundstrom (2012)
argue that during Medvedev's presidency we can observe that climate change
policy was shaped and influenced by his overall drive for modernisation and
the development of energy efficiency, which makes them conclude that
Russia's climate policy depended on 'Medvedev's authority, the degree to
which energy efficiency goals have been institutionalised, and the economic
67Looking at the role of transnational actors in the security policy of the Soviet
Union in the 1980s Matthew Evangelista (1995) comes to the conclusion that
even though the majority of these transnational actors were scientists with an
extensive level of expertise and competence on the issue, their opinion was
only taken into account when the Soviet domestic structure was shaken due to
the 'severity of the economic crisis, the challenges of the Reagan
administration, and the advent of a strong reformist leader' (ibid: 36).
153
incentives and constraints of a post-Kyoto agreement that induces Russia to
participate' (ibid: 1316). The following section looks at Medvedev's official
speeches during his time in office which relate to climate change. It is argued
that the official political discourse was not linked specifically to Medvedev's
presidency, but rather it reflects embedded ideas pertaining to the economic
benefits that should remain even after the change at the executive level.
Presidential speeches on climate change: 'either we all should contribute, or
we should abandon all attempts'
There are a number of scholars who analyze policy speeches and official
documents to study Russia's domestic and foreign policies (for example see
Angermueller 2012, Kratochvil 2008, Kratochvil et al. 2006, O'Loughlin et al.
2004). Jensen and Skedsmo (2010: 441) in their comparative study of Russian
and Norwegian Arctic policies justify their choice of data on the grounds that
'the selected texts are all articulated by formal political authority [and] intend
to represent the countries' approaches to the European Arctic [... the texts] set
the agenda and shape the issues at hand, and they frame and produce
representations of foreign policy.' For the purpose of this research presidential
speeches are treated as the written representations of the state leaders'
approach to Russia's climate change policy.
The analysed texts were collected from the official website of the
Russian President (http://kremlin.ru) and include publicly available transcripts
of the President's statements at press conferences. interviews, meetings with
government officials (foreign and domestic) and the general public. The 72
speeches studied cover Medvedev's presidency (May 2008-May 2012) all
mention 'climate change'. The data were further analysed using qualitative
content analysis. While Krippendorff (2004) questions the categorisation of
content analysis as quantitative and qualitative, in this case the 'qualitative'
attribute means that the relatively small number of texts were individually
studied and specified keywords ('climate change') were analysed within the
textual context. Further on, other content analysis methods are employed -
'taking a sample of media, establishing categories of content, measuring the
presence of each category within a sample, and interpreting the result'
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(Bertrand and Hughes 2005: 198). As the content analysis here is 'problem-
driven' (Krippendorff 2004), the defined textual categories are influenced by
the research questions aimed at exploring Medvedev's approach to the problem
of climate change and whether the change in Russia's climate policy could be
solely ascribed to his presidency. Six categories were identified within the
studied texts follows: 'global cooperation', 'environmental leadership',
'economic benefits' , 'helping the environment', 'global security' and
'responsibility' (several categories have been attributed to the same text), the
results are presented in Table 4.2 below.
Table 4.2 Percentage of speeches (Medvedev, 2008-2012) by identified
categories
Category % Examples of quotations
Global 78 'the topic has not left anyone indifferent';
cooperation 'obviously, regardless of anyone's attitude, everyone
should get involved based on scientific knowledge
and objective predictions'
Economic 38 'we must improve our energy efficiency, which at the
benefitsl Green end will help to solve global problem of climate
economy change and reduce the GHG emissions';
'we should be ready for any scenario and use it for
the benefit of our economy'
Global 21 'another area of our cooperation is environmental
Security security';
'climate change is one of the main threats and
challenges'
Helping the 18 'our goal is not only improve our lives, but also to
environment think about future generations; that is why the
problem of climate change stays in the centre of our
attention' ;
'we all have an interest in radical improvement of our
environment'
Environmental 14 'currently Russia is a world's leader of GHG
leadership emissions reduction';
'some time ago we took very serious responsibilities,
whilst a significant part of developing economies did
not do it, such as China, India, Brazil; Americans did
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not take, but we did'
Responsibility 7 'we are all responsible for climate change';
'we understand our responsibility for GHG emissions
along with other major emitters'
The least frequent category proved to be 'responsibility' (7 percent, N=5)
representing only a few cases of Medvedev acknowledging Russia's
contribution to climate change and with only one case when Russia was
specifically referred to as one of the biggest emitters in the world. This result,
together with the relative unpopularity of the category 'helping the
environment' (18 percent, N=13), is quite predictable, based on the earlier
discussion of the Russian government's neglect of environmental policy. The
concept of 'environmental leadership' also does not enter presidential
discourse too often (14 percent, N=lO). Recurring throughout the speeches
along with reminders of Russia's 'great commitments' to the Kyoto Protocol or
'drastic' goals of GHG emissions reduction, it yields to the more popular
concept of presenting climate change as another 'global security' issue (21
percent, N=15). This category acknowledges the importance of the climate
change problem and stresses the urgent necessity to deal with it or adjust the
state's policy, in view of climate change consequences. The latter message was
largely provoked by the devastating consequences of the heat-wave in Russia
in the summer of 2010 - 'considering what is happening this summer, we do
not know what is going to happen next year, the climate is changingwe have
to take it into consideration and allocate some budget for it' (President of
Russia website 2010a).
The top two results deserve more detailed discussion. Firstly, the
majority of speeches (78 percent of them, N=56) referred to climate change
within the context of global cooperation. Also, 35 speeches from the category
'global cooperation' were presented during global summits (G8, G20, BRICS)
or bilateral .meetings with various state leaders where climate change was
mentioned in the same sentence with other global challenges such as global
poverty, illegal immigration, energy and food security and so on. It could be
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argued that in the Russian case climate change is used in order to demonstrate
the state's involvement in processes of international cooperation and
development as 'a modem and liberal state.' Another frequently repeated
message in this category promotes the idea of global responsibility, where
Medvedev appeals to every country to take part in the fight against climate
change, as without global efforts solutions will not be found anyway. In this
context Russia's desire not to commit to the second period of the Kyoto
process does not come as a surprise - it does not involve all countries. It should
be noted that the majority of the speeches in the category 'global cooperation'
only mention climate change in one or two sentences.
A more explicit discussion takes place within the 'economic benefits'
category (38 percent, N=27), in which the main message given by Medvedev is
'we will win no matter what', thus climate change will be addressed in the
manner most beneficial for the country. For example, during the meeting with
the managerial staff of Russia's Academy of Science just prior to the
Copenhagen speech, Medvedev stated that 'development of an energy-efficient
economy is a definite priority, regardless of our [Russia's] attitude towards
.climate change' (President of Russia website 2009b). A similar message was
presented in Medvedev's official speech at the Copenhagen summit: a 'global
climate "deal" is a real chance for "green" economic development and
investments around the world. In the end measures for mitigating climate
change will assist in solving global environmental and socio-economic
problems, in practice achieving those "millennium goals" we set some time ago'
(President of Russia website 2009a). In his blog on 5 June 2010 (World
Environment Day), Medvedev published a piece with a title 'Environment and
economy do not contradict each other. A normal economy is environmentally
friendly.' In this article Medvedev states that 'unfortunately with some delay,
we have finally realized that it is vital to protect our environment and that
economic and environmental developments are inextricably linked.' Further on
in the article he once again talks about 'energy efficiency' and 'green
economy', and how these ideas have become a trend which he finds quite
sensible - 'I have always said that people start dealing with environmental
problems when they feel the economic necessity.' At the meeting with the state
157
security council 'on questions of environmental protection' (President of
Russia website 201Oc),Medvedev claimed that countries such as the United
States and China got involved in climate change mitigation (and in general
problems of environmental development) because they saw the 'opportunity to
make money, and we [Russia] should have the same attitude.'
The analysis of the presidential speeches mentioning 'climate change'
suggests that whilst the categories such as 'environmental leadership' and
'responsibility' do not enter the official discourse that often, the category of
'economic benefits' proposes the most elaborated and explicit vision of climate
change problems within the state's national interests and the most frequent
referral to the climate topic happens within the category of 'global cooperation.'
It can be argued that Medvedev's presidency signified a shift from the policy
of 'de-environmentalism' to 'pragmatic environmentalism', which holds that
the environment will eventually benefit from the state's actions but only if it
brings obvious benefits for Russia's state policies andlor economy.
'Climate pragmatism ': 'without sensible pragmatism we won 't solve
. l bl .68environmenta pro ems.
Several years ago Russia's environmental 'greatness' was just a 'cover' in the
speeches of the country's leaders and state officials. In business terminology
this is what is called a 'green-washing technique' - 'tactics that mislead
consumers regarding the environmental practices of a company' (Parguel at el.
2011: 15 cited in Mason and Mason 2012). Consumers here are the
international community in front of which Russia tried to demonstrate its
importance in the climate negotiation process as seen in Russia's involvement
in the Kyoto negotiations. Fear of possible economic losses due to international
obligations to cut GHG emissions along with the underestimation of the
negative effects of climate change resulted in Russia's peculiar involvement in
the international negotiation processes and reluctant domestic climate change
policy. Korppoo and Vatansever (2012) state that this (largely) superficial
'environmental leadership' does not work anymore. Firstly, the international
community has realised that the reduction in GHG emissions was not a result
68 President of Russia website (201Oc).
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·of governmental policy; secondly, Russia (as the successor of the USSR) has
significant historical responsibility for the world's GHG emission record; and
thirdly, that the Russian economy is still extremely carbon-intensive (the
carbon intensity of its GDP is 81 percent greater than the world average).
Recently, as the analysis of Medvedev's official speeches shows, there is
a move to an understanding of climate change policy not as a policy of 'costs'
but as one of 'opportunities' (Giddens 2010). As the Director of the Centre of
Environmental Policy, Vladimir Zakharov summarised, 'for the next 20 years
nobody will be able to operate their economies without fossil fuels, so nothing
threatens Russia's economic interests. Now we need to start thinking about
how we can provide environmental services and get investments in the
"greening" of our economy' (interview, Moscow, 21 July 2011).
Beside the involuntary drop in GHG emissions of the 1990s and a rather
fictitious environmental leadership in climate change mitigation policy, Russia
possesses the ability to lead the way in sustainable development without
significant economic costs. Russia does have potential to de-carbonise its
economy through an increase in energy efficiency and the development of
renewable energy sources (Bagirov and Safonov 2010; Overland and Kjarnet
2009), which might benefit both Russia's economic development and global
GHG reduction goals. Averchenko (2009) argues that merely following its
plans for the improvement of energy efficiency might be enough for Russia to
fulfil its carbon reduction obligation by reducing GHG emissions by 40 percent
(2007 is taken as a baseline) by 2050. There are a number of sectors which
have potential for energy saving, for example, the municipal/utility sector
(through the modernisation of central heating systems), the oil and gas sector
(reduction of gas flaring or a decrease in leakage during gas transportation),
transport (renovation and popularisation of public transport or implementation
of fuel efficiency standards), residential buildings (through enforcing energy
standards onto new or renovated buildings as well as raising public awareness
about energy saving and promoting the use of electricity meters) and so on
(Averchenko 2009, Opitz 2007, World Bank 2(08). The extensive list of
measures for developing the energy efficiency of the Russian economy were
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formalised in a federal law (23/11/2009, N261). The law was updated
throughout the past several years with the latest. version, signed by the re-
elected President Putin, extending measures for improving energy saving in the
automobile sector.
Energy efficiency plans are already included in the Russian Energy
Strategy towards 2020 (Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation 2003)
and considered to be a priority not only for the energy sector in particular but
the whole economy as well (Bogdan et al. 2009). In this sense, it is interesting
how even the role of 'Gazprom' in Russia's state policy can be presented as a
tool for economic and environmental development. At the ceremony
celebrating the start of building the offshore pipeline of the Nord Stream gas
project Medvedev stated that "'Nord Stream" is not just a major transnational
project, but also in our view, [Russia's] input into the global solution of
environmental and climate problems[ ... ] which will allow us to reduce GHG
emissions without economic sacrifice' (President of Russia website 201Ob).
With regards to renewable energy the Deputy Director of the Russian
State Institute of Energy Strategy, Pavel Bezrukikh, states that 'renewable
energy sources in Russia could cover 35 percent of the country's total primary
energy supply. [...Currently] renewable energy sources account for less than
one percent of Russia's energy' (cited in Overland and Kjarnet 2009: 7). Based
on calculations of the technical and economic potential of renewable energy
sources in Russia Overland and Kjarnet (2009) state that the development of
alternative energy sources could also 'contribute greatly to the structural
changes needed for the country to assume tougher [GHG reduction]
commitments without slowing [Russia's] economic growth' (ibid, 5). The
'optimal use of renewable energy sources' is included in Russia's 2020 Energy
Strategy, in which they are seen as a way to ensure energy supplies in regions
with 'decentralised energy supply systems' (such as the Far North of Siberia)
and also as a solution to environmental problems (through the 'lessening of the
volume of harmful substances produced by current energy use'). The strategy
aims to increase the share of renewable energy sources in Russia by up to 4.5
percent by 2020. The policy of development of renewable energy sources was
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also stimulated by the acceptance of the Presidential Decree 'On some
measures to improve energy and environmental performance of the Russian
economy' (2008), a decree of the Russian government '[O]n the main
directions of the state policy in the sphere of energy efficiency of electric
power from renewable energy sources by 2020' (2009) and the earlier
mentioned Federal Law 'On energy saving and energy efficiency' .
According to a report by the World Bank (2008), these savings through
improvements in energy efficiency 69 will benefit the economy by
approximately $120-150 billion per annum through an increase in oil and gas
exports. Russia will also decrease its GHG emissions, improve its air quality
and as a consequence will lessen the health risk from pollution for the
population. McKinsey Global Institute's report (2009: 7) states that Russia 'has
the .largest relative potential among all the BRIC[S) countries to reduce
emissions through implementing only measures that are economically
attractive'. The McKinsey Global Institute proposes 60 measures which would
require investments of €150 billion (over twenty years), but the energy savings
achieved would result in €345 billion (over the same timeframe), energy
consumption would be reduced by 23 percent and GHG emissions by 19
percent.
Furthermore, another issue connected with the economics of climate
change should also be highlighted: Russia's economic losses due to the
consequences of climate change. Arguably, this idea was implicitly or in some
cases explicitly present in Medvedev's speeches in the category of 'global
security' in which climate change is treated as another major threat to national
.security. Indeed, as was mentioned earlier in this chapter, Russia is extremely
vulnerable to the consequences of climate change, including threats to the
economic stability of the country. According to data provided by Roshydromet
(2012) every year Russia's economy loses 60 billion rubles (around £1.27
billion) due to extreme weather events and climate change increases this
amount every year by 6 percent. For instance, in summer 2010 the central part
69 The report states that 'Russia's current energy inefficiency is equal to the
annual primary energy consumption of France' (World Bank 2008: 5).
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of Russia saw continuous records for highest temperature and was subject to
massive areas of toxic smog. The heat led to significant damage to the
agricultural sector, resulting in 41.6 billion rubles (around £0.832 billion) of
losses (RIA Novosti 201Ob). The negative consequences of the anomalous
weather event also led to severe social losses: during these months the death
rate in Moscow alone increased from 360-380 people dying a day to 700 (RIA
Novosti 20l0a). Yulia Yevtushok of Oxfam-Russia (interview, Moscow, 22
July 2011) stated that 'even though the connection to climate change was not
proven, because the fires happened in Moscow it forced our government to
doubt their position towards climate change.'
Overall, as the above analysis has demonstrated, for Russia climate
change mitigation policy has become increasingly beneficial in both
environmental and (perhaps more importantly for the state) economic terms.
Commitment to the GHG emission reduction goals is a 'low hanging fruit',
where by modernising its economy and getting more income into the budget,
Russia can also contribute to the global fight against climate change and
become a more genuine 'environmental leader'. Moreover, there is also a
realisation of the economic losses which Russia is already facing due to the
consequences of climate change, which is arguably, also pushing the issue up
the priority ladder. As the content analysis of Medvedev's speeches has
showed, Russian state leaders become more and more aware of the economic
side of climate policy.
Concluding remarks
On 1 January 2013 the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol came
into force. Russia became one of the few Annex I parties (along with Japan and
New Zealand) who refused to take on new targets in GHG emissions reduction
within this international framework (RIA Novosti 2012e), which was
announced at the UNFCCC in Doha, Qatar (2012). Two months earlier, the
Russian President's advisor on climate change, Bedritsky, justified the state's
position by stating that Russia advocated the adequate involvement of all
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countries without any exception in finding solutions to the problem of climate
change (RIA Novosti 2012a, see more in International Affairs 2010: 237).
This most recent Russian participation in the international climate change
negotiations in Qatar should not come as a surprise or be seen as a totally
negative development. First, Russia did not 'go Canadian' (Dobrovidova
2012a), meaning that unlike Canada, Russia did not completely abandon the
Protocol. At least until 2015 it will be (along with other parties) calculating the
results of GHG emission reductions during the first period (2008-2012), and
even after that it will keep reporting its emissions levels' according to the
Protocol's requirements (RIA Novosti 2012e). Since the Copenhagen
Conference the rhetoric used by Russian officials in addressing climate change
has changed: even though they remain reserved towards international
commitments, all recent statements confirm domestic dedication towards GHG
emissions reduction which will be achieved through economic modernisation
and improvements in energy efficiency. The recent changes in climate change
policy emerged because of the realisation that Russia can develop its economy
and cut GHG emissions (what is summarised here as 'climate pragmatism').
This again leads us to the deep connection between the economy and the
environment in Russia (Henry 20IOa). Under new circumstances this
correlation can actually be seen as a positive tendency. Practically speaking,
the idea of treating climate change mitigation as profitable and beneficial as
well as understanding the nature of economic losses from climate degradation
and the importance of climate change as a topic of global concern is moving
the policy beyond the point of rhetoric. This is encouraging Russia to take steps
towards a more sustainable and 'greener' economy and consequently making
Russia a more realistic 'environmental leader' . If the hypothesis that the media
coverage of climate change issues correlates with the state's policy, is correct,
then it will be possible to observe this change in the state's policy on the pages
of newspapers.
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CHAPTER 5 - RUSSIAN NEWSPAPERS AND CLIMATE CHANGE
In the previous chapters it was shown how the PrM is applicable in the context
of the Russian media production process. As all five PrM filters (ownership
structure, advertising, sources, flak and ideology) can be defined and explained
in this context it was suggested that they should work in a similar way as they
did for the United States but with some modifications (as discussed in chapter
three). According to this idea a number of hypotheses were posited to be tested
through a range of methods, including media analysis.
This chapter offers an analysis of Russian press coverage of climate
change which allows us to identify the priority themes within the coverage,
changes in these priorities and even omissions of certain events or facts. More
importantly, it allows us to test for a correlation between state policy and media
policy, one of the chief hypotheses in this project. Data was collected from five
national newspapers: Izvestiya, Kommersant, Rossiyskaya gazeta,·
Komsomol'skaya pravda and Sovetskaya Rossiya. The aim of the chapter is to
study the dynamics of media coverage by looking at how the amount of climate
change news changed depending on certain conditions over time
(modifications in state policy, global conferences on climate change,
acceptance of international documents and so on). Through discourse analysis
the chapter will also look at how the character of these articles varied under the
specified conditions (how climate change and state policy on it were portrayed,
who were the main newsmakers and opinion leaders on the topic and so on).
Coverage in the newspapers mentioned above will be studied by focusing on
three events: the Kyoto Conference (1997), the Copenhagen Conference (plus
acceptance of the Climate Doctrine) (2009) and the heat-wave in Russia
(2010). The rationale behind these choices is that state policy changed
tremendously between the Kyoto and Copenhagen Conferences, so it allows us
to see if there was a correlation between this change and media policy, whilst
the heat-wave allows us to explore whether other reasons, such as natural
disasters, have more influence over the coverage rather than the state policy.
Following the theoretical approach of the PrM (explained in the previous
chapters), the methods used in this analysis will to some extent duplicate the
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ones used by Herman and Chomsky in their original research and will allow for
the examination of media policy from a similar perspective.
Methodological considerations: analysing media texts
Before discussing methods used for the analyses of the Russian press, it is
relevant to go back to the postulates of the PrM and to discuss the original
methods used by Herman and Chomsky to test their hypotheses.
The methods of the PrM
Herman and Chomsky suggest using both qualitative and quantitative methods
in applying the PrM. Their findings in Manufacturing Consent (1994 [1988])
were at first acquired by quantitative techniques. The PrM analyses how
particular techniques in arranging and physically shaping information
stimulates the 'preferred readings' (Klaehn 2009b: 44,). For instance, front
page coverage, big headlines, catchy wording in the lead paragraph 70 and
graphics can be powerful tools in captivating the reader's attention. These
quantitative data give an overall understanding of how coverage of certain
topics differ from one newspaper to another, or how they are covered in
comparison to other topics. Even so, Herman and Chomsky do not stop at
analysing results gained from mathematical calculations. Klaehn (2009a) in his
interview with Herman suggests that the PrM uses methods similar to critical
discourse analysis (such as the one developed by Teun van Dijk). Herman
agrees with him and it is quite clear why. The PrM proposes looking at the
media articles in the context of the historical, political or economic situation.
Alike Teun van Dijk (1991: 116) argues that 'discourse analysis of news is not
limited to textual structures' and that text on its own does not possess. any
specific meaning, but only after it is read and interpreted by the reader, from
his/her social or cultural background within the previously mentioned current
70The lead paragraph is the first couple of sentences of the article, which
'captures the essence of the event, and it cajoles the reader or listener into
staying awhile' (Mencher 2(06). The message carried in this few words has a
big influence on the reader, as much as the headline or conclusion.
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historical, political or economic situation, is a particular meaning assigned to
the article. Discourse analysis will be discussed in more detail below.
Another method Herman and Chomsky use in their book is the 'paired
example', in which they compare similar cases which involve different political
or economic interests. For instance, they analysed media coverage of religious
victims. One case was about the Polish priest Jerzy Popieluszko who was killed
by Polish police - which they contrasted to the numerous cases of priests killed
in Latin America. The results of the analyses showed a big difference in the
media coverage of the Polish priest and priests from the area of US influence.
The murder in the Communist state by far received the prevailing amount of
coverage. Herman and Chomsky explained this difference by characterising the
Polish priest as a 'worthy victim' (victims of the enemy Communist state), in
contrast to the 'unworthy victims' (victims of the states favourable to US
policy). They suggested that media coverage will be in favour of the news
which suits dominant political interests and makes people sympathise with the
victims of the opposed regimes and at the same time, the media try to distract
the public's attention from the information about unpopular state policies
(Klaehn 2(02).
Giving some specifications, Herman and Chomsky predict that not only
the quantity of the news on the worthy and unworthy victims will be different,
but also the quality of information will differ ('crudely in placement,
headlining, word usage, and other modes of mobilizing interest and outrage'
(1994 [1988]: 35». They suggest that worthy victims are depicted in a more
'humanized' fashion in order to appeal to the audience's empathy and make
them interested in the development of the story, whilst the unworthy victims
are presented very briefly with minimal emotions, preferably with no context.
Herman and Chomsky also anticipated that journalists would mostly be using
official sources of information, such as sources in the government of the
United States, in the case of covering unworthy victims so unwanted
information could be avoided. Overall, according to Herman and Chomsky the
coverage of convenient and inconvenient news would systematically differ in
quantity and quality 'in ways that serve political ends' (ibid).
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After summarising the quantitative results of the media analysis, Herman
and Chomsky look at the motives presented in the coverage, but in doing so
they continue to present each separate theme mentioned by journalists in
historical context, and they also point out how some facts which were played
up in one case were downplayed in another. For example, in the case of the
Polish priest, the media kept mentioning the government's responsibility for
the crime. In the Latin American cases on the contrary this aspect was not
covered. The model assumes that the quality and quantity of the media
coverage depends on the interests of the power elite (Klaehn 2009b). So, in
order to understand those interests the media analyses need to be undertaken
with diverse methods which can give a complete picture of the power
framework of the case studied.
With regards to the media analysis of climate change issues in Russia, the
method of 'paired examples' and the comparison of 'worthy' and 'unworthy'
victims, to some extent was reconstructed through the comparison of the
coverage of the Kyoto and Copenhagen Conferences. As will be discussed in
detail below, during the first conference, climate change is expected to be an
'unworthy' topic and during the second conference it should become a 'worthy'
topic due to the changes in the elites' interests. It is expected that this
dichotomisation will alter the coverage quantitatively and qualitatively. Based
on the provided outline of the PrM's original methods and the modifications of
the model discussed earlier for the case study of media coverage of climate
change in Russia, this study utilises the methods of content and discourse
analysis, which are discussed below.
Content and discourse analysis of climate change reporting
Cotter (2005: 416) argues that 'the discourse of news media encapsulates two
key components: the news story, or spoken or written text, and the process
involved in producing the texts.' She notes that the first dimension has been
closely studied by many scholars whilst the second one is often overlooked.
Applying the PrM to the Russian case of media coverage of environmental
issues incorporates both of these dimensions. It looks at the complex
production process of news, but at the same time, by means of content and
167
discourse analysis, it studies the outcome of this process - written or spoken
text produced by journalists under or in spite of the influence of the
surrounding context. Content and discourse analysis can be interpreted and
used very differently depending on the purpose of specific research, therefore,
the use of these methods here will be outlined below.
Being a very popular method in studying media messages, content
analysis allows the researcher to break the data into 'bits and pieces' (Pierce
2(08) and gives a measure of 'quantifiability' to the project. Complexity of the
content analysis depends on the particular case and purpose of the research and
how researchers understand it. This study will use the definition given by
Neuendorf (2002: 1): '[content analysis] defined as the systematic, objective,
quantitative analysis of message characteristics', a characterization which can
be supplemented by Krippendorff's (1980) definition, which refers to content
analysis as 'a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences
from data to their context' (cited in Bertrand and Huges 2005: 177). Thus, the
application of content analysis will allow us to follow the methodological logic
of the PrM.
It should be noted that the data collected for this research project will not
precisely reproduce the type of data collected by Herman and Chomsky for
their original study. For example, as the articles are collected through a
computer database it is impossible to calculate column inches and there is no
equivalent of editorials in the researched Russian newspapers. However, for
this part of the research, content analysis will allow us to identify the salience
of the topic throughout the selected timeframes and within the range of the
studied newspapers. Furthermore, it will demonstrate whether the quantity of
the articles devoted to climate change alters depending on such variables as
ownership structures, advertising policy or political orientation.
Discourse analysis allows us to explore the uniqueness of the text
produced by media (van Dijk 1991) where the meaning of words can be altered
and understood completely differently depending on the context. So, discourse
analysis will be used to look at the language as a whole, including the non-
linguistic categories, such as who is presenting the news, who is the audience,
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what types of non-verbal communication are involved and how information is
situated in the bigger context of social interactions. It again leads us back to the
methods used by the authors of the PrM, where after analysing the quantitative
characteristics of the text they go into the depth of the news information and
investigate the real intentions behind the messages. For example, Herman and
Chomsky's research of the peculiar coverage of the Polish priest's murder
which is not just interpreted as another criminal report, but as taken in the
political context, it is seen by the researchers as an influence of the Cold War
on the US media. Herman and Chomsky come to this conclusion by providing
a comprehensive analysis of the situation behind the events described in the
articles and by referring to specific sentences or paragraphs, they try to explain
why this might be biased or, even more, why it can be a product of a
'propaganda machine'. In some places their method reminds us of detective
investigative techniques. For instance, Herman and Chomsky go as far as to
characterize the media coverage of the Polish priest's murder and a hundred
religious victims in Latin America as a 'knowing lie' (1994 [1988]: 49) the
statement made by the State Department representative about the political
situation in El Salvador, and present a logical argument as to why they think so
by bringing in evidence from different sources.
Discourse analysis has several interpretations," hence, there are quite a
variety of schools and approaches to understanding and implementing
discourse analysis and even the definitions of discourse differ drastically. Van
Dijk (2011: 3-4) points out that discourse can be seen as 'social interaction,
[... ]as power and domination, [... [as communication, [... ]as contextually
situated, as social semiosis, as natural language use [or], [...]as a complex
layered construct' .
Due to the specific nature of this research project (explained below) and
the original postulates of the PrM, a methodology inspired by 'critical
71 Schiffrin et al. (2005: 1) note that generally for linguists 'discourse' means
anything 'beyond the sentence', whilst for some other researchers discourse
analysis is an analysis of 'language use'. While both these understandings of
discourse involve language, critical theorists go beyond these definitions and
look not only at the linguistics characteristics of discourse. but also its non-
linguistic characteristics (the social context in which language has to operate).
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discourse analysis' (CDA) will be applied for this study and in particular the
work of two prominent linguists, Teun van Dijk and Norman Fairclough, will
be drawn upon. Even though they do differ in some of their views on discourse,
in this case they could be referred to as representatives of one approach to
discourse studies (Gillespie 2006). CDA considers discourse to be inseparable
from its social context, however, as much as discourse is influenced and
transformed by the surrounding interactions or environment, in tum it also
possesses power and may change that context: 'the discursive event is shaped
by situation, institution and social structure, but it also shapes them'
(Fairclough et al. 2011: 357). For this research, discourse will be seen as 'a
form of social practices (economic, political, cultural and so on)' (Fairclough
2001: 122) which does not only consider the nominative function of the
language (defining the objects) but the 'linguistic conceptualization of the
world' (Fairclough et al. 2011: 358). As Fairclough et al. (ibid) state that
discourse:
may have major ideological effects[ ... ] [it] can help produce and
reproduce unequal power relations between (for instance) social
classes, women and men, and ethnic groups, through the way it
represents things and positions people.
In the case of climate change coverage in Russia the following 'forms of
social practices' will be considered - the state's position towards climate
change policy, media dependency on the state, businesses' position towards the
problem and again media dependency on it, as well as the unclear messages
produced by the scientific community, NGOs' struggle to lobby successfully on
environmental issues, public reluctance to face the problem as well as the
growing influence of international actors on Russia's climate change policy
(see more in chapter four). So within this complex discourse created by various
actors, journalists' choice of words does acquire special functions - 'linguistic
conceptualization' . For instance, if a state-owned newspaper after the
Copenhagen Conference starts referring to climate change as a well-known fact
rather than a lie created by Western scientists then it can be argued that because
of the political context this choice of words is very likely to be connected with
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the state's policy and journalists do not just show the change in their beliefs or
knowledge (from unknown to known), but also the change of how the situation
is perceived or 'conceptualised' by the main actors of the existing discourse.
The previously outlined understanding of language suggests looking at
the words as carriers of certain purposes and even as a medium of ideology or
power. As Fairclough et al. (2011: 358) point out discourse produced through
this language can be 'racist, or sexist'. COA tries to expose these hidden
messages and reveal relationships of power. This approach to discourse
analysis has been influenced by the Frankfurt School of thought and Marxism:
the source of the word 'critical' and also the idea of not only studying and
analysing power relationships in society by the means of language, but also
trying to change and influence it. That is why the research topic in COA is
vitally important. As Fairclough et al. (ibid) state '[COAl openly and explicitly
positions itself on the side of dominated and oppressed groups and against
dominating groups.' Topics most popular among followers of COA include
gender, discrimination, globalisation, democracy, racism, and the environment,
or as Teun van Dijk (2001: 353) puts it, '[COAl focuses primarily on social
problems and political issues. '
In this context Klaehn's (2009a) previously mentioned remark about the
connections he saw between the PrM methods and COA could once again be
considered fair and justified. The issues which Herman and Chomsky were
looking at were concerned with the relations between the oppressed and
oppressors, whether it was the coverage of the priests' murder or the Vietnam
War. At the same time, as mentioned before, they looked at the language used
by media in the social context, and also in the context of power, which in their
case belonged to the 'elite' of the American society or in the majority of cases,
to the US government.
Discourse analysis is also widely used by scholars studying media
coverage of climate change (Boykoff 2009a, Carvalho 2005, Carvalho and
Burgess 2005, Doulton and Brown 2007, Fletcher 2009, Olausson 2009). For
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example, Amy Fletcher (2009: 801) through the application of 'frame
analysis,72states that this methodological approach:
[d]eepens our understanding of why nation-states respond as they
do to various large-scale environmental challenges and enables the
identification of pathways by which even intractable policy
conflicts might be successfully re-framed towards consensus
solution.
Anabela Carvalho (2005) applies CDA to study media representation of
climate change in British media which has allowed her to track the changes of
the climate change discourse over time:
[t]he greenhouse effect evolved from a strictly scientific problem in
the mid-1980s to a controversial political matter at the end of that
decade, and from there to an object of regulation dominated by
techno-corporatist governance.
Similarly, Carvalho and Burgess (2005: 1458) used CDA to conclude that
in the case of the UK broadsheet newspapers 'political actors have played by
far the most powerful and effective role in shaping climate change in the public
sphere over the last 20 years'. CDA has allowed Ulrika Olausson (2009: 433)
to confirm that there are 'close bonds between policymaking and the media' in
her study of climate change coverage by Swedish newspapers. However, in this
case the 'relationship between media frames and the structures of power seems
to expand beyond the borders of the nation-state into the transnational sphere
of Europe' (ibid).
When applied to media coverage of climate change issues in Russia. the
PrM approach closely resembles the main ideas of CDA. Russian journalists
have to operate in the complex environment of the increasing governmental
centralisation of media, diffused boundaries between big business and the state,
the worsening environmental situation and alarming messages from the NGOs
72 As Fletcher (2009: 801) states. frame analysis allows us to 'expose the role
of political language and worldviews in the construction of plausible.
meaningful and socially relevant pathways that can enrol a majority of
stakeholders and citizens in collective actions'.
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and international communities. Carvalho ·and Burgess (2005: 1461) state that
'CDA attempts to understand the links between texts and social relations,
distribution of power, and dominant values and ideas'. As can be seen there are
various social and power relations that coexist in the post-communist society
with the developing ideology of free market economics and the persisting
ideology of the strong state. So, the analysis of Russian media will be
conducted with consideration of this context. As Teun van Dijk (2008) argues,
'discourse is not produced without context and cannot be understood without
taking the context into consideration' (cited in Fairclough et al. 2011: 372).
In summary, the information collected will be used to provide an
understanding of coverage. Then articles will be studied on the subject of how
often they refer to official sources, NGOs, business and scientists in their
information on climate change. Furthermore, samples from different
newspapers and different events will be analysed by means of discourse
analysis within specific politico-economic contexts. The hypotheses along with
the choice of media organs and events will be explained before presenting and
examining the results of the analysis.
Media analysis of climate change coverage in Russia
If the PrM is applicable in the Russian case of communicating climate change
issues, then the following outcomes can be expected:
1. Russian media organs owned by actors with an interest in continued
carbon emissions will take a more sceptical/hostile view toward
climate change and/or produce less coverage.
2. Russian media organs relying heavily on advertising by actors with
an interest in continued carbon emissions will take a more
scepticallhostile view toward climate change and/or produce less
coverage.
3. The Russian media will be 'drawn into a symbiotic relationship with
powerful sources of information by economic necessity and
reciprocity of interest' (Herman and Chomsky 1994: 18).When either
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these sources of information change, or when those sources change
their position, Russian media coverage will change accordingly.
4. Coverage of climate change will increase when it is in the interest of
the 'dominant elites', for instance, after governmental acceptance of
climate change regulation policy, ratification and approval of
international documents, participation in international negotiation and
demonstration of a pro-active climate change mitigating policy.
5. Micro-factors of media production such as journalists' professional
norms or journalists' writing style to approach the problem do not
result in major interference, and are subordinate to macro-factors
such as ownership structure or dominant ideology (which are
described in the PrM's discussion of the ideology filter). So, the
coverage of climate change during the extreme weather conditions
(which arguably can satisfy journalists' desire to write about a
sensational story) will not be greater than the coverage during the
period of major international negotiations or national activity on
climate change.
The PrM filter 'flak' cannot be examined in this part of the research since
it is difficult to investigate its effect by the means of media analysis, so it was
studied through other appropriate methods.73
Testing of these hypotheses will allow us to see the influence of
economic and state elites (where they exist) as well as the influence of each
PrM filter over media coverage. Furthermore, if the chief hypothesis as stated
above (that of the dominant influence of the state over the Russian media) is
correct, then in this case coverage of climate change issues in Russia should
change depending on the state's policy. For instance the coverage before the
Copenhagen Conference in December 2009 should not really be significant and
73 As was explained in chapter two, the presence of the filter 'flak' suggests
reaction to media activity by civil society, influence by the elites or censorship
by the authoritative groups, the analysis of the media texts cannot demonstrate
whether the information was influenced or not, censored or provoked some
negative reaction from outside, hence, the influence of this filter was explored
during the series of interviews and findings reported in chapter three.
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qualitatively it should be presented in a way which ridicules climate change,
seeks to diminish the belief that humans are to blame, or maintains that Russia
has nothing to do with it. Just before the Copenhagen Conference when the
Russian government changed its position towards being more sensitive to
climate change and adopted the Climate Doctrine, the quantity and quality of
news should have changed. The statements acknowledging human impact and
the negative effect for the country will become more frequent (further on in this
chapter more predictions about the analysed events will be spelled out and
tested). Nevertheless, the commercial unpopularity of the topic among
businesses (media owners or advertisers) will still be an obstacle to the
popularising of the problem, as will be tight connections between the Russian
state and businesses (especially the energy sector).
On the other hand, if the PrM does not work then those filters will not
influence the coverage, whilst some other processes neglected by Herman and
Chomsky might interfere with news production. It might be unforeseen
weather conditions such as extremely hot/cold summers/winters or, perhaps,
journalists' professional norms such as the necessity to cover something which
has a direct influence on people's everyday lives, or the requirement to present
the problem from different angles which prove to be important. For the purpose
of testing all of these suggestions in this chapter, five Russian newspapers will
be analysed through content and discourse analysis. The timeframe of the news
coverage will be limited to two months around the selected events.
The choice of media organs
When explaining how they chose media organs for their research, Herman and
Chomsky talk about the elite media organs that lead the regional and local
media outlets due to their obvious benefits, such as a better financial base,
bigger audience and larger number of, and sometimes more qualified, staff.
The 'elite media' are at 'the top of a tiered system' (Hearns-Branaman 2009:
125, see also Chomsky 1997) which gives them the opportunity to determine
their policy and shape media content. Furthermore, the media which happen to
be closer to the centres where major economic and political decisions are made
have more chances to be at the top of the informational hierarchy (Klaehn
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2(02). In this research project it is vital to consider characteristics of the
analysed media organs such as whether they have federal or regional
distribution, the size of the actual audience, and what media organs are the
most popular among the intellectual, business and political elite of the society,
as well as who owns them, how much they depend on advertising revenue and
how much they are financially independent.
One of the central challenges in gathering data for this research and
conducting media analysis is to find adequate representatives of all Russian
media. It should be noted that any selection will have some limitations. For
instance, as mentioned above, it seems obvious to base the selection of studied
material on its popularity and audience size. At the same time some of the
newspapers are read only by a small group of members of the intellectual or
business elite who cannot be ignored during the analysis. It is obvious that it
limits the research if one type of mass media are analysed, for example, only
newspapers or internet sources. This might be the most practical way to gather
information but considering how much larger TV audiences tend to be, and
television'S influence, analysis of TV news could benefit this study.
Nevertheless, considering the time constraints of the project, this source of
information will be omitted and only print media available through electronic
databases will be analysed.
In order to gain an insight into the popularity of the Russian media
outlets and their actual audience size, the opinion polls of the Public Opinion
Foundation (Fond 'Obshchestvennoe mnenie') are helpful. The poll 'Mass
media: preferable channels of information' conducted by FOM in 2007· has
demonstrated that Russian people are actively interested in news about Russian
and world affairs. They get most of their information through national
television (90 percent of respondents see TV as a major news source). National
newspapers were in second place with 30 percent of respondents citing them.
Regional TV, national radio, local newspapers and local TV follow one another,
with little difference of one or two percent (29, 26, 26 and 25 percent
respectively). The internet had quite a low position, with only 9 percent of
respondents using it as a preferred channel of information. More recent FOM
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(20013) data shows that even though TV and newspapers remained in the same
positions (with 89 percent and 27 percent of population resorting to these
media for news), the internet's audience has expanded significantly with up to
29 percent of Russians using it as a news source". Considering these data, it
would be desirable for this research project to analyse the representatives of the
most popular categories such as national television and national newspapers as
well as internet news web sites. However, because the popularity of the internet
in the years of the selected events (for the purpose of media analysis) is very
different (being very unpopular in late 1990s and becoming quite popular after
2009), internet sources were ommited. As already mentioned, for practical
reasons TV also will not be considered in this work.
Following the same logic of identifying the most popular media outlets
amongst these two categories, let's go back to the poll's results. The top two
results of the newspapers' popularity belong to the newspaper Argumenty i
jakty (Apeyueumu u paKmbl) and Komsomol'skaya pravda (KOMCOMOJlbCKaR
npa60a),75 both of which can be considered tabloids. However, as will be
discussed later, the history of the Komsomol'skaya pravda makes it difficult to
equate the newspaper to, let's say, British tabloid newspapers. The same goes
for Argumenty i jakty: in the 1980s as it was one of the trendsetters in the
perestroika movement. Even though Argumenty i jakty according to this
opinion poll is one of the most popular newspapers, it will not be used in this
research, since it is a weekly newspaper, whilst all other studied media are
published on a daily basis.
74 Sarah Oates (2013: 6) states that 'according to the measurement by the
World TelecommunicationslICT Indicators Database, 43 percent of the
Russian population was online by March 31, 2011. The organization reponed
an increase in usage of 1,826 percent between 2000 and 2010'.
?5 Another way of comparing the papers' popularity and reach is to compare
their circulations, where again Argumenty i jakty and Komsomol' skaya pravda
take the leading roles. For example, AiF is the world's 1ih largest newspaper
(Newspapers24.com 2011) with its 2.3 million circulation, whilst KP daily
publishes 655,000 newspapers, its Friday issue comes up to 3 million. Even
though the other newspapers' circulation is much more modest, they are still
considered to be mass newspapers. .
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Due to its popularity the analysis of Komsomol'skaya pravda is important
for understanding what kind of information about climate change the majority
of Russia's population receive. However, smaller-circulation organs such as
Rossiyskaya gazeta (POCCUUC1\Q.Reasema), Izvestiya (Hseecmus), Kommersant
(KoMMepCaHm'b)and Sovetskaya Rossiya (Co6emC1\Q.RPOCCWl)(identified as a
number one choice by 3 percent or fewer of respondents) cannot be ignored
due to their special ownership structure, target audience or political affiliation.
Rossiyskaya gazeta is an official newspaper of the Russian government, and its
coverage heavily depends on the state's official policy. lzvestiya and
Kommersant belong to the quality press and position themselves as
independent press aimed at the so called elite or decision-makers: highly
educated people, managers, politicians, members' of the intelligentsia and so
on. Sovetskaya Rossiya, in tum, is a left-wing" newspaper which 'is popular
among senior citizens who proudly carry on the ideals and traditions of the
Soviet legacy or use the newspaper as an arena to disagree with the current
government policy or more generally with the modem capitalist world order.
So, the choice .for the analysis of Russian print media organs are
Komsomol'skaya pravda, Rossiyskaya gazeta, Izvestiya, Kommersant and
Sovetskaya Rossiya. Relevant information about the chosen media outlets is
presented below.
Komsomo!'skaya pravda (KP)
Type: Newspaper -tabloid
Frequency: Daily
76 'Left' and 'right' are quite ambiguous in the Russian context. During the
Soviet Union the government identified themselves as 'left-wing' 'by its
[USSR'] leaders hostility to "rightist reactionary" regimes abroad' (Evans and
Whitefield 1998: 1024). During perestroika 'right' and 'left' acquired absolute
opposite meanings - 'the "left" came to denote the free market democrats and
liberals, and the "right" the devotees of socialism and the communist system'
(ibid). In the modem Russia, these terms were inverted once again, and for the
purpose of this research, it is understood that newspapers that characterize
themselves as 'left' are supporters of communist ideals, whilst 'right-wing'
newspapers advocate the development of capitalism and liberalism, but at this
moment the 'left' has become the opposition rather than the ruling party.
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Circulation: 655,000, Friday issue - 3,000000
Ownership structure: Belongs to the group of companies 'ESN' (mostly
concerned with energy production) (Media Atlas 2011) and has close ties with
the Russian railways company (OAO RZHD) which is considered the second
largest monopoly in Russia.
Additional information:
The majority of the audience are women. The newspaper is mostly read
by married people in the age group 45 or older (Atlas SM! 2011). Even though
now the main aim of the KP is entertainment, which includes capturing the
audience's attention with coverage of various scandals and celebrity news, it
was first established in 1925 as a main media organ for Soviet youth
(Komsomol). By using the language of its direct audience (Strovskiy 2011), in
less formal ways than other newspapers, it would spread news about the best
representatives of the Soviet youth (true communists and hard workers who
would build a better future for the country), Over time the KP became
increasingly popular and the newspaper .did not act only as an outlet of the
party's line, but also during the years of Khrushchev's thaw it heavily criticized
the individual institutions of the Soviet government or people in charge of
them. Strovskiy (2011) points out that at that period of time the influence of the
KP was really significant and even ministers and party members were afraid of
its critique. After perestroika the newspaper moved away from politics to the
infotainment sphere. According to the.BBC news website, 'it [KP] has built its
reputation on a gentle nostalgia for the Soviet period, firm backing for Kremlin
policy and a keen interest in celebrity news and scandal from home and abroad'
(The Press in Russia 2008), which might be explained by the newspaper's
historical heritage and ownership structure dominated by the energy
companies.
Rossiy,skaya gazeta (RG)
Type: Official newspaper of Russian government.
Frequency: Daily
Circulation: 179,240
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Owner~hip structure: Government of the Russian Federation
Additional information:
The majority of the audience are men. The newspaper is mostly read by
married people with higher education in the age group: 55 and older (Atlas
SMI 2011). According to the official website of the newspaper it 'enjoys
official status, because acts of state come into effect upon their publication
here' (Rossiyskaya gazeta website 2011). At the same time, the RG does not
restrict itself to publishing only official documents, but also tries to attract the
attention of the general reader by covering various types of domestic and
international news. The newspaper defines its readership as an 'even-tempered
adult inclined to conservative views'. Even though over time, the newspaper
has published some criticism of some state institutions, it is expected to cover
the state's official position in a manner which would appeal to the supporters of
state policy.
lzvestiya
Type: Social-political and business newspaper
Frequency: Daily
Circulation: 234,500
Ownership structure: Until May 2008 the media was owned by Gazprom
(The Press in Russia 2(08). The latest information on the ownership of the
Izvestiya claims that it is part of the NMG media holding whose shares belong
to OAO 'AB 'Rossiya' - 54.96 percent (co-owner Yuriy Kovalchuk is widely
reported to be a close associate of Vladimir Putin), OAO 'Surgutneft' 19.49
percent, OAO 'Severstal' 19.49 percent, group SOGAZ 6.06 percent (Media
Atlas 2011).
Additional information:
The majority of the audience are men. The newspaper is mostly read by
married people with higher education in the age group: 65 and older (Atlas
SMI 2011). The Izvestiya is considered a centrist newspaper with a
predominantly liberal readership. As the KP, Izvestiya was also first founded at
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the birth of the Soviet era in 1917. At first just a mouthpiece of the Communist
Party, it eventually became popular among intellectuals and academics. During
and after perestroika, it criticised the Kremlin's policy on various occasions,
however, it has been noticed that since the newspaper had been bought by
SOGAZ, its media policy went through changes once again (The press in
Russia 2(08).
Kommersant
Type: National business newspaper
Frequency: Daily
Circulation: 125,000-130,000
Ownership structure: 1999-2006 belonged to oligarch Boris Berezovsky,
in 2008 was bought by oligarch Alisher Usmanov (owner of Metalloinvest)
(Online gazeta 2011).
Additional information:
Audience demographic characteristics: men 57 percent, women 43
percent, managers 29 percent, professionals 19 percent, office workers 13
percent, workers 12 percent, students 4 percent (Kommersant website 2011).
Kommersant positions itself as a rightwing liberal newspaper, which is mostly
aimed at businessmen or would-be businessmen. From the beginning when it
was founded in 1989, the newspaper was plotted as an analogue of the Western
quality press, and its articles would lack evaluations or judgements of the
events described, sharing only facts and information which would not interest
ordinary readers, but would appeal to managers or specialists (Strovskiy 2011).
It characterises itself as 'one of the most authoritative and influential
publications for Russia's decision-makers' (Kommersant website 2011).
Sovetskaya Rossiya (SR)
Type: National left-wing (communist) newspaper
Frequency: 3 times a week
Circulation: 300,000
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Ownership structure: Its editor Valentin Chikin claims that 'economically
the newspaper is independent from any power structures, parties or financial
groups. The basis of its budget comes from the subscription and readers'
donations. Profit from advertising is negligible' (SR official website 2012).
Additional information:
SR was launched in 1956 as an official media organ of the CPSU
(RSFSR) and Council of Ministers of the RSFSR. In 1990-1991 its editor-in-
chief turned the newspaper into an opposition organ and channel to transmit the
ideas of the Russian Communist Party which makes it (in this sample of media
organs) a representative of the left-wing media. One of the specific features of
this newspaper in comparison to the other studied media organs is that three
quarters of every issue of SR consists of articles written by its readers, rather
than professional joumalists.?" According to the opinion poll taken by the
Public Opinion Fund (FOM 1997) in Moscow, 61 percent of its readers are
retired people (to compare,the same research for other newspaper showed on
average 31 percent of readership of all newspapers are seniors).78 Also, in
comparison to 'an average Muscovite', readers of SR are quite politicised: they
77 This is the so called 'Lenin's principle' which originates from his idea of
how media organs function. Besides journalists working and writing for the
newspaper there also should be a network of regular people contributing to the
issues who are not particularly educated to work in the newspaper but who
share similar political views and have a 'grasp from the field' (more on this in
Strovskiy 2011).
78 It is interesting that the readership age profiles seem to show that the print
media is mainly consumed by a considerably older audience (typically +45 for
KP, +55 for RG, and +65 for Izvestiya, 61 percent of the readers of SR are
retired). The public opinion poll (FOM 2(08) shows that there is only a small
difference between respondents' attitude towards climate change problems
depending on their age, such as out of the age group 18-35 70 percent of people
consider climate change to be an important problem, 36-54 years old - 72
percent and 65 percent of people over 55 years old. Based on this information
the argument that the print media orients its coverage towards its audience's
interests is not very convincing, however, it needs further study. From the point
of view of the PrM itself, the issue of audience preference based on age
specifications is not considered worthy of exploration. As has been mentioned
before, Herman and Chomsky. intentionally, left out the impact of the audience
over the media coverage.
182
show interest to political news. comments on political news and also news
from other regions twice as much as other readerships.
The Kommersant, KP, RG and Izvestiya were accessed through an online
database: Public.ru, whilst SR was accessed through the database Integrum
World Wide.79 These organisations are commercial and collect mass media
information in order to sell access to business. government and academic
organisations so they can monitor their press ratings or conduct other research
relevant to them. In order to find news/articles applicable for this project a set
of keywords was specified. They all refer to climate change in one sense or
another. The options include: 'climate change', 'global warming/cooling', and
the 'greenhouse effect' (H3MeHeHHe KJIHMaTa.rJI068JILHOe norenneaae,
rJIo6a.rIbHoenOXOJIO,lJ;aHHe.napHHKoBIdA3CPq,eKT).Depending on the analysed
event. keywords include: the Kyoto Conference. the Kyoto Protocol. the
Copenhagen Conference and the Climate Doctrine (KHOTCKaSlKOHq,epeHQWI.
KHOTCKHH:npoTOKOJI, Konearareacxaa KOHq,epeHUWI, KJlHMaTlAecKaSl
,lJ;oKTpHHa).
The choice of events and expected results of media coverage
The media analysis will cover a two month period covering three events related
to climate change issues. The events selected are considered to be 'critical
discourse moments'. as Carvalho (2008: 166) states '[c]ritical discourse
moments are periods that involve specific happenings, which may challenge
the "established" discursive positions. Various factors may define these key
moments: political activity, scientific findings or other socially relevant
events'. In order to test the main hypothesis of Russian media dependency on
Russian state climate policy. the choice of events is, predominately, determined
by what position towards climate change regulations at the specific point in
history the Russian government held. The analysed events are:
79 The use of different databases raised a concern for the comparability of the
researched data, however. it was noticed that both databases use the same
principle of collecting and exporting articles. The controlled search was
conducted where the same newspaper (which was on both databases) was
searched with the same keywords and the results were identical.
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1. The United Nations Climate Change Conference in Kyoto,
Japan, 1-11 December 1997
2. The United Nations Climate Change Conference in
Copenhagen, 6-18 December, 2009 and acceptance of Climate Doctrine of
Russian Federation on 17 December 2009
3. The heat-wave in Russia in August 2010
The United Nations Climate Change Conference in Kyoto, Japan, 1-11
December 1997
The Third Conference of the Parties under the UNFCCC is famous for the
announcement of the Kyoto Protocol, in which for the first time states agreed
to legally restrict the amount of GHG emissions allowed for the signatories.
The principle and significance of the Kyoto Protocol is discussed in detail in
chapter four. For this section it is important to understand that in December
1997, Russia had a strong anti-Kyoto position and together with the United
States, Canada. New Zealand and Japan was lobbying for lower emission
restrictions for industrialized countries. Also, at this time there was a strong
negative attitude towards the Kyoto Protocol among the Russian scientific
community and the president's advisory team (the opposition was led by
economic advisor Andrey lllarionov and academic Yuriy Izrael). So, for this
event the media coverage is expected to be low, since the climate change topic
was very far from the state's agenda, and the character of the news is expected
to be very negative. For instance, the origins of climate change should have
been questioned: whether people have anything· to do with it or not and
whether it was happening at all. The Kyoto Protocol is expected to be seen as a
danger to Russia's economic development, or even more as a conspiracy
among the Western countries against Russia, with the view that Russia should
abstain from signing it. The sources of information are expected to be
dominated by government representatives and academics closely working with
the Kremlin.
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The United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen, 6 - 18
December, 2009 and the Climate Doctrine, 17December 2009
The Copenhagen Conference and Russia's position during its negotiation also
have been discussed in detail in chapter four. The main issues connected with
this event are that at this conference countries were supposed to come to an
agreement and produce a new document in order to replace the Kyoto Protocol
which was supposed to expire after 2012. Eventually, for the global
environmental and scientific community who had big hopes for the conference,
it turned out to be a fiasco, since major disagreements did not allow countries
to finalise their decisions and produce a new legally binding document on
climate change policy. In spite of the negative outcome of the conference the
Russian government announced its firm position that it would be working on
reducing GHG emissions regardless of whether the global community came to
an agreement or not. Closer to the end of the conference the Russian Climate
Doctrine was adopted which officially stated that climate change had an
anthropogenic character and that its negative consequences could damage the
country's wellbeing.
Media coverage of climate change in this period of time is expected to
mirror the official vision of the problem and also accept the anthropogenic
character of climate change and the position that mitigating climate change will
benefit the country. In particular, the positive change in coverage should
coincide with Medvedev's visit to Copenhagen and acceptance of the Climate
Doctrine. The news mentioning the acceptance of the Climate Doctrine is
expected to be slightly more extensive than that devoted only to the conference
since the doctrine was a direct initiative of the Russian government, whilst the
conference until the very last moment was not favoured by the head of state,80
however, due to the time overlap between these two events, it will be difficult
to separate them. State officials are still expected to dominate among
information sources. Representatives of NGOs and different academic
institutes are also expected to act as sources since the more government
80Medvedev was advised not to go to the conference and nobody knew if he
would go until the last moment, so NGOs tried to do their best to influence him
to take part in it (Yuliya Yevtushok, interview, Moscow 22 July 2011).
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changes its policy towards climate change regulation, the closer it gets to the
position of NGOs and scientists working on this problem.
Russian heat-wave in August 2010
The anomalous heat-wave of the summer of 2010 led to some very severe
consequences in the central part of Russia The temperatures in Moscow broke
previous records. The heat-wave provoked vast forest fires around major cities
in central Russia, and official forces could not gain control for several weeks.
As a consequence extreme weather conditions moved climate-related topics up
the news hierarchy. This event is interesting in two ways. Firstly, it happened
after the president and government took the course of supporting climate
change regulations after. accepting its existence and its negative character for
Russia. The media coverage, as in the previous case, should have been in
favour of climate change regulation and mitigation. Secondly, if this natural
disaster provoked much greater coverage than the state's participation in the
UN conferences then it would bring into question the functioning of the PrM,
which does not consider such factors as journalists' interest in covering
extraordinary events which closely affect their audience (see chapter two).
If the PrM is correct, then the amount of articles during this period of
time cannot be higher than during the Copenhagen Conference and it is
expected to be consistent with the official position on the problem: that Russia
is supporting climate change mitigation programmes and will take part in them.
The information sources are expected to be the same as for the previous event,
but with greater contributions from NGO and academia (see the previous
section for explanation).
These three events are good cases to consider in order to see how media
coverage has changed along with the differing political contexts. The Kyoto
and Copenhagen Conferences, being 12 years apart from each other,
demonstrate almost polar positions of Russian official policy towards climate
change issues. The heat-wave brings into the analysis an aspect which was
ignored by the PrM, journalists' norms, which tend to cover vivid events
directly related to their audience.
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Content analysis of media coverage of climate change in Russia
The first stage of media analysis consists of content analysis, which considers
the numbers of articles mentioning climate change in all the studied
newspapers across three selected events. The results of the content analysis
are presented below in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1 Number of articles mentioning climate change within the cases
studied
Newspaper Kyoto Copenhagen The heat-wave
Conference Conference 1.07-31.08.2010
1.11 - 1.12.1997 1.11 - 31.12.2009
Komsomol'skaya 4* (Moscow**) 19 13
pravda 0.2%*** 0.54% 0.43%
Rossiyskaya 2 (federal issue) 41 32
gazeta 0.1% 0.84% 0.63%
Izvestiya ·3 (Moscow) 30 22
0.18% 0.55% 0.48%
Kommersant 3 (Main) 22 6
0.1% 0.61% 0.18%
Sovetskaya 1 15 7
Rossiya 0.2% 3% 1.4%
Total 13 127 80
* Absolute number of articles on climate change published within the studied
timeframe in the selected newspapers.
** 'Moscow' - articles were published in newspapers distributed in the
Moscow area; for the 'Rossiyskaya gazeta' and 'Izvestiya' - 'federal issue'
includes articles distributed throughout the country; for 'Kommersant' - 'main'
category excludes the articles published in specialised issues of the newspaper
such as 'Kommersant-den' gi' and so on.
***Percentage of articles on climate change towards overall number of articles
published within the studied timeframe in the selected newspapers.
In order to test the first two hypotheses (whether the coverage changes
depending on the media ownership structure or advertising policy) a series of
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two sample proportion tests was conducted (with STATA software). The test
aimed to assess the statistical significance of differences between various
newspapers within the studied timeframes. For instance, the proportion of
articles published by KP during the 'Kyoto' period was compared to the
proportion of articles published by Kommersant within the same timeframe.
Then to the proportion of articles published by RG and so on (the test was run
for the all possible pairwise combinations). During the 'Kyoto' period the test
did not show a significant difference over all five newspapers (p-value>O.05),
regardless of whether we are talking about the state-owned RG or profit-
oriented KP. During the Copenhagen Conference and heat-wave periods, the
communist newspaper SR significantly stood out with publishing more articles
than the other newspapers (whether this significant difference in the number of
published articles represents a different media policy on climate change by this
media organ will be studied below through discourse analysis). Furthermore,
during the summer of 2010, Kommersant published significantly fewer articles
than the other newspapers.
The analysis demonstrated the following results: Kommersant and RG (p-
value=O.OO34), Kommersant and Izvestiya (p-value=O.0313).81 As has been
mentioned earlier Kommersant characterises itself as a quality newspaper for
professionals, which tries to maintain its image as a serious business media
outlet. As will be discussed below the heat-wave in 2010 produced mostly
sensational articles.. which might be a reason for Kommersant's reserved
coverage during this particular period (it is important that during other periods
it did not show this difference). The conducted analysis shows that the first two
hypotheses were not quite borne out. Whilst the supposedly independent SR,
indeed, published proportionately more articles on climate change, the other
four newspapers did not show significant differences over all three periods
(with only Kommersant being relatively reserved during the heat-wave). The
81 Given the high number of observations (more than 3,000 articles per
newspaper) our statistical power, i.e. our ability to discern population
differences from the sample is remarkably high. Therefore, the lack of
statistical significance in most of the tests is unlikely to be due to a type-two
error.
188
similarities as well as acknowledged differences will be analysed further
through discourse analysis.
With regards to the fourth hypothesis, that media would follow the
interests of the dominant elites, all newspapers did follow the same trend where
12 years after the Kyoto Conference the coverage of climate change had
changed tremendously, from almost no representation in 1997 (cumulative
number of 13 articles) to some representation in 2009 during the Copenhagen
Conference (127 articles). The argument of the significant influence of the
Russian government over media coverage can be also supported by the
comparison of the last two events. Even though many argue that unusual
weather conditions bring attention to climate change, the highly politicised
events of December 2009 (Copenhagen Conference and the acceptance of the
Climate Doctrine) provoked 47 articles more than the heat-wave. However, it
should be noted that within the 'Copenhagen' case that there is no alteration of
coverage before or after Medvedev's attendance at the conference or the
acceptance of the Climate Doctrine. For instance, only three out of five
newspapers mentioned Climate Doctrine and only did this once (this finding is
discussed in more detail later in this chapter).
The fifth hypothesis appears to be partially correct. One of the possible
reasons for journalists' lack of interest in climate change is that it does not have
direct relevance to the audience (for more see chapter one), so the events of
summer 2010 with its direct effect on millions of Russians could have been a
'perfect' situation for journalists when climate change quite literally entered
the houses of much of the audience. Indeed the coverage of climate change at
this time was relatively high (compared to the Kyoto coverage), however, it
was still 37 percent less than during the politicized events of December 2009
and, as will be discussed in more detail below, in many cases it did not refer to
the direct correlation between natural abnormalities and the climate change
phenomenon. At the same time coverage of the Copenhagen Conference and
the Climate Doctrine were much clearer on climate change issues and their
relevance to Russia's interests. This observation confirms the PrM's view of
the minor role of micro-processes over media coverage, meaning that even
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on climate change issues) or the general concept of scientists as such ('as
scientists agreed', 'as many scientists think' and so on).
Another interesting observation which can be made is that overall there
was extremely low reference to 'business' sources. This is strange, considering
how much GHG emissions depend on the business sector and how much (in
Russia's context) the gas and oil industries might suffer from climate change
progression but also presumably from mitigation measures (see chapter four).
There were also slight, but rather predictable, variations between the
information sources of the different newspapers, for instance, Kommersant
more often than others refers to 'business' sources and Komsomol'skaya pravda
more often uses non-standard sources of information (for example, regular
people as witnesses of climate change). In contrast to the other newspapers
Sovetskaya Rossiya made no references to Russian officials at all, but instead
made frequent use of foreign state officials (such as Venezuela's President
Hugo Chavez or Bolivian leader Evo Morales). Another peculiarity of this
newspaper is that quite often the authors of the articles were themselves
significant figures with a very strong opinion on the subject (the leader of the
Communist Party of the Russian Federation Gennady Zyuganov or the former
leader of Cuba Fidel Castro). In some ways they became journalists and
information sources in one.
Overall, the third prediction on the media's dependency on sources of
information has proven to be correct. In particular, all newspapers (apart from
Sovetskaya Rossiya) have demonstrated the correlation between the change in
the state position on climate change and media dependence on the 'Russian
officials' as sources of information. This finding was demonstrated not only by
the number of mentions of Russian officials in the articles, but also the way
they enter the discussion - as saviours of the negotiation process, the highest
source of authority on the subject or as defendants of national interests.
Discourse analysis of media coverage of climate change in Russia
The methodology for the analysis of Russian articles on climate change is
inspired by the approach suggested by Mautner (2008: 30) for the analysis of
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print media, which as she mentions 'draw[s] on the tradition of both critical
discourse analysis and corpus linguistics', 82 and it also fits within the
methodology proposed by van Dijk. Even though the toolkit of Mautner's
method suggests studying seven elements of the text, only six will be used for
this research.83 They are lexis, transitivity, modality, sources, textual coherence
and argumentative devices establishing rapport between author and reader -
each of these assesses the different levels of the discourse created by the texts.
Mautner states that 'on the level of lexis, the analyst will try to identify
patterns in the choice of words, and in particular those with a distinctive
'evaluative meaning' (2008: 38). For instance, she gives an example of how
Eastern European migrants have been portrayed by the journalist through the
use of such highly negatively evaluative words as 'crooks, gangsters, mob,
undesirables' (ibid) and so on. Furthermore, migrants are described as a big
threat which is stressed by the emphasis of their large numbers - '45,000
crooks on the way here' or 'more than SEVEN million more on their way~
(ibid). The negativity of the situation is also transmitted through an accusatory
(towards the government) choice of adjectives and verbs - 'border patrols will
be powerless', 'the shambolic immigration service' (Mautner 2008: 38). So, the
example demonstrates how the atmosphere of the migrants' intervention and
government's weakness is depicted through the specific choice of words. In the
case of media coverage of climate change in Russia, it is also necessary to
study what kind of words are used to describe climate change, whether it is
referred to as a 'fact', 'lie, plot or fiction' and 'disaster or apocalypse' can
create three very different pictures and messages for the audience.
82 'Corpus linguistics encompasses the compilation and analysis of collections
of spoken and written texts as the source of evidence for describing the nature,
structure, and use of languages. This work typically brings a quantitative
dimension to the description of languages by including information on the
probability with which linguistic items or processes occur in particular contexts'
(Kennedy 2002: 2816).
83The nonverbal message components will not be analysed due to technical
reasons. It suggests the study of photographs, page layout, font size and type,
however, for this research data was accessed through computer databases but
contained only the text and not the form of the articles
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Carter and Simpsons (1989: 290) state that 'transitivity [... ] shows how
speakers encode in their language their mental picture of reality and how they
account for their experience of the world around them.' For instance, Mautner
(2008: 41) in her analysis on migration points out the different ways of
portraying the same situation but with different object-subject relations - 'The
immigrant left', 'The immigrant was deported' and 'Immigration officers
deported the immigrant'. It is apparent that these three phrases imply the
journalist's different visions of the problem and send different messages to
their audience. The first example implies that the immigrant left willingly
without causing any trouble, whilst in the second case it can be understood that
he was fighting against his departure and perhaps trying to remain in the
country illegally, and in the end the third version brings in an additional actor
(a representative of authority) who takes control over the situation and gets rid
of the immigrant. In the case of climate change coverage in Russia, in order to
analyse texts on the transitivity level, the following analysis looks at how
climate change is pictured, for example, is it an uncontrollable natural force or
a consequence of anthropogenic influence? How aredecisions made to control
climate change? Is Russia an active participant, an observer or a victim? Such.
analysis of subject-object relations will not only allow us to see who is
perceived to be in charge of the situation, but also who is there to be blamed
for it, of course, if there is any (if climate change is indeed seen as an
uncontrollable force then it takes responsibility away from people).
Stubbs (1996: 202 cited in Mautner 2(08) defines modality as 'the ways
in which language is used to encode meanings such as degrees of certainty and
commitment, .or alternatively vagueness and lack of commitment, personal
beliefs versus generally accepted or taken for granted knowledge.' Modality
can vary not only according to authors' personal uncertainty about the
described events, but also because of the general 'tradition' of a certain type of
writing, such as advertising, is usually very affirmative in its strategy to sell the
products, whilst academics quite often try to avoid words of 'high modality'
(for example 'must', 'definitely', 'absolutely'), but tabloids on the contrary are
also very confident in what they are saying (Mautner 2(08). In the study of
media coverage of climate change, this stage of analysis will be able to
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demonstrate whether the coverage is still sceptical and journalists are unsure
about climate change's reality, or whether its existence is no longer questioned.
Textual coherence refers to the structure of a text, how certain
information is emphasised through repetition or on the contrary omitted from
the text, or two issues which are not obviously related are mentioned in the
same text. In her case study of newspaper coverage of immigration, Mautner
(2008) demonstrates this with the example of how migrants are portrayed as
being linked to crimes. For instance, if at the beginning of the text the
journalist talks about criminals and gangsters and several paragraphs later the
word 'migrants' first appears, a reader naturally perceives it in the criminal
,
context described earlier and links crime and migration together. In the case of
climate change, the example of such textual linkage could be seen, for' instance,
in the articles when the climate is mentioned in the same row with other global
problems such as child labour, Somali pirates, education in the developing
.world and so on. In this case, even if climate change is not familiar to a reader,
he can still make an educated guess that it is as important as other problems
mentioned next to it.
The last level is the level of argumentative devices, which show the
relations between the author and his audience. Mautner (2008: 43) states that
these relations can be achieved 'through the use of rhetorical questions [... J
appealing to the supposedly unifying force of common sense, [... ] and the
construction of a "we" group.' Indeed, in the Russian case the journalist's
appeal to the common sense of the audience is quite frequent (for example, 'it
is obvious that any kind of warming in Russia's severe climate will only
benefit the country'), which implies that the author and the audience are in full
agreement with each other and there is no room for challenging the journalist's
statement. Another common demonstration of the unification of the author's
and the audience's attitudes towards the climate change problem in Russia is
the repetitive use of the pronoun 'we' ('we all know', 'we saw').
Further on, the analysis will be applied to the collected data. It should be
mentioned that only articles which discuss climate change as one of the central
topics will be analysed in this section. As approximately half of the studied
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articles mention the keywords used in a context not quite related to climate
change, and the overall content of the articles was devoted to something either
unrelated (for example, a celebrity mentioning climate change as one of her
fears) or related in a distant way (for example, government negotiations
mentioning the Kyoto Protocol as one of several forms of cooperation). Hence,
for discourse analysis articles which do not just mention but also discuss the
problems of climate change in some detail were selected. Table 5.4 presents a
summary of the main themes underlined by the discourse analysis of the data
collected, it is followed by detailed case-by-case analysis.84
Table 5.4 Main themes in the media coverage devoted to climate change
Kyoto Conference Copenhagen Conference Heat-wave
KP Conference = Variety of topics; Sensational nature of the
'battle'; Choice of words with heat-wave and its
Alarmist messages; high emotional value; consequences;
Surprise of Journalists - 'one of the Questioned the link
Russia's successful people'; between cc and the heat-
trend of reducing Russia - a leader of the wave;
GHG emissions; climate change Impossible to stop cc -
Sarcastic way of negotiation process; the economy 'must'
portraying Russia's Reoccurring theme of a develop;
successes in GHG 'western plot' against Greater attention to the
reductions; Russia's interests; idea of a 'climate
No mentioning of A vague picture of weapon';
Russia's resistance climate change (cc) .
to the Kyoto nature and
Protocol. consequences;
'Win-win' situation.
RG N/A Russia - a leader in the Direct links between cc
negotiating process; and the heat-wave;
Russia's stable position Confirmation of cc;
vs. the chaotic Some uncertainty or its
behaviour of other consequences or nature;
states; No conspiracy theories;
Confirmation of cc Issue of public opinion;
existence; Government was
Sometimes its prepared;
anthropogenic character The Kyoto Protocol -
is questioned; benefits and possibilities
Cc pictured from an for Russia.
upbeat position;
84 Even though each of the selected articles was carefully studied through the
methodology proposed by Mautner (2008), due to the word limit in the chapter
only the most frequent and prominent characteristics of the analysed texts are
presented.
196
Benefits for Russia;
Izvesti Conference = Questioned the Almost none of the
ya 'battle'; existence of cc or its . articles discuss cc to a
Alarmist messages; anthropogenic character; great extent;
Surprise of Cc - 'a plot?'; 'Horrifying'
Russia's, so far Russia's firm position consequences that the
successful trend of on cc and its leading weather brought upon
reducing GHG role in the negotiations; Russians;
emissions. Other countries cause Cc - one of the possible
Russian difficulties on the way explanations of heat-
government- of reaching an wave;
defenders of agreement. Existence of cc was not
national interests; certain;
No mentioning of Cc's anthropogenic
Russia's resistance origin was brought into
to the Kyoto question even more.
Protocol More sensationalists
messages;
Questions the Kyoto
Protocol.
Komm Conference = Economic aspect of the Economic context;
ersant 'battle'; problem; Resemblance with the
Alarming 'win-win' situation; business report;
messages; Impersonal style Criticisms of the
Scepticism towards (reporting of facts); government;
anthropogenic A number of articles President's behaviour-
climate change; . shared the climate 'absolutely correct';
Russia 'the most sceptic position; 'Win-win' situation;
sensible' position; Questions the activities
US hostile position. of the Russian
government (but not its
leaders!)
SR No reference to Destructible nature of None of the articles
Russia, capitalism - cause of cc; discussed climate as a
'Main polluter of Heroes (e.g. Latin central topic
the planet' - the US America) vs. villains Leader of the
(criticism of its (e.g. the US); Communist Party
citizens and Fidel Castro - author of blames the party in
government). several articles; power for burning
No references to Russia Russia;
or the Russian Main reason for social-
government. environmental
apocalypse - the current
financial system;
Cc - a definite threat, a
danger for the whole
world and everyone
should unite to fight it.
No direct mention of
specific Russian state
officials.
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The Kyoto Conference coverage
The limited amount of articles devoted to climate change during this period of
time does not really present much material for analysis. The omission of the
topic speaks louder about the attitude towards climate change problems.
However, applying the methodology described above to the collected data,
some conclusions can be drawn. For Kommersant, Izvestiya, KP and SR (RG
only mentioned climate change among other scientific topics discussed in its
articles) the Kyoto Conference became the starring point for the articles. All
newspapers compared the conference with some kind of a battle or a scandal -
'scientists acted on the offensive' (Kabannikov and Potapov 1997), 'general
abuse', 'arguments continue' (Golovnin 1997), 'heavyweights' (lzvestiya
1997) or 'fierce disputes' (Motskobili 1997). The Izvestiya, KP and
Kommersant reproduced the alarmist messages which aimed to raise major
concerns among their audience - 'God, what do we inhale!' (Chizhikov 1997),
'Japan will sink' (Kabannikov and Potapov 1997) or 'we are all hostages in
climate thriller' (Motskobili and Maksimenko 1997).
In both Izvestiya and KP there was the reappearing theme of the surprise
of Russia's (so far successful) trend of reducing GHG emissions. Whilst the KP
talks about Russia in a more sarcastic way by pointing out that reduction has
happened unintentionally due to the economic decline of the 199Os,Izvestiya
pictures the Russian government as defenders of national interests who are
trying to achieve mutually beneficial results (Izvestiya 1997).Kommersant also
praised Russia's 'realistic' goals (Motskobili and Maksimenko 1997) and very
'sensible approach' to the problem (Motskobili 1997). Interestingly, whilst one
of Kommersant's articles provides a very clear and rational description of the
climate change problem and its anthropogenic character with even slightly
alarming messages of climate change's negative consequences (Motskobili and
Maksimenko 1997), another article purposefully debunks the anthropogenic
character of climate change (Shvarts 1997). Even the title states that 'there is
no one to blame' ('kraynikh net'), the article continues with arguments against
industries' impact on climate change, supporting this statement by the opinion
of scientists at Harvard University.
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In the SRs article, on the contrary, there was no reference to Russia,
instead the article was devoted to the 'main polluter of the planet' (the United
States) whose citizens lack 'environmental awareness' and whose government
refuses to follow through its initiatives to develop sustainable energy sources
(popov 1997).
Conclusion on the Kyoto Conference coverage
To sum up, the coverage of climate change during the Kyoto Protocol was low,
as expected, so in this sense the earlier prediction proved to be correct. Few
articles which were published at that time in the studied 'newspapers did not
give an adequate picture of the problem, rather, they speculated about the
sensational features of it (disastrous nature of climate change or the political
fight around climate change). Russia's performance was never questioned and
it was not articulated how unwilling Russian authorities were in their
cooperation on mitigating climate change. On the contrary Russia was
portrayed as a leader of the negotiating process or in the case of the
oppositional media organ the SR, it was absolutely ignored and instead
attention was diverted towards the United States. It could be argued again that
the mass media were defending the state's position or at least not challenging
it. At the same time rather than coverage of climate change being biased or
sceptical, the real issue was a striking overall absence of information on
climate change.
The Copenhagen Conference and the Climate Doctrine coverage85
Izvestiya
The reason for Izvestiya publishing the articles during this period of time
became either the conference (predominantly) or the initiatives by Medvedev
or the Russian government. All articles could be roughly divided into two
groups. The first one questioned and debated the existence of climate change or
its anthropogenic character. In this case the article 'Osnovy naturfilosofri' in
Izvestiya (Sokolov 2009) was especially interesting since its disbelief in the
8SSincemore articles were available for events of 2009 and 2010, the analysis
will be divided into subcategories of different newspapers, unlike in the case of
the Kyoto Conference, where such separation would be rather pointless.
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existence of climate change backed up by referring to it as a matter of faith and
the negotiations on climate change as religious wars. Also, quite often in these
articles journalists appeal to the abstract universal concept of 'common sense'
or confirm their position by using the term 'opinion of many scientists,'. The
second group is devoted to the report of Russia's firm position on climate
change and its leading role in the negotiations (Farizova 2009b) whilst other
countries were described as the troublemakers which slowed down acceptance
of the agreement.
Komsomol'skaya pravda
In contrast to Izvestiya, the KP had a greater variety of the reasons for the
articles to be written including the conference, the government's initiatives,
weather anomalies, opinions of climate sceptics and even competition for
readers which the newspaper initiated. Probably due to its tabloid nature, the
style was also quite different to other newspapers, and the choice of words
often had higher emotional value: 'disaster film "Day After Tomorrow" might
become a reality' (Moiseenko 2009). 'major myth of 21st century' (Kovyneva
and Moiseenko 2009), 'unbelievable natural abnormality' (Smirnova 2009) and
so on.' Furthermore, journalists tried to represent themselves as 'one of the
people', which could be observed through the numerous repetition of the
personal pronoun 'we', and also to engage their audience by appealing to them
through questions, which were frequently used as titles of the articles - 'Have
Russian hackers exposed the myth of global warming?' (Kovyneva and
Moiseenko 2009) or 'Global warming - climatologists' fiction?' (Smirnova
2009) and so on.
Like lzvestiya, KP also depicted Russia as a leader of the climate change
negotiation process, whilst Medvedev was described as one of the saviours
who would prevent the 'climate catastrophe'. Despite all disagreements in the
scientific and international communities, the Russian president reassured his
citizens that there was no reason to panic and the country would benefit from
the situation in any case even if 'God forbid, [... ] climate change is really
happening' (Krivyakina 2009). There was also the reoccurring theme of a
'western plot' where western countries were trying to exploit the rest of the
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· world and western scientists exaggerate the seriousness of the problem.
Overall, the discourse created by the articles of KP drew a vague picture of
climate change where it was not really confirmed whether it was happening or
not and to what extent, and where only the Russian government's position was
clear, and in any case would not damage the country's national interests.
Kommersant
The discourse created by Kommersant slightly differed from the other
newspapers studied, mainly because in most articles, climate change issues
were discussed from the economic perspective where GHG emissions became
another currency in the modem world ('global warming was announced as
profitable for Russia' (Granik 2009b). Another peculiarity of this newspaper
was its generally impersonal style where the main role of journalists was
supposedly to present the facts and describe events from different points of
view.
There were also two articles which shared the climate sceptic position
and even referred to the opinion of Illarionov, whose role in Russia's anti-
climate change position has been discussed earlier ('British scientists
underestimated Russian climate' (Sapozhkov and Butrin 2009) - the article was
provoked by the Climategate scandal) or made fun of this environmental
abnormality ('[e]ven if climate change does not exist we still had to invent it,
so hundreds of bureaucrats were able to spend the state budget on their crusade
against cars' emissions' (Khamas 2(09». Another interesting feature of this
newspaper was that, like others, Kommersant quite often referred to the state in
discussing climate change problems. But more than other newspapers it tried to
question the activities of the Russian government, perhaps not so much its
chief executives (which also was present here but in a more indirect way, for
example through the sarcastic choice of words 'Medvedev pogody ne sdelal',
meaning 'Medvedev did not playa role,86) (Granik 2009a), but the civil
86lnterestingly, both Izvestiya and Kommersant, with a two-day difference in
articles published with almost the same title - as mentioned, Kommersant
produced an article with the title 'Medvedev did not playa role' ('Dmitry
Medvedev Pogody ne Sdelal' by Granik 2009a), whilst in Izvestiya produced
one titled 'Copenhagen did not play a role' ('Kopengagen Pogody ne Sdelal'
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servants and ministries were criticised quite openly (for example, in the article
'Protocol of the missed opportunities' (Shapovalov 2009), bureaucracy was
blamed for causing insurmountable difficulties for business to be able to use
benefits from selling unused GHG quotas).
Rossiyskaya gazeta
Predictably, the Rossiyskaya gazeta in its coverage of climate change during
the period studied was following the steps of the Russian government. Even
more than in the previous newspapers, Russia was presented as a world leader
in the negotiating process ('in GHG reductions, Russia is already a world
leader' (Petrov 2009), 'Russia is extremely interested in concluding a new
agreement' (Merinov 2009». Another concept which is promoted by these
articles is Russia's stable position against the background of the chaos of the
Copenhagen Conference which was created by other participants. In several
articles, after journalists described the battle between the rich North and poor
South, or the emotional behaviour of the Latin American leaders, or the
hopelessness of the conference organizers, there followed a paragraph which
stated the clear position of the Russian president - 'we are committed to the
GHG reduction process, but we will protect national interests' (Elkov 2009).
Another distinguishing feature of the RG s texts was, even though they almost
always confirmed the existence of climate change, in some cases its
anthropogenic character was called into question.
On average it pictured climate change from an upbeat position ('solutions
are possible', 'existing technologies are enough') and also as a process full of
positive opportunities for Russia ('potential', 'benefits', 'opportunities',
'investments') (for example see Shmeleva 2009). Again, as in other
by Farizova (2009a». Literal translation of this expression means that
somebody or something did not 'fix the weather' (which obviously correlates
with the climate change topic). The actnal meaning tells us about the
unimportance of the actor or the inability to achieve something. In spite of the
disparaging attitude towards the head of state in the Kommersant publication's
title, both articles carried very similar messages. Izvestiya highlighted that
about 'the only leader who announced his country's commitments on carbon
emissions regardless of the conference outcome was Dmitry Medvedev' and
Kommersant also wrote about Medvedev's 'clear position on climate policy'
and 'pacificator' character of his presentation.
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newspapers, the idea that Russia would benefit in any scenario kept
reoccurring. One of the most interesting and unusual articles was written by the
former president of the USSR Michael Gorbachev (2009). This piece ('Kto
povyshaet gradus?' -'Who is raising the temperature?') was full of very
emotional appeals to solve the problem, and that it should be done by the states
that were the most responsible for it. He blamed the current economic system
(,irresponsible race for extra profit at any price', 'blind faith in the invisible
hand of the market' and 'states' inaction') for the catastrophic environmental
situation. He saw the solution in an intellectual breakthrough, moral re-
education of business, active role of civil society, but what was more
important, states' leaders should become 'real' leaders.
Sovetskaya Rossiya
As in the previous case, the character of this newspaper's coverage could be
predicted, of course in its own way, different from the Rossiyskaya gazeta's.
The common theme of all the articles was the destructible nature of capitalism,
which had brought climate catastrophes upon us. In the invective writing style,
the authors tried to accentuate who was a hero (normally a representative of
Latin America) and who was a villain (normally American or Western
European politicians). In one out of several articles written by Fidel Castro
(2009a), already in its headline 'The truth about what happened at the summit'
('Pravda 0 tom, chto proizoshlo na sammite') implied that everything people
heard before was not quite correct. The article was written in a very emotional
manner, with frequent use of such strong phrases as 'before we discussed in
what type of society we will live, now we discuss will humanity live at all',
'the last thing that people can lose is hope', 'men and women armed with truth'
and so on. The speech of Barack Obama was described as 'deceptive and
demagogic', whilst Evo Morales and Hugo Chavez both produced 'wise and
meaningful' speeches which would be remembered in history as 'concise and
relevant' . Then Latin American leaders completed their mission at the
conference and Barack Obama, on the contrary, left without its completion.
These remarks followed with the description of the 'amazing battle' where
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countries of the third world rebelled against Obama's and other 'rich countries'
representatives' attempt to impose the document proposed by the United States.
The peculiarity of Sovetskaya Rossiya s authorship was discussed earlier
on in the section on the information sources, however, this factor had a
significant influence over the coverage of climate change in this newspaper.
Fidel Castro was an author of three out of nine articles that discussed climate
change as a central topic. and seven out of allIS articles published in the SR
over the studied period with some mention of climate change. There is no
publicly available information on how exactly the SR got hold of his articles,
whether he writes specifically for them or they just re-print them from
somewhere else. What is more important is that in his articles he is not just an
ordinary journalist who passes information to his readers, but he shares his
very active political position, he appeals to his fellow comrades and tries to
disgrace his ideological opponents. In another of Castro's articles 'Chas Istiny'
('Moment of truth') (2009b), he concluded with a highly emotional statement:
'For the heads of empires, in spite of their cynical lie, the time of truth comes.
Their own allies trust them less and less. In Mexico [at the time of the
publication it was the next location of the UN climate change conference] as in
Copenhagen and as in any other country, they will encounter growing peoples'
resistance from those who have not lost their hope to survive.' Other articles
were slightly more neutral, but still stressed the opposition between the
developed and developing countries, also they paid great attention to regular
protestors who were manhandled by the Danish police.
Another very interesting point, especially in contrast to the coverage of
all the other studied newspapers, was that in the SR there were again no
references to Russia or the Russian government at all, either in a positive nor
negative way, which could be seen as extremely odd. First of all, as an
oppositional newspaper Sovetskaya Rossiya could have used this opportunity to
point out the destructive policy of current Russian officials or on the other hand
to praise Russia's natural resources such as boreal forest and appeal to it as a
possible environmental leader (but perhaps under a different government). One
might argue that it is the former policy of the Soviet Union that brought Russia
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to be one of the greatest C~ emitters in the world and that the Soviet legacy of
environmental neglect further stimulates Russia's environmental degradation.
Conclusion on media coverage of the Copenhagen Conference and the Climate
Doctrine
The pictures created by the five newspapers differed to the extent that they
differ in their nature, such as Kommersant more often portrayed climate change
from the economic point of view, the KP brought out the sensational nature of
the problem, Izvestiya shared a slight scepticism about climate change but
mostly backed up the government's position, the RG. following the tradition of
the Communist newspapers, praised the state's leaders, whilst the actual
communist newspaper which currently is in opposition (Sovetskaya Rossiya)
used this opportunity to underline the destructive nature of capitalism.
There were overarching themes throughout all the articles and no major
contradictions between them were observed. All newspapers contributed to the
creation of the same discourse or it could be argued that they were all
influenced by the same political, economic and social discourses. It supports
the earlier prediction about the media coverage of these events. All newspapers
to some extent did mirror state policy on climate change, and in the majority of
the articles, climate change's existence was accepted and even its
anthropogenic origins were too.
One of the earlier stated hypotheses did not prove to be correct: the
coverage after the acceptance of the Climate Doctrine did not change
significantly, though three out of five newspapers (KP, Izvestiya and RG)
mentioned its acceptance and its positive influence. It could be explained by
the fact that the change in the state's policy on climate change did not happen
during the Copenhagen Conference as such, but some time before it (after
Medvedev's appointment to office), hence. the Doctrine or Medvedev's speech
at Copenhagen did not signify the start of the policy but were logical steps in
its continuation.
Overall, there were some disagreements in the coverage and not all
articles fully concurred with the above mentioned statements, however, on
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average similarities prevailed. None of the articles openly criticised the state's
policy on climate change. Even when Kommersant did try to point out some
drawbacks, the victim of its critique became the country's bureaucratic
apparatus instead of its leaders. Sovetskaya Rossiya; which actively criticised
the US and Western European climate policies, did not mention the Russian
government at all and did not use this opportunity to demonstrate its
oppositional nature. Furthermore, in the majority of the articles (except for
those in the SR) Russia was portrayed as a leader of the negotiating process and
it was noted how much the national economy could benefit from it. Incontrast,
there was hardly any mention that it was not a long time ago that the
'environmental leader' was one of the major obstacles in the way of the
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, and signed it only due to the certain benefits
it was promised.
The heat-wave coverage
Izvestiya
With only five articles directly related to climate change issues, almost none of
them were actually about climate change. Most of the time discussion started
with the 'horrifying' consequences that the weather brought upon Russians
('Temperature records were broken' (Obraztsov 2010a), 'Why do we hear more
often messages from the Ministry of Emergency Situations?' (Izvestiya 2010),
'climate of mass destruction' (Obraztsov 201Ob») whilst climate change would
enter the articles further on in the texts as just one of the possible reasons
which were constantly emphasized ('surely, global warming is only one of the
reasons' (Izvestiya 2010), 'it would be too banal to explain temperature rise by
global warming' (Obraztsov 201Oa».
The climate change's anthropogenic origin was brought into question
even more ('climatologists still do not offer one explanation about climate
change' (Izvestiya 2010), 'it is unclear who should be blamed for climate
change - Earth or human beings' (Savinykh 2010». Journalists tried to explore
different theories about why the heat-wave happened: for example, an increase
in solar activity or even such an extraordinary one as a 'climate weapon' which
explored the old concept of the Cold War where the United States was trying to
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destroy Russia's wellbeing. Not only were the reasons of the heat-wave
disputed but also the ways to cope with it, for instance, there were some
questionable proposals for 'geoengineering' (Obraztsov 201Ob). Russia's
decision to join the Kyoto Protocol was discussed in the context that it did not
require anything from the country and even promised some benefits, however,
Izvestiya stated that how 'right' the decision was remained to be seen
(Obraztsov 201Ob).
Kommersant.
For Kommersant only two articles were distinguished which did not just
mention climate change but discussed it in a more significant way. One of the
articles talked about climate change in the economic context, mentioning the
difficulties associated with the approvals of the JI projects in Russia
(Shapovalov 2010). The article resembled business reports, full of economic
terminology and analysis. It should be noticed that the article did offer some
criticisms of the government. For instance, it talked about the 'negative
expectations' business had that approved projects would go to the major state
corporations, however, the author noticed that these 'negative expectations
were met only partially'. Whilst some approved projects were presented by
such major companies as 'Gazprom oil' and 'Rosneft", they were 'diluted' by a
smaller projects.
A second article titled 'Summer will call us to account' ('Leto sprosit
strogo') (Sborov 2010) connected the heat-wave and climate change but also
mentioned it in the economic context. The author quotes the Presidential
advisor on climate change, Alexander Bedritsky: 'if climate risks are
miscalculated, than economic losses are unavoidable'. The article goes on to
discuss whether the Russian Ministry of Energy should budget the possible
risks of natural disasters (such as the heat-wave of 2010) each year. It
concludes with information on insurance companies which do not take into
consideration the problem of global warming and will not adjust their tariffs.
Rossiyskaya Gazeta
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Overall, the texts were full of very strong statements confirming climate
change and its anthropogenic character (the 'majority of scientists confirm that
global warming is happening [... ] anthropogenic influence objectively
contributes to climate change' (Elkov 2010» and discussions about the
consequences for Russia (,Russia is huge, so climate change will show itself in
different ways' (Rossiyskaya gazeta 2010», there was some place for
uncertainty. In this case it is interesting to look at the interview with Izrael (a
prominent Russian climatologist and also infamous climate sceptic). Izrael
denied the connection between the heat-wave and climate change, but he
admitted that climate change was happening, however, there was no reason to
worry - 'The process of melting will not take decades like the authors of
environmental horror stories claim, but thousands of years. In this time, 1think,
human beings will find a solution' (Medvedev 2010).
One of the leading themes in this coverage was a demonstration of the
possibility that Russia could take a leading role in fmding solutions to the
problem ('Russia should lead by example' (Shmeleva 2010» and also climate
change was often accompanied by the discussion of national interests
('modernisation and energy efficiency of the Russian economy' (Pertsovskiy
2010».
The RG raised the issue of public opinion by stating that the heat-wave
had managed to change the low level of awareness of the problem, however,
the government was prepared for it (interview with Minister of Natural
Resources and Environment Trutnev: 'I reported to the government about
possible threats [... ] 1myself of course believed scientists, but there was a hope
maybe it would not happen tomorrow' (Smol'yakova 2010». The Kyoto
Protocol was mostly discussed in the context of the benefits and possibilities
for the country ('a tool for modernization and energy efficiency of the Russian
economy', 'number of opportunities' (for example Pertsovskiy 2010).
Komsomol'skaya pravda
Due to the nature of the KP (being a popular tabloid), as in other cases, it often
uses highly emotive words and sensationalist expressions (,Why did nature
decide to fry us?', 'we are getting fried by a gigantic anti-cyclone - atmosphere
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monster' (Smirnova 2010), while some articles also pointed out the sensational
consequences of climate change ('jellyfish in the Moscow River' (Mironov
2010)). Like other newspapers the KP questioned the direct link between
climate change and the heat-wave (Komsomol'skaya Pravda 2010), then in the
same piece it would jump to the conclusion that even though people do
influence the climate, it is impossible to stop climate change since the economy
'must' develop. The coverage of the KP also paid greater attention than other
newspapers to the idea of a climate weapon, devoting the whole article to look
at the different aspects of its possibility and only at the end in a brief paragraph
mentioned a counterargument (Kuzina 2010).
One out of the six articles devoted to climate change covers Vladimir
Putin's trip to the far north and his meeting with scientists studying permafrost.
The article shows Putin's concern with climate change problems: 'I just saw
how fast the sea is "eating" the land, this is really impressive. However,
nobody explained to me whether these changes are connected with human
being's influence'. After scientists re-assured the Prime Minister (at that time)
of the anthropogenic character of climate change, Putin shared one of his
'typical' .climate jokes:
A thousand years ago mammoths started to die out around these
territories, it is said, that it was connected with global warming and
the shrinkage of the food supply. So mammoths aggregated on
these islands. It all was without any anthropogenic character! It
would be good, if you [scientists] would tell us what is going to
happen not only here in Russia, but also around the world, to which
islands we need to migrate (Gamov 2010).
The author of the article remarks after this quotation of Putin's words, that
'everyone understood it was a joke and had a laugh. Putin also laughed with
everyone "[ ... ] when will we be flooded or get frozen? Tell us in advance. so
we know where to run", continued to joke Putin' (Gamov 2010).
Sovetskaya Rossiya
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SR published seven articles during the studied period mentioning climate
change and even though none of them discussed climate change as a central
topic there are still some valuable observations to be made. Gennady Zyuganov
(2010), leader of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, wrote an
article 'Politics of catastrophes' ('Politika katastrof'), where he argues that the
climate, peat development or regular people were not the ones to be blamed for
fires, but the current ruling party, whose 'incompetence' was burning Russia.
Another article went even further and firmly stated that the main reason, for
social-environmental apocalypse was the current financial system, which must
be destroyed. Climate change was described as a definite threat, as a danger for
the whole world and everyone should unite to fight it (Khanzhin and Khromov
2010).
There were also three articles written by Fidel Castro where once again
he mentioned that problems such as climate change are the consequences of
neo-liberalism (Castro 2010). Although in SR coverage there were some
aggressive statements towards state leaders, the current financial system and
even the Russian government (Kramich 2010) including reference to 'soulless'
bureaucrats and businessmen who are responsible for climate change due to
their interest in immediate profit), once again there was no direct mention of
specific Russian state officials, or criticism of them.
Conclusion on mass media coverage of the heat-wave
Once again the media coverage was influenced by the newspapers' defining
characteristics. Kommersant looked at the economic aspect of the problem, the
KP highlighted in its coverage the sensational facts, Izvestiya stayed quite
sceptical towards the problem and at the same time sensationalist, the RG
pursued a clear line of relations between climate change and the heat-wave and
used it as evidence of the right decision made by the government admitting the
existence of climate change, whilst the SR did not have any articles on climate
change as a central topic and in the articles where climate change was at least
mentioned. the SR again blamed the current world political and financial
system for the global problem.
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Again common conclusions can be drawn. In support of the predictions
stated above, overall there was much less uncertainty on reporting about
climate change since it became more apparent and more vivid, to the extent
that for the first time RG mentioned Russian public opinion on climate change
and in particular, how low the level of concern was, and suggested that such
unpleasant abnormal acts of nature might help to change this situation. All
newspapers apart from SR pronounced the state's position and its decisions
correct on the grounds that they would benefit Russia whatever happened.
Once more, only Kommersant openly questioned the government's
performance on climate change problems, however, it was not concerned with
the country's leaders but ministers or other officials, and the SR questioned the
capitalist policy in general. It should be noted that not all of the articles on
climate change during this time were provoked by the heat-wave, but on the
contrary some dealt with unrelated issues such as the implementation of the
Kyoto Protocol.
Another interesting observation was made that was not apparent and
noted in the predictions. It seems that the media coverage of climate change
during the heat-wave was much less structured and adequate87 than it was
during the time of the Copenhagen Conference and the Climate Doctrine. The
issues which prevailed before in the political and economic context were raised
again, such as uncertainty about its anthropogenic character and climate
change's positive consequences for Russia. Furthermore, it provided more
opportunities for sensationalist and alarmist messages, such as the climate
weapon explanation of the heat-wave (a conspiracy against Russia).
87 One might argue that 'adequate' coverage of climate change is a vague
concept. Such as there is a difference between improving media coverage of
climate change by making it more sophisticated or by making it more
sympathetic to taking action to mitigate climate change. Even though for the
environmental activists and supporters of the active climate change mitigation
policy the latter would be the most desirable outcome, but talking about the
problem in terms of the freedom of speech and Russian media becoming
something different than just a propaganda tool, blind commitment to either
side can be considered a step back for the development of democratic media.
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Discussion
The Kyoto and the Copenhagen Conferences happened 12 years apart and in
this period of time Russia's state policy went through drastic changes. For a
number of years it was sceptical of climate change and tried to stay aside from
international negotiations; at the same time Russia had a strong anti-climate
change lobby. A decade later Russia changed its priorities and just at the time
of the Copenhagen Conference accepted at the state level climate change's
anthropogenic character and admitted that it was in the country's interests to
take action on it. A limited selection of media organs was taken into
consideration, due to practical reasons this was an optimal way of conducting
the analysis. However, for future research it could be interesting to study not
only print media, but also TV, radio and internet sources, and perhaps rather
than selecting certain events looking at a longer duration might reveal other
interesting conclusions.
The analysis conducted showed that in the Russian case the media
coverage of climate change has indeed stayed within certain boundaries. One
of the most striking findings demonstrated that the coverage of climate change
in the studied newspapers has changed throughout the years from 13 articles
during the Kyoto Conference to 127 in the time of the Copenhagen
Conference. Even though during the heat-wave the coverage stayed pretty high
with 80 articles, the event attracted less attention than did political affairs. It
can be concluded that in the Russian case of climate change coverage, the state
acts as an independent variable by directly or indirectly altering the media
policy on the subject. Neither different ownership structures nor the degree of
advertising dependency of Russian newspapers had much influence over the
newspaper coverage. Even during the scarce coverage of the Kyoto Conference
and especially during the Copenhagen Conference, the Russian state was
presented in a beneficial way as a saviour of the negotiating process and
Russian leaders were praised for their tactical approach to benefit the Russian
economy in any scenario. Overall, the difference in the amount of articles
between the newspapers was insignificant, with a few exceptions.
212
Kommersant published fewer articles on climate change during the heat-
wave. Perhaps it could be argued that the lower coverage in this newspaper
might be explained by its ownership structure - Alisher Usmanov
(Metalloinvest) owns it. Hence, it could be said that due to the industrial
interests of the owner Kommersant limited the coverage of climate change,
however, this does not explain why Kommersant's coverage did not differ in its
amount during the other two events. Hence, we can argue that the explanation
is in the newspaper's writing style, which tries to present information in a
rational more business-like manner (which is also supported through discourse
analysis of its articles). Objectively speaking, even though scientists do say that
climate change makes extreme weather more likely, they are generally
reluctant to assert a causal link in particular cases."
The left-wing Sovetskaya Rossiya published more articles than the other
newspapers (during time of the Copenhagen Conference and heat-wave) (if we
look at how many articles it produced in proportion to the overall number of its
news per newspaper). Interestingly enough, despite the quantitative difference,
qualitatively it also confirmed the Russian media's conformist position towards
the Russian government with regards to climate change topics. Being a left-
wing newspaper with strong support from Russia's communist party (the
opposition party), it in fact presented a vast critique of the capitalist world and
in particular blamed US President Barack Obama for all the problems.
However, the SR did not exploit this opportunity to condemn Russia's
government for its quite questionable climate policy or on the hand for its rapid
shift. So, indeed the SR coverage differs from other newspapers, but it still
stays within the 'manufactured consent' produced by the surrounding political,
economic and social discourses.
These results could be explained, firstly, by the fact that the
environmental degradation which Russia is currently facing is to a large extent
a legacy of the Soviet Union's policies (see more on it in chapter four); and,
88 Gruza and Ran'kova (2011) argue that in the case of the Russian heat-wave
the main reason was a 'slow moving anti-cyclone', however, global warming
contributed to this disastrous weather event by increasing the created
anomalous high temperature by 2-3 degrees.
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secondly, that there is a problem of the political opposition and its role in
Russia. For instance Luke March (2009) explains how the Russian government
'manages the opposition' by 'creating' political parties (he provides an example
of 'Just Russia'). Richard Sakwa (2011b: 526) states that in Russia:
the role of political opposition is marginalized. Parties have limited
political reach and fail to provide the framework for the
institutionalization of political competition or the integration of
regional and national politics. They are not the source of
governmental formation, personnel appointments or policy
generation; neither are they, more broadly, 'system-forming', in the
sense of providing the framework for political order.
With regards to the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF),
Sakwa (2008) argues that it 'deserves the title of "party" the most. However,
he spells out a number of key problems within the communist party itself. For
example, for a number of years the CPRF has struggled with its own political
identity, political goals and position towards the state leaders and ruling elites
('Do they need to overthrow them?', 'How party policy is compatible with the
free market economy and capitalism?' and so on).
The analysis shows that after the change in the state's policy in the
majority of the cases newspapers relied on Russian officials as the information
sources and this correlation is evident even during natural disasters. To be more
specific, it was dominated by the two most influential state officials -
Medvedev (predominately) and Putin. The significance of the state's influence
over media coverage is also supported by the observation that the state's
position (especially its leaders) has rarely been questioned by any newspaper.
Even during the scarce coverage of the Kyoto Conference and especially
during the Copenhagen Conference, Russia was presented as an environmental
leader and a saviour of the negotiating process.
Overall, after conducting this media analysis it can be concluded that
there is a correlation between state policy and media policy on the subject of
climate change. But other factors cannot be disregarded. For instance, coverage
during the heat-wave, even though it was not as high as during the Copenhagen
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Conference, was still quite significant and anomalous weather conditions did
bring additional attention to the problem. On the other side, as the discourse
analysis demonstrates, and as mentioned above, the coverage during this time
provided more opportunities for climate sceptics (which is rather strange
considering that the consequences of climate change were demonstrated) and
more space for sensationalist ideas about climate change. In contrast, when
politicians became the main source of information,and when the state's
position was clearly articulated, the coverage followed that lead. It became
more supportive of the climate change thesis and less sensationalist whilst the
climate change mitigation process was perceived as a subject of greater
importance and as a 'win-win' situation for Russia.
With that said, the comparison of media coverage in 1997 and 2009
shows that in the earlier period, when the government was resistant to taking
action on carbon mitigation the media reaction was not to primarily cover
climate change from a hostile or sceptical perspective, but simply not to cover
it at all. Even though the increase in coverage between the Kyoto and
Copenhagen Conferences correlated with the rise of climate change as an
important issue on the state's agenda, if the data collected are compared with
other countries (see chapter six), coverage of all three events still shows the
insignificance of environmental issues in Russia. Within five national
newspapers during two months around some major events related to the
climate change topic, the accumulated amount of articles did not exceed 127
articles per event. The next chapter explores this finding and argues that in the
Russian case, the omission of the climate change topic is a greater problem
than biased coverage of it could be.
Concluding remarks
One of the main messages of Herman and Chomsky's (1994) analysis of the
political economy of the American mass media states that the mass media are
an actor in the free market economy and function according to its laws, by
satisfying demands of owners, advertisers and information sources due to their
economic dependence. The application of the PrM's filters to the Russian case
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of media coverage of climate change has demonstrated that whilst newspapers
can be in private hands, the state can still shape their coverage. This was
especially evident through the analysis of the 'information sources' filters,
which showed that Russian state officials act as a dominant informational
source on the subject matter, and whenever they enter the discussion there is
hardly any journalists' critique following their statements, which ultimately
makes the Russian state the most authoritative newsmaker on this subject.
Furthermore, the application of the 'dominant ideology' filter (that the
media will follow the lead of the strong Russian state) has showed that when
the state slightly changed its stance on the problem and finally publicly
acknowledged the anthropogenic character of climate change and Russia's
commitments to GHG emissions reduction goals, the climate change topic
entered the media discourse with the overarching message of Russia's leading
position in the international negotiation process and a 'win-win' situation for
the state. Besides the biased coverage of climate change in Russian newspapers
and the absence of almost any critique of the elites' position on the problem,
the preceding analysis has revealed the clear omission of the climate change
topic from the Russian media discourse. Following the Russian position on
climate change or not questioning its stance, the Russian media fail to create a
full discussion of one of the most important and controversial environmental
issues of our time.
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CHAPTER 6 - MEDIATING CLIMATE CHANGE IN RUSSIA:
PASSING THROUGH THE BARRIERS
Concluding their analysis of media coverage of the Polish priest's murder and
the hundred religious victims in Latin America, along with the elections in El
Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua; 'the KGB-Bulgarian plot to kill the Pope';
and the wars in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia - Herman and Chomsky stated
that the PrM demonstrates that:
the "societal purpose" of the media is to inculcate and defend the
economic, social and political agenda of privileged groups that
dominate the domestic society and the state. The media serve this
purpose in many ways: through selection of topics, distribution of
concerns, framing of issues, filtering of information, emphasis and
tone, and by keeping debate within the bounds of acceptable
premises (Herman and Chomsky 1994 [1988]: 298).
Concluding the analysis of media coverage of climate change in Russia,
it is claimed here that media coverage on the issue stays within the broad
politico-economic framework which is influenced and controlled by the elites
and that the media hardly ever challenge the elites' position on the problem.
Similarly to Herman and Chomsky's study, the findings of this research show
that with regards to climate change, Russian journalists do not face open forms
of censorship or state orders, but the whole politico-economic system of the
country works in a way that it encourages coverage to stay within certain
boundaries. In summary it could be stated that in the case of climate change,
the state seems not to be a main 'client', but rather a main newsmaker that
takes the lead. This conclusion was reached through the adaptation and
application of the PrM filters to this case study, which has demonstrated that
whilst it is not clear how different ownership structures, advertising policies or
'flak' influence environmental communication in Russia, the filter 'sourcing'
became of great use. As discussed in more detail below, after the Russian
government changed its position on the climate change issue, the Russian
media turned their attention towards the problem which was signified by an
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increase in their coverage of climate change and the dominance of the Russian
state officials as sources of information.
However, the PrM fails to give further details of journalists' approaches
to such a complex subject. In this sense it is useful to return to the debate (see
chapter one) on the influence of micro-processes in the media coverage of
climate change (such as the specifications of the topic and the role of
journalistic norms). During the interviews conducted for this project,
journalists noted that interest in climate change is often stimulated by natural
disasters or abnormal temperatures (which was also confirmed by the media
analysis data) and on the contrary the lack of interest in some cases can be
explained by the complexity of the scientific data and abstract nature of the
problem (which does not contradict the PrM's ideas as long as the coverage
agrees with the elites' interests).
As will be discussed in greater detail below, in the Russian case silence
on the climate change problem speaks louder than any biased or unbiased
coverage. I argue that the omission of the climate change topic demonstrates
what Lukes (2005) calls the 'third dimension of power' which the Russian state
has exercised. Once again this fact fits perfectly well within the PrM's logic.
As was mentioned earlier in this dissertation, Herman (1996 in Mullen 2010)
states that it is one of the 'merits' of the PrM that it allows us to not only see
how the media content is shaped and why, but also what is omitted and why?
The PrM proves to be a great tool for the analysis of media systems and
in the way it addresses various topics. It shows how the system adjusts to the
natural processes of the capitalist economy and the way the interests of the
political, economic and societal elites are considered. Interestingly, in the last
few pages of their original study Herman and Chomsky (1994 [1988]: 306)
state that the 'system is not all powerful' meaning that there is a chance for
grassroots movements and civil society to find the loopholes and to overcome
the obstacles imposed by the elites and actually be able not only to
communicate their own messages but steer the discussion in a different
direction as long as they know the mechanics - the way the media operate.
Coming from this proposition and based on the conducted research at the end
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of this chapter it is possible to suggest a number of ways in which the climate
change issue in Russia can be popularised and how adequate discussion can
develop.
Adopting the PrM to the Russian case: the media and power, or the
powerful media?
As Oates rightfully notes 'social scientists remain unsure as to whether the
media tend to lead political change or (more cynically) if they merely reinforce
the consensus of the political victors' (2007: 1279). In the Soviet Union
(especially at its beginning) 'the media had a particularly important role for the
Soviet leadership in the creation of a fully communist society' (White and
Oates 2003: 32). Even though the media were considered a powerful
'propaganda tool', with total control and institutionalised censorship they were
a factor rather than an actor in the state's communication strategy. The
distribution of power was quite straightforward, from the top down, with the
state dictating to the media what to do and the media helping the state to
mobilise and 'organise the masses'.
More recently, during the period of perestroika and especially after the
collapse of the Soviet Union and the creation of the new state (with a
supposedly democratic regime) many (includingjoumalists themselves) saw an
opportunity for the Russian media to become the fourth estate. Furthermore,
media would be capable of altering the political regime, to bring attention to
the problems and place them on the agenda and actually be able to influence
the outcomes of the elections. In this sense the media would become a
'watchdog' for democracy and their main role would be 'to act as a check on
the state [... ] monitor the full range of state activity, and fearlessly expose
abuse of official authority' (Curran 2002: 217). Indeed, as Ivan Zassoursky
puts it 'the press in the early 1990s genuinely perceived itself as a "fourth
estate", that is, as one of the governing institutions wielding enormous
influence in society' (2004: 57). It could be argued that for a few years this was
the case, and one of the most famous examples of the Russian media being an
active actor of the political process is the case when they organised an
influential campaign against the first military action in the Chechen Republic
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(see chapter three). This 'golden age' of Russian media did not last very long
and soon it turned into a neo-Soviet media system (Oates 2007) where newly
acquired freedom of speech in many cases remained just a formality and
additional constraints dictated by the free market were added.
One of the main postulates of the PrM voiced in Herman and Chomsky's
work (1994 [1988]) states that the mass media are part of the free market
system and like any other market actor want to make profit and act accordingly.
Fourteen years later, in the new introduction to their book, Herman and
Chomsky restated that 'among their other functions, the media serve, and
propagandize on behalf of, the powerful societal interests that control and
finance them' (2002: xi). Mass media seek to satisfy the interests of their main
investors or in other words media want to make themselves financially
attractive. However, even for the US case this simplified vision of the media
production process did not cover all aspects of this complex institution. Making
media business sustainable in many cases does not just come down to the idea
of achieving the greatest circulation numbers, highest sales or the biggest
ratings. As the PrM demonstrates even in the United States there are multiple
actors in the media production process (which influence the media within the
frame of the model's filters) and all of these actors have some sort of
connections with each other. and the outcome of the media strategy depends
not on their individual influence but also on the agreement between these
actors. Hence 'media consent' depends on the 'consent amongst elites'.
The analysis of the media system in Russia by the means of the PrM
demonstrates that if we break this system into elements according to the filters
then it becomes clear that all of them are dominated by the most powerful actor
in Russia - the state. The conducted research showed that the state in one way
or another owns the most important media outlets. it has close connections with
the advertising market, it contributes to the reaction on media activity in some
form of censorship, it often becomes the dominant information source and it
creates a certain political or ideological regime in the country which some
might call political capitalism, managed democracy or a dual state. In this
superior role the state became one of the key differences between the original
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study by Herman and Chomsky and the Russian case, as Chomsky (1989b: 149)
specifies 'the model argues, from its foundations, that the media will protect
the interests of the powerful, not that it will protect state managers from their
criticisms'. Whilst in Russia, 'the powerful' are the 'state managers'. In the
study of media coverage of climate change through the series of interviews and
the content and discourse analysis of the selected newspapers, the hypothesis of
the state being a dominant independent variable has been proven to be correct.
These results were achieved through content analysis of the published
articles mentioning climate change. The quantity of the articles changed
significantly after the change in the state's climate policy (which was
demonstrated through the comparison of coverage of the Kyoto and
Copenhagen Conferences). The coverage provoked by the official events such
as the Copenhagen Conference and acceptance of the Climate Doctrine
provoked almost twice as many articles as the natural disaster event (the heat-
wave of the summer of 2010). Since the analysed newspapers were selected
according to the logic that they represent different types of ownership
structures, the conducted research also has shown that the newspapers which
are owned by the state quite predictably follow the state's agenda, however, the
more interesting and unexpected results that were achieved through this
analysis show that the newspapers owned by big companies or oligarchs are
not so different in their media policy to the state-owned ones.
An interesting case study was presented through the analysis of the
oppositional newspaper Sovetskaya Rossiya which claims to be independent. In
terms of how many articles each newspaper publishes per issue and how many
articles were devoted to climate change, Sovetskaya Rossiya talked about
climate change quite frequently and every time it accused the capitalist system
(often simply the United States) for its destructive force and for global
environmental degradation. At the same time Sovetskaya Rossiya was not that
different to the other studied newspapers, in the sense that it also did not
question Russia's climate change policy and its contribution to the world's
level of GHG emissions. Arguably this fact does not characterise the
applicability of the PrM in a negative or positive way, but rather raises a
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separate discussion of the role and existence of opposition in modem Russia
(see chapter five).
This analysis has also unfolded the limitations of the PrM in the case of
media coverage of climate change in Russia. Indeed, external factors do play a
role and coverage does stay within the boundaries, however, not all filters have
proven to be equally useful for the explanation of the communicatuion of
climate risks in Russia. For example, both media analysis and interviews with
journalists did not show significant evidence of advertisers altering the way
climate change is portrayed. Use of the filter 'flak' is more complex in the
Russian case. As discussed in chapter three, Russian journalists do face various
forms of censorship (even after it was officially banned), however, it should be
realised that 'climate change' is not 'corruption' or 'war in Chechnya', thus
Russian elites do not pay as much attention to it and to date there are no known
cases of journalists being imprisoned for reponing a story about C02 emissions,
or media outlets facing other kinds of prosecutions or threats. At the same time,
the journalists interviewed agreed that there is almost always some degree of
self-censorship in their work, regardless of what they write about. In Herman
and Chomsky's discussion it is apparent that 'self-censorship' is a common
characteristic of journalism, whilst the degree might vary depending on the
economic-political situation journalists work in and topics they cover.
The influence of the filter 'ownership structure' in the Russian case of
climate change coverage is slightly more difficult to identify. On the one hand,
as mentioned above, the content and discourse analysis of the selected
newspapers has not shown much of a difference in the coverage by the
newspapers representing various owners - even oppositional newspaper
Sovetskaya Rossiya did not fallout of the common trend. However, further
analysis has shown how the state plays a crucial role in various media
ownership structures. Even when the media outlet does not officially belong to
the state, there is almost always some connection between the government and
the owners. The interviewed journalists have also confirmed that they need to
take into consideration their media owners' interests.
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The 'dominant ideology' filter is also quite an ambiguous one, as
discussed in chapter two, in Herman and Chomsky's original study this filter
was named 'anti-communism' and it was clearly defined, It provided the idea
of a 'common enemy' which encouraged the media to stay within the
boundaries of capitalist ideology. Over the years the 'anti-communist' agenda
has lost its relevance in the United States and the filter has been modified into
the 'dominant ideology'. However, the authors still argue that the idea of
promoting a free market economy and capitalism has remained. In the Russian
case, experiencing a rapid change of political and economic regimes has
resulted in an uncertain condition with regards to dominant ideology driving
Russian policy - is it capitalism, consumerism or nationalism and so on?
Unlike in the original study of the American media, in Russia the ideology is
much more difficult to pinpoint. As discussed above, Russia is often
characterised as a managed democracy or political capitalism, these two
different concepts coincide in the description of the influential role of the state
in modem Russia. Indeed, as has been repeatedly concluded in the application
of the PrM to the Russian case of climate change coverage, even the most
insignificant filters have been significantly influenced by the state. Hence, even
though in a similar way to the US, in Russia we can also witness the
development of capitalist ideology at the same time Russian ideology has been
and ccontinues to be shaped by the influence of the strong state.
As this research has shown, the most straightforward and helpful filter in
this case study, became the filter of 'sourcing'. The newspapers' overall
consensus on climate change coverage can be explained through the dominance
of the state's official sources, and how the journalists follow the steps of the
state on climate policy. For instance, the coverage during the Copenhagen
Conference and the Climate Doctrine (the so called politicised or official
events) was much more structured and some might say more adequate (see
chapter five). There were less sensational messages, less scepticism and more
analysis of the problem. Hence, in this case the consent among the elites about
the anthropogenic character of climate change and a more pro-active stance on
the mitigation policy resulted in the more sophisticated and knowledgeable
coverage of the problem.
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In summary, the application of the PrM to the Russian case has showed
that whilst newspapers can be active actors in a free market economy, the state
can still influence their coverage. Furthermore, applying the PrM to the
Russian case of climate change coverage does not only allow us to see the bias
in the media reporting which often has culminated in praise towards the
country's leaders as saviours of the climate change negotiation process or the
presentation of any outcome of the international negotiations as a 'win-win'
situation for Russia, it also demonstrates that biased coverage of climate
change is a lesser evil in the Russian case, whilst the more serious problem is
presented through the omission of the topic.
No presentation of climate change versus misrepresentation
In the first chapter of this dissertation the importance of the mass media in the
process of mitigating or adapting to climate change consequences was
highlighted. As Kokhanova states: 'before we will be able to mitigate or solve
any kind of global environmental problems, firstly, we need to define those
problems - an exchange of information should happen' (2007: 19). The same
idea is shared by Anders Hansen (2010), who argues that the media need to
explain to people what the environmental problems are, especially in the case
of climate change - 'whatever 'symptoms' of climate change, that we see
around us, they are of course only just that because we have been told that this
is what they are, manifestations of climate change' (ibid: 170). As has been
discussed before (see chapter one) climate change is characterised as an
'unobtrusive issue' which cannot be noticed and understood without
specialised knowledge of the subject or without it being 'translated' and
'broadcast' by the media.
The reluctance of the Russian media to cover climate change was picked
up during the interviews. For example, Igor Podgorny from Greenpeace Russia
noticed that it could be considered a positive sign that now media have started
to mention climate change, whilst a few years ago even this was not the case
(interview, Moscow, 27 July 2011). Aleksey Kokorin from WWF-Russia
supports this position by stating that in Russia 'mass media cover climate
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change awfully, but before they did it even worse' (interview, Moscow, 27 July
2011).
A study of the worldwide collaborative research network 'MediaClimate'
(Bide et al. 2010) managed a comparative study of the media coverage of the
Bali Summit (December 2007) and the Copenhagen Conference (December
2009) in 13 and 19countries (respectively), in both cases Russia ended up with
the lowest amount of articles devoted to the topic." For instance, during the
conference in Bali there were only 13 articles published in two Russian
newspapers, (Kommersant and Moskovsky Komsomolets). For the Copenhagen
Conference the number was slightly higher, and Russian media outlets studied
together managed to publish 32 articles, whilst the top positions were occupied
by Denmark (the host country) with 710 pieces, Bangladesh with 317, Norway
with 264 and Canada with 262. The countries closest to Russia in their
coverage rate are El Salvador with 55 and Chile with 48, which is still at least
16 articles more than in the Russian case. Furthermore, only 17 articles in the
analysed Russian newspapers were directly devoted to the Copenhagen
Conference, whilst the other 15 just mentioned it in the discussion of other
topics, mostly in the context of the new strategic weapons agreement between
the United States and Russia (negotiations about which were happening
simultaneously) (Yagodin 2010).
The analysis of the newspapers' coverage of climate change in Russia
conducted for this research has confirmed these findings. As has been
demonstrated even within five national newspapers during two months around
some major events related to the climate change topic. the total amount of
articles did not exceed 127 articles per event. The number of articles which
were specifically devoted to climate change (rather just mentioning it in a non-
related context) is even less. During two months around the Kyoto Conference
in 1997 five newspapers managed to produce only nine articles discussing
89 The data was collected from 1 December 2009 to 22 December 2009 in the
studied year, from two national newspapers. One of which is supposed to 'have
a rather close relationship to the local power elite' and another one is 'a
"tabloid" paper or a more consumer-oriented outlet of journalism' (Bide et al.
2010: 19).
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climate change; during the Copenhagen Conference in 2009, it was 68 articles
and during the heat-wave events of summer 2010 only 30 articles were written
on climate change.
For the purpose of comparison a similar search was conducted, through
the electronic database Nexis, of UK newspapers. The result showed that in the
five selected newspapers (The Independent, The Guardian, The Times, The
Observer and The Daily Mirror (The Sunday Mirror» 337 articles devoted to
climate change were published during the Kyoto Conference and 1744 articles
were published during the Copenhagen Conference. To get comparative data
from a country which did not join the Kyoto Protocol the New York Times and
the Washington Post were searched. During the Kyoto Conference they
respectively published 133 and 112 articles. During the' Copenhagen
. Conference the New York Times produced 291 articles and the Washington
Post produced 260.
So, one of the factors characterising the media policy on climate change
in Russia which has been confirmed by this research is the relative omission of
information on this controversial problem. Many scholars. struggle to find
explanations of why journalists write about climate change in a sensational
manner, why they devote the same space and time to the arguments supported
by climate sceptics as to the arguments supported by the dominant majority of
scientists and so on. In the Russian case, one might say the problem is more
complex - why this debate on climate change has not even entered the public
discourse in any serious way.
As was discussed before, the PrM ignores the significance of the public's
influence over the media production process. Herman and Chomsky also state
that 'the Propaganda Model describes forces that shape what the media does; it
does not imply that any propaganda emanating from the media is always
effective' (2002: xii). As James Curran (2002), in his discussion on the 'limited
media influence' (from the perspective of the liberal approach to media
theories), states: 'audiences selectively attend to, understand, evaluate and
retain information from the media' (ibid: 132). So regardless of how well the
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media propaganda machine operates people do not simply absorb, without
questioning everything the media drops upon them:
This is because the public is not an empty vessel waiting to be
filled by media propaganda. On the contrary, most people possess
values, opinion and understandings, formed by early socialization,
membership of social networks and personal experience, which
structure their responses to the media. Even when people are
exposed to communications from the media on a topic they know
nothing about, they have core beliefs and general orientations -
'interpretive schema' - which results in selective assimilation of
information (Curran 2002: 132).
Taking into account all of these limitations and the fact that media's
effects over the audience are on its own is a grand area of research. However,
in the Russian case of climate change coverage, the correlation between the
low coverage of the problem and the low level of awareness of climate change
among the general population is quite striking.
The problem was demonstrated by the Public Opinion Fund (FOM 2(08)
which conducted an opinion poll where the respondents were asked to choose
not more than five out of 25 options of the problems they are most concerned
with. Whilst the most popular answers were 'inflation, price increase', 'high
housing prices' and 'expensive medical care', 'environmental problems' took
19th place leaving behind only problems connected with the immigration
situation, public transport and delays with pay days (the last three places were
taken by marginal answers falling into categories 'other', 'do not have any
problems' and 'do not know'). What is interesting is that when people were
directly asked whether they are concerned by the environmental situation and if
they think global warming is an important problem, 78 and 70 percent
(respectively) answered affirmatively. Another study was conducted by
Greenpeace Russia in 1999 which aimed to find out the public's attitude
towards the NGO and charities in general and it showed that people did not
mind supporting 'actions to protect the environment near their home or
neighbourhood; the actions they were least likely to support were "pressuring
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the authorities and business for the goal of resolving environmental problems"
and ''the battle against global climate change'" (Greenpeace Russia 1999, cited
in Henry 20 lOb: 198).
The World Bank (2010) commissioned a more specific opinion poll
which aimed to determine public attitudes across the globe particularly towards
climate change. The research was conducted in 16 countries: Bangladesh,
Brazil, China, Egypt, France, India, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Kenya, Mexico,
Russia, Senegal, Turkey, the United States and Vietnam. Even though the
results summary of the report states that overall people in all the studied
countries demonstrated a high level of concern about climate change, Russia in
almost all question categories occupies one of the last places, showing the
lowest level of concern amongst its citizens. For instance, 30 percent of
respondents in Russia consider climate change to be a 'very serious' problem,
whilst the opinion poll average is 60 percent. Only 18 percent of Russian
respondents 'strongly agree' that 'dealing with the problem of climate change
should be given priority, even if it causes slower economic growth and some
loss of jobs', whilst the average among 16 other countries is 35 percent. Russia
had the least number of people who think that the majority of scientists 'think
the problem is urgent and enough is known for action', at 23 percent, whilst
this multi-country poll shows that on average 51 percent of people agree with
this statement. Once again Russians are the most negative with regard to the
question of whether their country 'has responsibility to take steps to deal with
climate change', 58 percent, whilst the world average shows that 87 percent of
people think their state should be responsible for dealing with the problem.
Arguably, this rather low level of concern with environmental problems
in general and climate change in particular, can serve as a justification of the
limited media coverage of climate change in Russia. As is discussed further on
in this chapter, this is a questionable statement - is press coverage limited
because readers are not interested, or are readers not interested because
coverage is limited? The role of media in forming public opinion and
generating public interests is explored to a great extent in the studies devoted to
the media's 'agenda-setting' capabilities. For example, McCombs and Shaw
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(1972: 176) argue that with a 'help' of mass media 'the readers learn not only
about a given issue, but also how much importance to attach to that issue' (See
also Carroll and McCombs 2003; McCombs 2004, 2(05). Considering the
relatively significant influence of the Russian media over their audience, and
the low level of general awareness of the problem, an increase in the level of
coverage can lead to an increased understanding of the problem. As White and
Oates state, 'the media are more trusted than any other social institution in
contemporary Russia - more than the armed forces, the Church, political
parties or government itself' (2003: 33), hence, even though the public
influence over media coverage of climate change is debatable and is not
considered by the PrM, the possibility of media power increasing people's
awareness of the problem in Russia is rather high. Nenashev (20 lOb) states that
in contrast to Western media, where objective information and impartial
coverage are priorities, Russian journalism has always differed in its
preferences for commentary and analysis of events, which often included a
direct appeal to solve the political or social problems or provide people an
option of not only what to think about but also how to think.
Indeed, throughout the history of Russian media regardless of the degree
of their dependency on the state or other actors, they have always possessed the
specific characteristic of not just being an informer but rather an educator.
Interestingly enough, the Russian public is mostly content with the nurturing
role of media. As White and Oates (2003) found in their extensive empirical
research on the public's attitude towards media in Russia, - 'many
[respondents] thought it was simply irresponsible of the mass media to present
information in a neutral way, without any kind of reference to wider moral or
patriotic values' (ibid: 33). Another of White and Oates' interesting findings
showed that 'Russians are often more distressed by the portrayal of violence
and chaos on their television screens than by pro-government bias' (ibid) and
even more shockingly according to this research, Russian people have a more
positive attitude toward media coverage after the centralisation processes of
Putin's regime rather than in the era of media 'freedom' in the early 1990s
(mostly due to the fact that media coverage of the time was also quite chaotic
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and devoted large amounts of space or time to topics with violent or sexual
content).
Due to these concerns with media abusing these questionable topics the
public opinion poll conducted by the Russian Public Opinion Research Centre
(VTsIOM) showed that around 70 percent of respondents are in support of
some kind of censorship over mass media (Tarusin and Fedorov 2009).
Interestingly enough, the same ideas were voiced by a number of interviewees
in conversations about Russian media policy and climate change, where they
said the problem is not in state policy:
'the problem is in the media themselves, they like to shout about
their freedom but it comes down to the talk about scandals, so we
need some kind of control from the civil society, from the expert
community. I do not argue in support of control over the media (we
already had it), but something has to change, they need to become
more responsible' (Zakharov, interview, Moscow, 21 July 2011).
The public vision of the censorship of media activity comes down to a
very simplistic concept - the media can do anything if they do no harm (by
exposing too much of the above mentioned controversial topics).
Coming back to the discussion of the PrM's applicability in the Russian
context, it is useful to return to thePrM vision of this question. As Curran
(2002) mentions Herman and Chomsky's study, he notices that 'while it is not
anchored to a Marxist, class-based view of society [... ] it is similar in that it
assumes that 'controls within media organisations mesh with wider controls in
society to render American media "effective and powerful ideological
institutions that carry out a system-supportive propaganda function'" (Herman
and Chomsky 1988: 306 see in Curran 2002: 138). So, from the perspective of
the PrM the media are considered a powerful/actor which supports the existing
disposition of the power in society by reproducing or at least not challenging
the existing consent amongst the elites. This exact situation we can witness in
Russia, where even though the media possess a significant power over the
audience, which still expects from the media a guide to action rather than just
information, overall the media do not challenge the existing discourse of power.
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Furthermore, all other types of actors such as businesses, civil society or the
state are in some instances merged (such as in the case of the energy sector) or
one actor is much more powerful than the others (the state and the NGOs). In
this case the consensus amongst the so called 'elite' is very strong, whilst
dissent is negligible.
'Climate silence' and the state
The explanation behind the phenomenon of the media's reserved reporting of
climate change was unfolded throughout the previous chapters, which have
demonstrated the way Russian media operate and the correlation between
media coverage of climate change and state policy towards climate change.
Despite the recent modifications in the state's climate change policy, it is still a
low-priority issue. For example, at the end of the 1990s (around the time of the
Kyoto Conference), the Russian government was concerned more with the
economic crisis of 1997 and Yeltsin's relations with strong political actors at
the time - the oligarchs. The new chapter in Russia's political history and its
influence on media has been studied in detail beforehand, but in general,
Yeltsin's rule and the start of Putin's time were mostly characterised by an
orientation towards economic problems and Checbnya whilst all other issues
(including environmental problems) were postponed until 'better times'.
The same attitude could be witnessed amongst the general public. As the
deputy editor-in-chief of the 'Fund for Independent Radio', Elena Uporova
stated, 'we all know well that poverty goes along with the lack of interest in
environmental topics as well as the fact that the power elite does not give signs
that this [environment] is important' (presentation at the seminar 'Forest and
Climate', Chemal, 14August 2011). A similar view was expressed by an editor
of the newspaper 'Priroda Altaya' Sergey Malykhin: 'our country was going
through the long-term crisis of its political regime and it had to prioritise - in a
hungry country nobody cares about the environment' (interview, Chemal, 14
August 2011). So like the pieces of the same jigsaw picture, the public's, the
state's and the media's diminution or underestimation of the climate change
problem all contributed to the same outcome where the problem remains at the
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bottom of the hierarchy of needs and interests, and does not get closer to its
solution.
In order to break this pattern, this research project has tried to answer the
question: who is leading whom in ignoring climate change? During the
interviews, journalists often claimed that they do not write about climate
change because the audience is not interested in it. Rather it is very difficult to
make the problem look or sound relevant to people's everyday interests or
needs. and it is also difficult to give people a clear and straightforward answer
about what climate change is and what it means for them. Indeed this argument
is consistent with the findings which were made by researchers studying
problems of media coverage of climate change in various countries (see
chapter one). However, this does not explain why, if Russian journalists face
the same problems of public ignorance as their foreign colleagues, Russia is so
far behind in the amount of articles written on this topic compared with other
countries. American, British or Norwegian journalists facing the same
problems in their professional activity manage to write about climate change
up to ten times more often than their Russian colleagues. And why do Russian
journalists not use the climate change topic as an opportunity to question the
politicians' performance on the matter (which indeed is quite questionable), as
their foreign colleagues do? If this could be explained by the better economic
situation in other countries (since often Russian journalists and policy makers
state that environmental discourse will enter public space in Russia after key
economic problems are solved), what about such countries as Chile or El
Salvador? In this case the theoretical framework utilised for this research (the
PrM) becomes of great use.
As discussed in depth in chapter two, the PrM rejects the influence of the
audience on media coverage as a dominant factor, it also rejects the idea that
the topic itself might explain why journalists write about it in one way or
another. Rather, the PrM rather asks us to look for other macro 'filters' which
alter the media production process, such as who owns the media or provides its
financial stability, and as was suggested, according to the PrM in the Russian
case one of the main factors influencing media coverage might be the state's
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policy on climate change. As the energy efficiency project campaigner at
Greenpeace Russia, Igor Podgorny, stated:
[i]nterest appears when something happens at the state level. For
instance, when the Climate Doctrine was accepted, questions
arose. The same happened during the announcement of the action
plan for the Doctrine. We [Greenpeace] can clearly see now that
journalists started to follow the climate problem, even though their
interest is still very episodic (they only react on certain events) but
at least it is not only based on sensationalism' (interview, Moscow,
27 July 2011).
Prominent Russian scholar Oleg Yanitsky (2009: 759) also
concludes that in the third phase 90 of the environmental debates 'top
state officials together with top media managers decided who would
have access to the media.
The relative omission of the topic could also be explained by the state's
influence, or more precisely but the state success in taking this topic 'off
agenda' by exercising the 'less apparent face of power'. This thesis, introduced
by Bachrach and Baratz in 1962, points out that even though it is commonly
accepted that 'power is exercised when A participates in the making decision
that affect B', they also argue that 'power is exercised when A devotes his
energies to creating or reinforcing social and political values and institutional
practices that limit the scope of political process to public consideration' , or as
the authors further quote Schattschneider's famous remark: 'some issues are
organised into politics while others are organised out' (ibid: 949). Herman and
Chomsky also argue that 'bias in the media is evidenced not only in relation to
what is covered and how it is covered, but also in terms of what is omitted'
(Babe 2005: 216). Robert Babe refers to this in his study of the media coverage
of global warming in the Canadian newspapers where he confirms the
90 According to Yanitsky (2009), the third phase starts after 2000, whilst the
first and the second one occurred in the 1960s-1970s (when only restricted
amount of prominent scientists dominated the environmental discourse in
media) and the late 1980s-early 1990s, when any group could have raised the
issue (see more in chapter four).
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adequacy of the PrM which predicts that 'the daily press, financed by
advertisers and usually owned by multimedia organisation will downplay the
conflict between economic system and environment' (ibid: 187), which was
shown both by the biased coverage and the omission of certain aspects of the
problem. In the Russian case, 'the conflict between economic system and
environment' should be 'replaced' by the 'conflict between the state interests
and environment', then the conclusion of the omission of the 'inconvenient'
topics would be very similarly re-affirmed.
However, whilst in Bachrach and Baratz' vision of power, the state's role
in media coverage in Russia would suggest that state officials purposely
remove controversial issues from the agenda, Steven Lukes' (2005: 25) 'three
dimensional' extension of this power debate argues that power is exercised not
only when certain decisions were consciously made or were not made - 'the
bias of the system can be mobilized, recreated and reinforced in ways that are
neither consciously chosen nor the intended result of particular individuals'
choices'. Lukes suggests various ways in which potentially controversial issues
are 'kept out of politics, whether through the operation of social forces and
institutional practices or through individuals' decisions' (ibid: 28). For
instance, Lukes (2005: 144) refers to the Gramscian idea that '''submission and
intellectual subordination" could impede a subordinate class from following its
"own conception of the world"'. Lukes further continues 'Gramsci viewed civil
society in the West as the site where consent is engineered, ensuring the
cultural ascendancy of the ruling class and capitalism's stability'. InHeyward's
(2007) revision of Lukes' three-dimensional view of power, in the first two
approaches to power the 'agents can always identify and articulate their own
interests, the radical view [developed by Lukes] refused to take that for
granted. If the third dimension of power was successfully exercised, even a
slave might be content with his exploitation'. Lukes' arguments do not
contradict the PrM postulates, as has been repeated throughout this thesis, the
model states that in order for media to cover information in a certain way, the
elites do not have 'to decide' or 'not to decide' on something, but the system is
organised in a way that power does not have to be exercised and the 'agents'
(journalists) 'play' according to the rules willingly. As Chomsky (1998)
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argues:
[y]ou cannot be a good propagandist unless it's in your bones [... J
you don't even make it into those circles unless you're already so
deeply overwhelmed by doctrine and propaganda that you can't
even think in other terms. So when people talk like this, you'll read
liberal columnists in the New York Times very angrily saying,
'nobody tells me what to write. I write anything I feel like,' which
is absolutely true. If people with real power weren't sure that they
were going to say the right things, they wouldn't be in a position to
say anything they feel like (ibid: 187, see more on this in chapter
two and three).
In this respect ,it is useful, to refer to Lukes' explanation of the 'inactive
power':
'the features of agents that make them powerful include those that
render activity unnecessary. If I can achieve the appropriate
outcomes without having to act, because of the attitudes of others
towards me or because of a favourable alignment of social relations
and forces facilitating such outcomes, then my power is surely all
the greater' (Lukes 2005: 79).
Hence, in this situation the powerful elites do not have to control
every step of the journalists, they do not need to enforce sanctions,
threaten correspondents or dictate the news agenda. Rather the topics will
'naturally' enter or leave the public discourse such as happened with the
abandonment of the climate change issues in Russia, the topic was
removed from the agenda and still remains relatively unpopular due to
the elites (the state) and consequently the media being preoccupied with
other issues. Evidently, this dependence on the state's attention to the
problem makes climate change coverage extremely vulnerable, and as
discussed below the fears were raised that the recent modest burst of
activity in communicating climate risks will again disappear from the
agenda with change at the Russian executive level which might handicap
the state's climate policy.
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The role of personalities - will the situation get worse in Putin's third
term?
The application of the PrM (in particular its filter 'information sources') as
well as analysis of Russia's climate change policy has also allowed us to
conclude that in this case we witness the dominance of certain elite groups over
media coverage of climate change. Specifically, the significance of the role
played by Russia's main 'newsmakers' in the country - the state leaders - is
clearly demonstrated. Like many others, a journalist of RIA Novosti Olga
Dobrovidova, stated: •As soon as the president started to talk about it, everyone
started. Yes, I think the peak of media activity [media coverage of climate
change] does coincide with the position of the Kremlin' (interview, Moscow,
20 July 2011).
The specific characteristics of the Russian political system discussed
earlier in this dissertation confirmed that at the start of 'Putin's era' in 2000 the
system once again was modified with the rapidly strengthening powers of the
presidential post. After Putin' s second term it became apparent that it was not
about redistribution of powers towards a more presidential-focused type of
political regime, but towards Putin himself (see more in Hanson 2010). As
many have noticed after Medvedev's succession to the post in 2008, Putin still
maintained a significant amount of weight in Russian politics (arguably not
proportionate to his post as the Prime Minister at that time). With regards to
this problem Monaghan argues that 'Medvedev was more liberal and more
inclined to Russia's modernization, yet was the weaker figure and without a
political support base, whereas Putin was stronger, with a well-established
support base, and was more focused on maintaining the status quo' (2012: 2).
The renewed interest in environmental problems at the state level has
been associated with the start of the election campaign of the first Vice-Prime
Minister Dmitry Medvedev, when he included the issues of environmental
degradation and protection into his speeches (Bogdan et al. 2009). After
Medvedev become President, multiple signs of Russia's more active climate
policy followed (see chapter three). The influence of the personalities (heads of
state) over the existing discourse around climate change problems was also
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demonstrated through the media analysis conducted for this research, which
showed that the filter 'information source' was overall dominated by 'Russian
official sources,91 and in particular by two specific individuals - Putin and
Medvedev (see chapter four). So, one of the logical questions which arises
from the results is what will happen to climate change policy in general, and
particularly after the presidential elections of 2012 and the second swap of
offices between the two men, with Putin returning to the presidency (possibly
for another 12 years).
One of the fears which were voiced during this research was concerned
with Putin's 'special attitude' towards climate change issues (see chapter four),
which with his comeback might lead to an age of stagnation in climate change
policy, or the Russian media's loss of interest in the topic which has just started
to develop. Andonova (2008: 491) argues that seeing changes in climate policy
solely as a result of changes at the executive level of government would be 'an
oversimplification of political reality' . Chapter four demonstrated that
Medvedev's policy was not only moved by his striving for economic
modernisation, but by the ideas which will remain relevant for any Russian
leader. In order to test this hypothesis, the similar analysis (see more in chapter
four) was conducted which has included the study of official speeches and
statements after Putin resumed his Presidential position. Taking under
consideration the fact that he has been in the post for less than one year (at the
time of writing), this analysis suggests that in Putin's official discourse we can
witness the re-appearance of the same messages of 'pragmatic
environmentalism' rather than the previously evident ignoring of climate
change issues. However, it is acknowledged that a more extensive research
should be conducted towards the end of his term.
Overall, since May 2012 (the start of Putin's current term) and until April
2013, 13 texts with some references to climate change were identified. This
91The same results for the Copenhagen Conference were achieved by the
research of the network 'MediaClimate'. For the Russian case the analysis of
the 'principal groups of actors quoted' in the newspapers showered that the
category 'national political system' was twice as large as the next largest
category - 'science, expertise' (Yagodin 2010).
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figure on its own shows that the climate change topic has remained relevant to
the new administration. By comparison, during Medvedev's presidency there
were on average 18 texts in a year mentioning climate change, with peaks
coinciding with the Copenhagen Conference (there were 27 texts identified in
2009 and only five in 2011) and acceptance of major documents concerning
climate policy. However, unlike in Medvedev's case, during the first year of
Putin's third term there were no texts completely devoted to climate change or
that discussed it at length, rather, they mentioned climate change among other
items. Indeed, Putin's rhetoric on climate change differs to Medvedev's, whilst
Medvedev explicitly talked about Russia's position on climate issues, in
Putin's statements we can only observe brief references to the problem. At the
same time, it is also evident that the messages which Medvedev popularised in
his official discourse have remained relevant for the new administration.
Among the categories previously identified (Table 4.2), only two were
discovered in the texts of Putin's presidency (Table 6.1), however, they were
among Medvedev's most popular themes - 'global cooperation' and 'economic
benefits' .
Table 6.1 Percentage of speeches (Putin, 2012-2013) by identified categories
Cate20ry % Examples of quotations
Global 54 'Russia and Bangladesh negotiated to continue their co-
cooperation operation on the issues of global climate change'
'The international community is facing an urgent need
to find a way to effectively fight global challenges (such
as climate change)'
Economic 39 'We are convinced that economic development should
benefitsl not contradict the interests of environmental protection'
Green
'The "Nord Stream" will work fully automatically under
economy
constant supervision of the control centre, Without
intermediate compression stations, which will reduce
operating costs and reduce C02 emissions'
Hence, the economic benefits which follow from the policies of energy
efficiency stayed salient for the new Russian government. The messages of
sustainable development and the green economy repeatedly enter Presidential
statements. Interestingly, one of the statements during the first year of Putin's
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presidency (latest) also discussed the negative consequences of climate change
and in particular its effect on food security (however, as in the majority of the
texts no significant details are presented on this account). As the negative
influence of climate change is almost certain to grow over the coming decades,
this factor will force the government to abandon its policy of 'de-
environmentalism' and think of ways to diminish the negative consequences of
climate change.
Lastly, the majority of Medvedev and Putin's speeches mentioning
climate change discuss it within the context of global cooperation. As the
president of the NGO 'Centre of Russian Environmental Policy' Vladimir
Zakharov said:
'the change [swap between Medvedev and Putin] will playa
certain role, but I think, it is now impossible for Russia to tum back
in its climate policy (unless it drastically changes its political
regimes and closes up to the West again), we will keep integrating
into the world community. The pace might differ depending on
circumstances, but overall the forecast is optimistic; we will keep
paying more and more attention to environmental problems'
(interview, Moscow, 21 July 2011).
Igor Podgorny from Greenpeace Russia (interview, Moscow, 27 July
2011) admitted that he believes that the situation is currently at such a stage
that it cannot be ignored anymore. Furthermore as Podgorny states, it is
impossible for Russia to keep taking part in international negotiations (not
necessarily connected with the climate change topic) and to claim that the
problem still does not exist, 'considering that Russia is among the biggest
GHG emitters - the world community will not leave us alone' (ibid).
Correspondent John Harrison (radio 'Voice of Russia), said that he has not
noticed the 'climb down' of climate change issues after Putin's return (Skype
interview, 18 June 2012). Another influential figure in Russia's climate change
policy Alexey Kokorin from the WWF-Russia suggested the possibility of
'climate stagnation' in Russia and the decline of journalists' interest in the
topic (considering that Putin again will not be treating the problem as a serious
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one and reproducing jokes such as the one on 'fur coats'). At the same time he
repeats the ideas expressed by other interviewees that it should not affect
Russia's overall plan in reducing its GHG emissions, because this is connected
with its technological development (interview, Moscow, 27 July 2011).
Reasons for optimism about Russia's climate policy can be seen in such
'deeds' as Putin's preservation of the President's climate change advisor post,
the development of laws and initiatives on energy efficiency, and economic
modernisation as mentioned above, as well as the appointment (by Presidential
Decree 1311212012)of the Interagency Working Group on Climate Change and
Sustainable Development. Furthermore, on 23 March 2013, for the first time,
the Kremlin (the President's residence) and Red Square took part in the global
event: 'Earth Hour' (the main aim of which is to attract attention to the climate
change problem by switching electricity off for one hour). The official
announcement on the Presidential website stated that the decision of Vladimir
Putin to join this event 'is due to his traditional attention towards
environmental problems, such as the declaration by Presidential Decree, 1157
(11/08/2012) that 2013 is the year of environmental protection in Russia'
(President of Russia website 2013).
Can media coverage of climate change in Russia be changed?
Returning to the PrM's main postulate, media consent is led by agreement
among social, political and economic elites. In the Russian case of media
coverage of climate change it can be concluded that, yes, indeed in order for
the issue to become more evident it should fall into the area of interests of the
state. Then it should comply with the interests of the economic elites: the
financial organisations on which the media might depend (however, as
discussed, the interests of economic elites should not contradict the interests of
the state). As was mentioned on numerous occasions in Russia these elite
groups are extremely difficult to separate, or speaking more precisely, it is
difficult to see the economic interests without the government's influence over
them.
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Further on, after the media pass these 'barriers' and reckon that the
climate change topic is now in the interests of the 'main newsmakers' in the
country and it does not interfere with the major political and economic interests,
then the other factors start to have an influence. For example, difficulties
connected with understanding the scientific information, making information
more interesting and relevant for the audience, finding the legitimate
information sources (beside the official ones) and so on. Graphically these
processes could be pictured in the following way:
Figure 6.1 The three-stage model of media coverage of climate change in
Russia
The foundation of the pyramid has been explained on multiple occasions
throughout this dissertation, but a few extra words need to be said about the top
level. Though the collected data demonstrated the impact of the state's climate
policy and position on these issues, but in some cases it is not that
straightforward, for example, the number of articles mentioning climate change
related issues during the non-politicised event of the heat-wave in summer
2010 was still quite high and a certain amount of government critique was
presented on the pages of newspapers (for instance, with regards to the
bureaucratic obstacles on the way of the implementation of JI projects in
Russia). During the interviews quite often journalists stated that sometimes
they do not write about climate change because of various reasons such as the
complexity of the topic, the difficulty of making the topic sound relevant to
their audience, the desire to write about 'hot topics' rather than the prolonged
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process of climate change and overall the audience's lack of interest in or
ignorance of the climate change.
All of these issues are not considered by the system of the PrM filters,
which neglect such minor issues and concentrate only on the greater picture of
the economic and political discourse according to which mass media have to
adjust. However, in the latest edition of Manufacturing Consent, the authors
state:
J...] that the various parts of media organisations have some limited
autonomy, that individual and professional values influence media
work, that policy is imperfectly enforced, and that media policy
itself may allow some measure of dissent and reporting that calls
into question the accepted viewpoint. [...] The beauty of the system,
however, is that such dissent and inconvenient information are kept
within bounds and at the margins, so that while their presence
shows that the system is not monolithic, they are not large enough
to interfere unduly with the domination of the official agenda
(Herman and Chomsky 2002: xii).
The findings collected during the analysis of media coverage of climate
change in Russia show that certain disagreements and variations in reporting
on climate change can be witnessed. But overall they did stay within the
greater consensus, characterized by the extremely limited attention to the
problem among journalists and the absence of a sound critique of Russian state
climate change policy. Even though in the end in order to write about climate
change journalists do have to consider various micro-factors, as this research
project has shown it is very unlikely that the interest in the problem will be
maintained if it falls out of the powerful elites' area of interests.
The PrM suggests that media coverage of certain events might be altered
if the elites change their position on the problem, or if the elites fallout among
themselves, allowing various messages to enter the media space. In the Russian
case due to the significant dominance of the state over other actors that might
be involved in climate policy. disagreement is less likely to happen. On the
other hand, as was also demonstrated, climate policy not being the most
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important policy area for the state also has some benefits, for example, there is
much less understanding of how the topic should or should not be covered,
hence, there is less possibility of control or in the case of media activity, there
is less possibility of censorship.
As Herman and Chomsky originally stated (see chapter two), one of the
ideas behind the PrM is not only to expose the media production process, but
also for activists or anyone interested in the subject matter to be ~ble to see the
gaps and loopholes in the system so their messages could also be heard. Based
on the research conducted and the assumption that currently the idea of
developing a greater discussion of climate change issues coincides with the
state's more pro-active climate policy, several conclusions were reached on
what could be changed in order for Russia to bring the topic of climate change
to the same level with other topics of national interest. The first two
suggestions are concerned with the state and economic interests, and they were
addressed due to their superiority (as was demonstrated by the PrM), the other
two suggestions on the increasing role of the expert and activist communities
address the issues which concern the 'top' of the pyramid presented above.
That is to say they address the problem of how the debate on climate change in
Russia could become more sophisticated in the case where it does not
contradict the elites' interests.
A more defined and visible state position on climate change
Experts from the Russian Regional Environmental Centre state that one of the
main problems of Russia's climate change policy is the weak connection
between scientists, politicians and the public, as well as low media coverage of
climate change (Bogdan et al. 2009). In order to change the situation for the
better, first of all, cooperation between all members involved should be
established, however, due to the state's overriding influence, perhaps change in
this area is of greater importance.
Russian climate change policy has indeed become more active in recent
years. It is especially important that one of the most recent documents in this
area - the comprehensive plan for implementation of the Climate Doctrine
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(2011) - includes such action points as dissemination of knowledge on energy
conservation, energy efficiency and renewable energy as methods to solve the
problem of anthropogenic climate change. Another point of the plan prescribes
providing public access to information on climate change and its influence on
life' (the organisation responsible for the first action is the Ministry of
Economic Development; for the second, the Ministry of Natural Resources and
Environmental Protection). So the necessity of communicating the state's
policy on climate change to the media has been officially acknowledged and
the next step would be to establish and maintain the channels of
communication between the state organisations and the media outlets.
For instance, one of these channels became the post of the president's
advisor on the climate change issues, which fortunately was preserved after
Putin's return to office. The appointment to the post of a prominent scientist,
Alexander Bedritsky, strengthened the ties between the state and science and
resulted in a qualitative improvement of the President's speeches and remarks
on the subject matter, which in tum, improved communication with the media.
The next step could be the establishment of a special state department working
on this problem (for instance, as the Department of Energy and Climate
Change in the UK), which would develop the idea of recently created the
Interagency Working Group on Climate Change and Sustainable Development.
Of course, quite obviously, attention to the problem will rise significantly if
President Putin will become more proactive and explicit in his rhetoric on
climate change issues (at least in the way Medvedev did by clearly articulating
Russia's GHG emission reduction goals and attending international
conferences).
Another possible solution brings us back to the specific characteristics of
the Russian media system. As Yasen Zasurskiy (2004) states, the Russian
media system is one of the very few media systems in the world where the state
plays such a significant role. Perhaps, in the case of climate change another
way to solve the problem of media covering climate in a certain way (or not
covering it) is to look at it from different angles and take it to the level where
the coverage does not contradict the 'consent' amongst the elites. For instance,
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to talk about climate change on a personal level of how people can contribute
to the fight against climate change, or on the contrary bring it to the
international arena, and talk about climate change considering how it might
improve or damage Russia's image and international relations.
For instance. Russia has a unique position in being part of key
international organisations such as the G-8 (which includes highly developed
countries with vast interests in climate change negotiations), 92 but also
belonging to industrialising countries' organisations such as the BRIe (the
actors with an ambivalent stance on climate change mitigation policy) and,
finally. being one of the biggest energy exporters, it can relate with energy-rich
developing countries (which are mostly extremely sceptical or even hostile to
the negotiations on GHG reduction goals) (Bagirov and Safonov 2010). So, in
this sense Russia could be portrayed as an ambassador for the conflicting sides
involved in the climate negotiation process. This is basically what Russian
media has already been trying to do but in a very restricted way. Of course all
of these issues are also political and to some extent controversial. However,
hypothetically they allow media actors to present the topic in a less divisive
way where attention is removed from the state and the issues are discussed
from a personal point of view or in a way that is beneficial for Russia.
In conclusion. in order to popularise the climate change topic in Russia,
the media could not only focus on the powerful domestic actors but also at
other levels of analysis. For example. Yanitsky states that 'Russian society
today needs a strategic dialogue with Europe' (2009: 764), and he also sees this
as a way to bring the environmental debate in Russia to the next level: 'the
dialogue should be taking place on continental as well as regional and local
levels' .
Climate change as economic news
The next possible way to improve media coverage of climate change is
strongly connected with the previous one, since it once again involves the state,
92 For example, members of the EU with a strong pro-climate change
mitigation policy.
245
but this time from the perspective of its close ties with the country's economic
system. As Uporova (2012) states, 'editors-in-chief do not like social topics, if
nothing particularly interesting is happening in there. That is why you
(journalists] need to trick them - to present environmental information as, let's
say, an economic one' (seminar presentation, Chemal, 13 August 2012).
Moreover, many researchers argue that the common misperception among the
people in charge of the climate policy is that they treat the problem as purely
environmental and keep it separate from economic issues. They do not see the
dual direction of the climate mitigation programmes, which do not just allow
for solving the problem of climate change but also stimulate energy efficiency
programmes, development of renewable energy and so on (Bogdan et al. 2009).
This idea of Russia being able to gain a double benefit by following
climate change mitigating policy through economic growth and achieving
environmental development has been discussed in chapter four as well as how
this approach is becoming more pronounced in the statements of the state
officials picked up by the media (see chapter five). Perhaps, even more
reinforcement should be made in this direction, since it seems to be the least
controversial and contradicts the interests of neither the state and industry, nor
of the environmentalist and scientific communities. As the director of the
Centre of Environmental Policy, Vladimir Zakharov suggested, 'We need to
understand that for the next 20 years nobody will be able to operate their
economies without fossil fuels, so nothing threatens Russia's economic interest
and Russia will keep fulfilling its mission of providing these services. Now we
need to start thinking how we can provide environmental services and get
investments in the "greening" of our economy' (interview, Moscow, 21 July
2011). In this case the exploitation of the idea of Russia being a 'Great
Ecological Power' or an 'environmental donor' (see chapter four) could be
especially beneficial. Such as since the state policy in improving energy
efficiency would tremendously contribute to the state's and world's carbon
emission reduction goals, in this sense, Russia would really lead the way in
climate mitigation policy (rather than keep referring to its involuntarily
emissions' drop).
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The NGO activist, Yulia Yevtushok of Oxfam-Russia, shared her
experience of changing the approach to the problem of climate change:
Through our [unfortunate) experience in working on climate
change problems in Russia we realised that we should not be so
direct with this topic since it does not work. So, now we are
working through the problem of food security and we already can
see that it is much easier to get to people [including journalists)
through this topic, which is also affected by climate change, but is
more tangible (interview, Moscow, 22 July 2011).
So, food security would be another economic and social topic which is
also connected with climate change, but, perhaps, easier for the media and
general public to comprehend and relate to. Finally, another potential economic
side of the climate change problem which also would be relatively easily
popularised by mass media is carbon trading, for which Russia has great
capacity, especially, if it follows a policy of energy efficiency and development
of the renewable energy sources as discussed earlier. 'Being realistic, I should
admit that as soon as carbon trading starts developing in Russia, journalists will
follow the money. For instance, look at the experience of the serious federal
newspaper Kommersant: they usually write about climate change in terms of
some economic problems. I think most of the media outlets can adopt the same
strategy', - Dobrovidova, correspondent at the RIA Novosti (interview, Moscow,
20 July 2011). However, Russia's exit from the Kyoto-2 makes the fate of
carbon trading in the country unclear (though there is some possibility of
developing the national carbon trading market).
In summary, the economic 'card' could arguably be the strongest one in
attracting more attention from the Russian media to climate change. As
Zakharov stated 'now that economic growth is working on us [Russia), the
richer we will get the more attention will be diverted to environmental
problems' (interview, Moscow, 21 July 2011). Also, if the topic is approached
from the position of potential benefits or elimination of losses, then it will not
contradict the wishes of either the state or business elites.
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Publicising Russian science
Until a few years ago the Russian scientific community was creating additional
barriers in the way of popularising the climate change mitigation policy.
Mandrillon characterises their performance during the Kyoto ratification
process as follows: 'scientists have not only failed to issue any warnings but,
when their opinion has officially been sought, they have expressed opposition
to the Kyoto Protocol' (2008: 143). On the other hand, one of the reasons
behind the positive change (in a quantitative and qualitative sense) 93 of
coverage of climate change issues in Russia is attributable to the shift in the
role scientists played in addressing this problem. This shift was signified by the
appointment of the climate change advisor to the President in 2009, or by
Russian scientists' contributions to the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report on
Climate Change in 2007, which included the most up-to-date information on
climate change and its consequences in Russia (Bogdan et al. 2009).
Furthermore, climatologists have become more proactive in
communicating their knowledge on the subject and making it more accessible
for the wider public including journalists. A successful example of scientists'
attempts to share their information on climate change is the launch in April
2009 of a monthly electronic newsletter 'Izmenenie Klimata' ('Climate
Change') by Roshydromet. According to the editor of 'Izmenenie Klimata', Dr.
Pavel Vargin (email communication, April 2013), the idea to create the
newsletter 'was in the air' for a while - 'to improve the communication of
climate change risks is an acute problem for all countries including Russia.'
Vargin notices that 'often you can see in the mass media pseudo-scientific
discussion about climate, hence, we try to publish opinion and comments of the
most prominent scientists in the area of climate change from Roshydromet,
Russian Academy of Science and so on'. As the founders of the newsletter
state, its main purpose is to communicate complicated messages about climate
93 Once again it should be noted that the positive qualitative and quantitative
trend in media coverage of climate change is not understood in the sense that
the media should start to publish more articles in favour of taking action
toward climate change but maintain its rudimentary level of analysis. Instead
the positive change is the one signified by the more sophisticated and
knowledgeable understanding of the problem.
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change to the broader public and raise general awareness and understanding of
the problem. Anyone, whether a journalist or an ordinary person interested in
climate change affairs, can subscribe to it for free. Currently the newsletter has
435 subscribers, including various academic organisations, NGOs,
international organisations, foreign diplomatic missions in Russia, and
(particularly important for this research) the Russian central and regional mass
media (Roshydromet 2012). During the fieldwork for this project several
respondents (journalists and representatives of NGOs) noted that this
newsletter had been of great use to them, and that they would like to see more
initiatives like that coming from the scientific community.
Despite the increase in such positive practices by scientists, another
obstacle to improving the media coverage of climate change needs to be
addressed. As was discussed in chapter four for a long time Russian science
was dominated by climate change sceptics. However, after the change
happened the voices actively supporting recognition of the anthropogenic
character of climate change and the necessity of its urgent mitigation became
more evident and in some cases even went to the other extreme. For example, a
journalist of the newspaper Svobodnyy KUTS, Tamara Dmitrienko, said 'I was at
one seminar where a host was constantly referring to AI Gore's movie [An
Inconvenient Truth]. He was convincing us of one point of view, which I did
not like. 1 think they should not adjust facts but present various arguments'
(interview, Barnaul, 13 August 2011).
A climate change reporter for the Russian news and information agency
RIA Novosti noted that journalists try to give an opportunity for sceptics to
share their point of view in order to write a more balanced (objective) article
(Olga Dobrovidova, interview, Moscow 20 July 2011). The problem of
journalists' desire to cover climate change in a balanced manner and to what
consequences it leads has been widely discussed in the literature (see chapter
one). In the Russian case this problem should be addressed in a more cautious
way due to the state's history of climate scepticism and also with the state
history of the very open propaganda of the Soviet time, in which case the
presentation of one point of view might lead to its total rejection. Hence this
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problem could be solved through the improvement of journalists' ability to
evaluate scientific controversies.
In conclusion, the importance of the role of experts in this topic cannot
be underestimated, and it was stressed on many occasions by journalists
themselves. For example, the editor of the newspaper 'Priroda Altaya' Sergey
Malykhin said that in order to write about climate change, journalists do not
have to become experts themselves, but they just need to have a reasonably
good understanding of the issues, know the main trends and the expert
community' (interview, Chemal, 14August 2011).
Environmental NGOs as spokespeople for climate change
Environmental NGOs became one of the best sources of information during the
field work conducted for this research project. Due to the specifications of their
work they had a vast knowledge on the various aspects of Russia's climate
change policy, such as the position of the state, business, science and of course
their experience of working with journalists. As the experts of the Russian
Regional Environmental Centre confirmed, NGOs play a great role in
educating people and disseminating information. Furthermore, NGOs see
themselves as at the centre of interactions between various actors of the climate
change policy, 'as a unique keeper of climate information in Russia' (Bogdan
et al. 2009). However, as media analysis (chapter five) demonstrated even
though NGOs are the third popular source of information for journalists writing
on climate change, they lag quite far behind and overall they are mostly
dominated by two influential NGOs: WWF-Russia and Greenpeace Russia.
Nevertheless, environmental NGOs indeed serve as a 'unique' source of
information on climate change, or at least on how to find this information.
Quite often members of NGOs themselves become, or already were, academics
or they integrate the scientific community in their work or collaborate together
on the problem.
Oleg Yanitsky (2009), drawing on 20 years of research on environmental
movements in Russia, classifies scientists involved with the work of the NGOs
into five categories: neutral, aware, involved, partner and fully integrated. In
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sum, 'neutral' scientists only provide some expertise for certain projects. The
scientists who fall into the 'aware' category in addition to sharing their
knowledge on the subject also get concerned with the problem. The type
'involved' is relevant to scientists who remain affiliated with their academic
institution but also share the NGO's ideas and even take part in their actions.
The fourth type, 'partner', brings collaboration between the scientist and the
NGO to the next level and in this case scientists are officially affiliated with
academic institutions but also with the NGO. The final type, 'fully integrated',
characterises scientists who no longer work in academia but are fully employed
bytheNGO.
There is no data on how many scientists are involved with the NGOs
working on climate change issues in Russia, and at what level. For instance,
Podgomy from Greenpeace Russia shared the 'experience of initiating a
Greenpeace project on climate change together with scientists, but they
struggled to find scientists who will cooperate. The problem was that when
scientists find out that they will have to work with Greenpeace, they were very
cautious. As Podgomy said 'they just did not knowmuch about us and thought
we only throw paint at fur coats' (interview, Moscow, 27 July 2011). It seems
that in the interest of promoting the topic in the media, collaboration between
these two groups [scientists and activists] needs to be at least at the third level
of Yanitsky's classification. In this case it could be suggested that science and
the NGOs might become one unified and consequently stronger voice in their
communication with the media and will illuminate possible problems. There is
the possibility of another problem arising - the merger between the scientific
and activist communities might compromise the objectivity of the scientific
information.
Another problem which at the moment stops the NGOs from being a
stronger voice in the climate change discourse is their ambiguous relations with
the state. On the one hand, activists themselves share their negative
experiences of trying to communicate with state officials involved in climate
change policy (even if it is just to get access to the Russian official delegation
at the international conferences on climate change) (various interviews, 2011).
On the other, state officials acknowledge the existing problems, such as during
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Medvedev's speech at the conference 'Rio+20'. The former president stated:
'there are around 80 environmental NGOs in Russia [... ] but of course it is not
easy to work with them: environmental organisations are difficult partners, but
because of this the state needs to support them' (Medvedev 2012).
Perhaps the NGOs are considered 'difficult' because they are one of the
few groups of Russia's civil society who constantly question and try to
scrutinise the government's performance. As an example, Medvedev's speech
at the 'Rio+20' and overall Russian performance at the conference'" were
described by the NGO 'Ekologicheskaya Vakhta po Severnomu Kavkazu'
(Environmental Watch in the North Caucasus) (2012) as a total failure. On
their website the NGO's activists published an article under the title 'At the
Summit "Rio+20" Russia became one of the countries unable to make
environmentally responsible decisions.' In the subheading they go even further
by directly insulting the newly appointed Prime Minister: 'Dmitry Medvedev
lied to the international community about Russia's successes in the sustainable
development sector.'
Unfortunately, sometimes the NGOs themselves act as a barrier in
disseminating knowledge on climate change by being resistant to
communicating with journalists - 'I often fight or argue with our journalists,
because .they often call when some disaster happens and ask us what does it
mean and what to do, in this case I re-direct them to the Ministry for
Emergencies and Elimination of Consequences of Natural Disasters, because
with us [environmentalists] they should talk about how to prevent these
disasters, not what to do when they have already happened' (Anonymous
source, interview, Moscow, July 2011). The frustration of this environmental
activist can be understood, since it seems rather useless in some cases to talk
94 At the UN conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20) which took
place from 20 June 2012 until 22 June 2012 in Rio de Janeiro (Brazil) (RIA
Novosti 20l2b), Dmitry Medvedev acknowledged once again the necessity to
develop sustainable economic models which will allow for neutralising the
environmental threat. He also reported that Russia is successful with its
commitments to the Kyoto Protocol and that GHG emissions will be reduced
by 25 percent by 2020 (of the level of 1990) and that Russia expects the same
from other countries and will participate in a global agreement only if all
countries will take part in it (Medvedev 2012).
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about a disaster which has already happened and when there is nothing that can
be done by the NGO to fight its outcomes, whilst at the same time the NGO's
messages of warning are ignored by mass media. It could also be seen as a
wasted opportunity to attract and maintain journalists' interest in the subject,
especially, if the topic is connected with global climate change (a prolonged
process) which is characterised by the numerous natural disasters and which
requires constant attention.
In conclusion, the NGOs indeed have great potential for popularising the
problem of climate change in Russia and they have already been doing so for
many years in the forms of special conferences, events, seminars, trips to
places where consequences of climate change can be observed and so on.
However, there are still multiple problems which to some extent could be
solved through enhancing communication links between the NGOs and other
actors involved in the process of disseminating information on climate
change."
Concluding remarks
The application of the PrM to the Russian case of media coverage of climate
change has demonstrated the theoretical validity of this approach. Russian
journalists write about climate change not because they were commanded to do
so, but because the environment in which they operate everyday is constructed
in a way that the 'manufacturing of consent' happens 'naturally'.
The main difference which was observed between the original analysis of
the US case study and the analysis of Russian climate change coverage is the
different position of the state. In the US case both economic and state elites
were a vital part of the context created. However, the hierarchy between these
95 For an extensive study on the environmental NGOs in Russia consult Laura
Henry (201Ob) Red to Green: environmental activism in post-Soviet Russia and
David Feldman and Ivan Blokov (2012) The Politics of Environmental Policy
in Russia, which outline, on the basis of extensive empirical evidence, the
major problems environmental NGOs face in their work and also how they
cope with them and adjust to the existing political, economic and social
environment.
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two groups was not determined. In the Russian case, the state is clearly at the
top of the hierarchical ladder. The state dominates media discourse and plays a
significant role in elite consensus. Hence even though modern mass media in
Russia need to operate according to the logic of the free market, before the
economic factors 'take off and start to take part in shaping media messages,
the information passes through state elite consensus. This is evident in the case
of climate change when the state slightly changed its stance on the problem and
fmally publicly acknowledged. the anthropogenic character of climate change
and Russia's commitments to GHG emissions reduction goals, the climate
change topic has entered the media discourse with the overarching message of
Russia's leading position in the international negotiation process and a 'win-
win' situation for the state.
With regards to the specific PrM filters, it has been concluded that in the
case of media coverage of climate change in Russia, not all filters are equally
useful in explaining the particularities of the media activity. For example,
newspapers with different ownership structures, advertising policies and
political stances did not show significant differences in their approach to the
problem. However, with the analysis of the 'sourcing' filter it became quite
clear that the coverage follows the agenda of the information sources used in
the articles which are, in turn, dominated by official Russian sources. Another
specification of the studied case which led to the modification of the PrM, is
that the climate change topic in Russia has not reached the same level of
controversy and popularity as in other countries, hence, the 'powerful elites' do
not invest much effort or time in controlling or adjusting coverage.
Besides the biased coverage of climate change in Russian newspapers
and the absence of any critique of the elites' position on the problem, the PrM
has allowed us to see the clear omission of the topic from media discourse.
'Climate silence' was demonstrated by the small number of articles published
on the subject, through the interviews with people involved in these processes
and by the data presented in public opinion polls. It has been argued that the
topic was involuntarily removed from the public discourse since it did not fall
into the sphere of elites' interests, hence we can talk about the 'third dimension
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of power' which does not refer to the 'decision making' or 'non-decision
making' processes but rather describes the situation where the social system is
organised in a way that the interests of the powerful elites are met effortlessly.
The specifications of the climate change topic itself have also influenced
the applicability of the PrM. It was argued that after media information passes
the greater barriers created by the state and economic elites, further on the
micro-factors start to be important. Journalists still have to find a way to access
complicated information, to understand the various arguments on the subject,
to make it appealing for the audience and to be able to maintain the audience's
interest in the prolonged problem of global environmental change,
Finally, Herman and Chomsky (1998) believed that the media system
which is restricted and twisted in many ways by the elites is still capable of
some change and dissent and the interested parties, such as grassroots
movements or other members of civil society, are capable of finding the
loopholes in the system and affecting it. In the case of media coverage of
climate change in Russia these possibilities can be presented in the following
ways: since open critique of the government is risky and undesirable, the
discussion could be brought down to the local level or raised to the
international level; the economic benefits of climate change mitigation policies
could be popularised; and the scientific and activist community need to become
more vocal and find ways of cooperating with each other and other interested
parties. Most of these practices have already been taking place for a couple of
years, however, in order for Russia to bring the discussion of climate change to
the next level, they need to be developed further.
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CONCLUSION
For almost 70 years in Russia political, economic and social life was
determined by the communist nature of the state, where a centrally planned
economy was managed by a one-party government whilst the mass media and
other social institutions served the interests of the ruling elite by defending and
propagandising the ideals of communist society. While the methods of building
and sustaining this political regime were openly criticised by the West and
sometimes silently questioned by Russian citizens, in general hardly anyone
would be surprised to find out that Pravda would not publish journalists'
investigations on issues such as the CPSU's budget policy or that Western
Europe provided better welfare than the USSR.
After the split of the Soviet Union, it was expected that with the fall of
the old regime Russia would move to become a liberal democratic state,
however, ~stead of this the state fell into a 'grey area'. Russia is qualified as a
democracy, but as one with a 'managed' or 'illiberal' nature. It is a capitalist
state but the scale of state interference and the level of corruption often
intercept the invisible hand of the market. The protection of human rights is not
always ensured due to the faults in the state's legal system. Finally, the long
awaited freedom of speech, which at the birth of the new state was recorded in
the Russian Constitution, is questioned on a regular basis especially as a result
of the murder of prominent journalists, the threatening of their lives, forceful
closure of media outlets and financial sanctions towards the 'Fourth Estate'. In
the modem Russia mass media have also become participants of the free
market economy and have to adjust to market mechanisms. However, it is not
always clear when the media is guided by external actors and is being censored
or suppressed, or when it is just following the logic of the free market and
fitting within the new capitalist society. In order to understand the ways the
Russian media operate it has been suggested that the PrM developed by
Herman and Chomsky in 1988 should be applied.
The PrM belongs to the political economy of communication studies and
recommends analysing media systems within the broader politico-societal
context within which they exist. Throughout their case studies Herman and
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Chomsky debunked the myth of the liberal nature of the American mass media
and the 'watchdog' role in the democratic society and proved the legitimacy of
their model. Despite their empirical testimonies for many years Herman and
Chomsky's study was contested or neglected by the broader academic
community. Amongst the reasons for critique, some scholars shared a concern
about whether the PrM can be applied in different geographical and political
contexts and whether its postulates will be re-affirmed if a different subject of
the media coverage will be analysed. In this sense, studying the Russian media
system through the filters of the PrM and analysing the media coverage of
climate change in Russian newspapers allows us to test the theoretical validity
ofthePrM.
According to Herman and Chomsky, the main argument of the PrM
states that media 'consent' is manufactured by the elites through the
implication of a straightforward system of five filters which embrace major
factors influencing the media production process. The filters look at the media
ownership structure, the influence of the advertising market, their dependence
on information sources, who react to the media messages and in what way
('flak'), and how the dominant ideology of the state constrains media activity.
The application of the PrM to the Russian case broadened the theoretical
debate on the controversial study of Herman and Chomsky. In tum the PrM has
allowed for the identification of the main actors and factors influencing climate
change coverage in Russia and provided a new tool for the analysis of the
communication of environmental risks in the post-Communist society.
Climate change is one of the biggest and the most ambiguous challenges
for the world, bringing together science, politics, economics and people who
are directly influenced by its consequences. In Russia the climate change topic
becomes even more complicated since according to the most recent data the
country is extremely vulnerable to the effects of climate change, but also it
finds itself amongst the largest GHG emitters in the world which occasionally
has made it one of the key figures during the international negotiation process
(for instance in the Kyoto Protocol). Russia 'earned' its high status of being
one of the biggest contributors to climate change due to the fact that its
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economy heavily relies on the extraction and export of fossil fuels and in
general the Russian economy is extremely carbon intensive (due to climate
conditions and the obsolescence of its infrastructure). To make the case even
worse the Russian energy industry is closely connected with the state to the
extent that it becomes virtually impossible to separate the state from business
interests where climate policy is concerned.
Furthermore, Russia inherited the 'Soviet legacy' of neglecting
environmental problems and sacrificing the environment to economic
development. In the late 1980s and early 1990s for a short period of time
environmental issues moved up on the SovietlRussian agenda, however, after
two decades of major political transformation which included economic decay
and social destabilisation they were pushed down again. For a long time (and
still to this day) economic development became the priority, placing all other
problems and especially environmental ones, to the background, leading to the
policy of 'de-environmentalism'. All of these factors are important because as
the PrM argues media coverage is directed by the consensus achieved amongst
the political and economic elites of the country. To predict the direction of
media coverage of climate change in Russia, we need to know the priorities of
the main actors involved in the climate policy.
The application of the PrM filters to the Russian case has demonstrated
that the Russian media production process is heavily influenced by external
actors. The state and big industries (with close connections to the state) own
major media outlets in Russia, they dominate the advertising market, Russian
journalists often rely on official sources in their pursuit of information, the
state often becomes the monopolist in the production of 'flak' or negative
reaction to media messages and, fmally, as already mentioned the regime or
dominant ideology of Russia is classified as an 'illiberal' democracy where
powers often get abused. In this sense it can be argued that the PrM is very
much suited to explain media production processes in Russia and why they get
influenced and even managed by the consensus among elite groups. However,
the analysis of media coverage of climate change in Russia has demonstrated
that in this particular case, the situation is not that drastic. Journalists are not
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killed for writing about GHG emissions, newspapers do not have quotas on
how many articles they should produce on climate change and Russia's climate
policy is not classified information. Furthermore, the coverage is not
significantly altered depending on differences in newspapers' ownership
structures or advertising policies. At the same time we can see how the media
follow the state's position on climate change policy - this is particularly
obvious when considering the analysis of the 'sources of information' filter
which has been dominated by official Russian sources (especially after the
change in state policy towards becoming more pro-active in climate change
mitigation).
The correlation between the state's climate policy and journalists'
interests towards the topic was also re-affirmed during the interviews with
experts working in the media or with the media. Indeed, until a few years ago
the problems were not on the agenda of the Russian government and were
addressed only at international negotiations in order to receive some benefits
from external actors, whilst at the domestic level climate change was often
ridiculed and its anthropogenic character was not accepted. At the same time
media coverage and media interest towards climate change issues were
practically non-existent. It has been argued that the state has succeeded in
removing the issue from the agenda, or in other words, it has successfully
exercised its 'third dimension of power' .Thus, it did not force journalists to
write or not to write about the problem, but since the state acts as a 'main
newsmaker' on the topic and due to its reluctant attitude towards climate
change, this issue did not even enter public discourse.
A few years ago (around the time of the Copenhagen Conference in
2009), attention to the problem had risen on both sides - the state and the
media. The most important change was the official acknowledgement of
climate change and its anthropogenic origins and the announcement of Russia's
commitments to GHG emissions reduction goals. Arguably, these changes in
the state policy were motivated by the realisation of the economic benefits of
following a low emission policy. RUSSiahas a great capacity to cut its carbon
contribution to climate change and at the same time keep developing and
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modernising its economy. This approach has been described as 'climate
pragmatism', where the environment is still assessed from an economic point
of view, however, this time it leads to a pro-environment oriented economy. In
the media the change was signified by an increase in coverage on climate
change and the appearance of journalists specialising on the topic. Which once
again brings us to the authors of the PrM, who on multiple occasions stated that
the system they described was not a totalitarian one and the PrM does not
suggest that the media are openly managed by the ruling elite, but rather the
'manufacturing of consent' happens unintentionally. Journalists willingly
follow the rules of the game, or in our case they follow the lead of their most
important 'source of information' without any specific orders from the top:
'journalists are not paid by somebody to report climate change news in the way
they do (that climate change is made by space aliens or we are all doomed), but
they do it because they write what they are interested in [or because it sells]. It
is not a political order. And to be honest if something indeed was "ordered", it
would be impossible to prove it (as happened in the case of Andrey
Illanonov'")' (Kokorin, interview, Moscow, 27 July 2011).
Indeed the PrM does not assume some kind of conspiracy, but rather
helps to reveal how the major forces influencing the media work. Other factors
do play their role, but predominantly they are overshadowed by 'elite consent' .
Coming from this proposition, it was suggested that in the particular case of
climate change coverage in Russia the state elites serve as the initial barrier or
even motivators or de-motivators of the journalists' interest in the topic.
Further on, economic factors play a part in shaping media discourse on the
subject (journalists still need to consider how to sell their newspapers and also
not to create unnecessary conflicts with their owners or advertisers (even
though these factors matter to a lesser degree than state elites' interest in the
topic». If the topic falls in the sphere of interests of these elite groups then the
micro-factors start to play their part and journalists begin to think about how
96 lllarionov is famous for promoting his climate sceptic position and for years
he actively lobbied against the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, some argued
that his point of view was paid for by Western Hydrocarbon companies (see
more in chapter four).
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they have to deal with the problem. Hence, the changes described in the media
coverage of climate change in Russia should not be simplified to the
straightforward relations between the state and the media outlets. The
journalists did mention that climate change as a topic dictates its own rules - it
requires specialised knowledge, it has low appeal to the public as being a
prolonged and intangible process, it takes extra time to find the right
information sources and so on.
Overall, this research project has demonstrated the theoretical
applicability of the PrM in the Russian case of media coverage of climate
change issues. It has helped us to understand and explain the ways 'consent is
manufactured' among Russian media on the subject of climate change. The
limitations of the model were also re-discovered. For example, some filters of
the PrM were not as powerful or did not show their influence (for instance, the
ownership structure and advertising filters). The filters 'dominant ideology'
and 'flak', though were useful to some extent, but their effects could be
interpreted in different ways. In the case of 'ideology', it is unclear and quite
debatable as to what ideology in Russia we are talking about and what impact it
has. With regard to 'flak', journalists did not confirm that they face any kind of
censorship when they write about climate change, however, they did admit that
there is some degree of 'self-censorship' they are exposed to when working on
any kind of issue. At the same time, the filter 'sourcing' was extremely useful
and allowed us to confirm the important role of the state in media coverage. It
can be argued that for future studies on media coverage (in perhaps any
country), theoretical approaches such as the PrM (which belongs to the study
of the political economy of mass media) are useful, since they allow us to
identify the main political and economic factors involved in the controversies
surrounding climate communication processes, but on the other hand, as
Herman and Chomsky mentioned themselves, the model does have to be
adjusted according to each particular case study.
In conclusion, the Russian media system still is in a state of great
dependency on the government and often has to play by its rules, adjust its
content or to pay the price. In the case of climate change, the media are not
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'ordered' to write about environmental change, but rather they just follow the
interests of the 'main newsmaker'. Naturally, this seems to be a negative
situation, where the media do not question state performance (such as its
extremely weak domestic policy on climate change) but rather re-state the
elites' vision of the problem that Russia has great potential to become an
environmental donor and, as Medvedev claimed before the Copenhagen
Conference, 'we will win, no matter what'. As previous studies on media and
climate change have shown, sometimes unrestrained media coverage of climate
change can be counterproductive. There is the possibility of the abuse of
alarmist messages, controversy, and tendency to cover the problem in a
supposed-balanced way by providing too much space to climate sceptics and so
on (even though they are very much a minority in the scientific community).
The Russian case demonstrates that following a single actor is likely to result
in greater orthodoxy, the coverage becomes more coherent, but does it make it
more adequate? As Bakhnov (interview. Moscow, 22 July 2011) put it: 'our
main official TV channel reproduces the state's messages, which is not always
bad. Many of Medvedev and Putin's decisions are good, they also understand
that Russia needs to develop. But, in my opinion, they should sometimes step
aside.' Naturally this tendency of the media following the state's lead on
climate issues is somewhat dangerous since if the state policy will again
become even more reluctant then the topic will disappear from the agenda as
well.
Climate change is a problem which will not be solved in a few years'
time and we will eventually understand this fact more clearly, as will the
Russian government. Regardless of whether the Russian state will try to
modernise its economy and attract more investments by making it more
sustainable, positioning itself as an 'environmental leader' due to its vast
reserves of natural resources and potential for carbon sinking (through its forest)
or trying to reduce economic loss from the consequences of climate change due
to its great vulnerability, there is an extremely small chance that the topic will
disappear from its agenda and therefore from media discourse. Hence, it is up
to civil society and the journalists themselves to find the loopholes in the
system in order to diversify and improve climate change coverage.
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